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I. ADMINISTRATION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
A. Jurisdiction
In a speech given in the fall of 1978 at the Twenty-Fifth Annual
Institute on Labor Law, John Fanning, Chairman of the National La-
bor Relations Board (the Board or NLRB), stated that the most signifi-
cant development in his twenty years on the Board had been the
expansion of the Board's jurisdiction.' It was Mr. Fanning's belief that
this trend would continue as existing jurisdictional limitations contin-
1. Fanning, Jurisdiction in the 1970s: The Impact of Comell, in THE SOUTHWESTERN
LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1979, 169, 171 (1979).
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ued to meet with growing disfavor.' The manner in which the Ninth
Circuit has dealt with jurisdictional questions arising under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (Act or NLRA)3 reflects a tacit approval of
Mr. Fanning's comments.
1. Statutory jurisdiction and definitions
The general jurisdiction of the Board encompasses "labor dis-
putes,"4 a term which includes employee representation and unfair la-
bor practices that affect interstate commerce.' Despite this wide-
ranging authority, the Board on occasion will decline to hear certain
cases whenever "the policies of the Act would not be effectuated by its
assertion of jurisdiction."
6
Section 2 of the Act defines the term "employee" to include "any
employee" while specifically exempting "any individual employed as
an agricultural laborer,. . . or any individual having the status of an
independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor."7
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,' the Supreme Court recognized
the broad statutory language in the Act's definition of "employee" and
determined that, in doubtful situations, underlying economic facts must
be examined when the term is interpreted and applied.' The Court also
noted that "the Board's determination that specified employees are
'employees'... is to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a
2. Id.
3. The NLRA is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976) as subchapter II of the Labor
Management Relations Act.
4. A "labor dispute" is defined by the Act to include "any controversy concerning
terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or con-
ditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee." Id. § 152(9).
The Ninth Circuit recently noted that courts rarely find "concerted union activity to fall
outside this broad definition." Hasbrouck v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 232, 586 F.2d 691,
694 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978). Cf. NLRB v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992,
995 (4th Cir. 1964) (refusal by ILA to service ships trading with Cuba held a political activ-
ity not intended to affect the terms or conditions of employment and thus not a labor dis-
pute). But see NLRB v. Twin City Carpenters Dist. Council, 422 F.2d 309, 312-13 (8th Cir.
1970); National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 411, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1965); National
Maritime Union v. NLRB, 342 F.2d 538, 542-43 (2d Cir. 1965).
5. See, e.g., NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963); Polish Nat'l
Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1937).
6. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
8. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
9. Id. at 129.
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reasonable basis in law."' 0
In NLRB v. Design Sciences," the Ninth Circuit addressed the
question of whether workers, who did approximately eighty percent of
their work on farms, were "employees," and thus subject to the protec-
tions of the Act, or agricultural laborers and therefore exempt from the
Board's jurisdiction. The employer designed grading and drainage sys-
tems on a contract basis for agricultural irrigation operations. Recog-
nizing that this was a close question and that the Board might have
reached a different conclusion, the court upheld the Board's finding
that the workers were "employees" within the definition of the Act.'
2
Independent contractors are also specifically excluded from the
Act's definition of "employees". In NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of
America,'3 the Supreme Court upheld the Board's determination that
debit agents who collected premiums from policy holders, prevented
lapsing of policies, and occasionally sold new insurance were employ-
ees and not independent contractors. The Court noted that the Act was
amended in 1947 to add the independent contractor exclusion and
stated that the amendment's obvious purpose was to "apply general
agency principles in distinguishing between employees and independ-
ent contractors."' 4 Because the debit agents did not have decision-
making authority and initiative, characteristics commonly attributable
to independent contractors, they were found to be employees under the
Act.
1 5
The Ninth Circuit also applied general agency principles in Associ-
ated General Contractors v. NLRB16 in reversing the Board's determi-
nation that owner-operators of dump trucks were employees. The
court emphasized the importance of the right-to-control test under gen-
eral agency law. Acknowledging that the determination of who has the
right to control and direct is the foremost factor, the court also noted
that this determination must be made by examining the relationship in
its entirety.'" The court recognized the distinctions drawn by the Board
between the right to control the manner and means of doing the work
10. Id. at 131.
11. 573 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
12. Id. at 1105.
13. 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
14. Id. at 256.
15. Id. at 258.
16. 564 F.2d 271 (9th Cir. 1977).
17. Id. at 279.
[Vol. 13
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and the right to control only the result of the work'" but reversed the
Board because its finding was not based on an examination of the "to-
tal factual context."' 19
This question arose again in Merchant's Home Delivery Service,
Inc. v. NLRB2 ° in which the court found delivery drivers to be in-
dependent contractors under the Act. The court recognized that the
Truckman's Agreement signed by each owner-operator was a guaran-
tee of their right to control the "method, means, and manner of per-
formance,"'2 ' and therefore held that this agreement, coupled with the
flexible hours the drivers worked, the entrepreneurial characteristics of
the job, and the fact that most of the owner-operators were established
corporations or partnerships supported the determination that the
workers were independent contractors. The court stated that the ad-
ministrative law judge (ALJ)2 2 and the Board had erred by giving too
much weight to the employer's right to exercise "an ex post facto right
to reprimand when the end result is unsatisfactory."
23
The Act also specifically excludes supervisors from its definition of
employee; unlike agricultural laborers and independent contractors,
however, "supervisor" is expressly defined.24 The determination of
18. While both the Board and the court recognized the distinction, the court thought
that the Board had improperly applied it to the facts. Id. at 280-81.
19. Id. at 282 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)). The Board
"gave inordinate weight to isolated examples of contractor control at the jobsite, control
which in the main involved only the result sought to be accomplished." 564 F.2d at 282. In
its decision the court expressly disagreed with the District of Columbia Circuit which had
found owner-operators of dump trucks to be employees. See Joint Council of Teamsters
No. 42 v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam). According to the Ninth
Circuit the Joint Council court had made two errors: "it failed to consider the relationship as
a whole, and. . . it was blinded by the presence of the contractors' right to control details of
the work." 564 F.2d at 282 n.ll.
20. 580 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1978).
21. Id. at 974.
22. Use of an ALJ is the initial step in the processing of unfair labor practices. A person
who wishes to file such charges must set them forth, in writing and under oath, and file them
with the Regional Director for the Board. This office investigates the charges; if they are
found to have some validity and if the charges are not dismissed or withdrawn, the Regional
Director files a complaint on the charges, serving it, along with a notice of hearing on the
alleged offending party. The ALI holds a full evidentiary hearing on these charges and, if
they are found to be true, orders appropriate remedies to correct the problem. This order
along with all findings of the ALJ are filed with the Board, which reviews all of these items
on record if a party files exceptions to the decision of the AiL. Judicial review of the
Board's actions is also available in the circuit court of appeals for the region wherqin the
charges were filed. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.2-.15 (1979).
23. 580 F.2d at 974.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976) provides:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of the
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, re-
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
whether an employee is a supervisor within the Act's definition hinges
on the concept of responsibility.25 The primary consideration for the
NLRB is the employee's authority to hire and fire other employees or
effectively to recommend such action.26 Often there is a fine line t9 be
drawn between supervisors and employees. For example, in NLRB v.
Doctor's Hospital,27 the Ninth Circuit held that registered nurses who
assign and direct other hospital workers such as licensed vocational
nurses and nurses' aides were not supervisors: "The leadman or straw
boss may give minor orders or directives or supervise the work of
others, but he is not necessarily a part of management and a 'supervisor'
within the Act."2 As a result of this narrow distinction between super-
visors and employees, the courts have determined that this is an appro-
priate area to defer to the Board's industrial relations expertise.29
The Act defines a "labor organization" as "any organization of
any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan,
in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, la-
bor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions
of work."30 The Supreme Court has held that any employee committee
which discusses subjects relating to working conditions, wages, or
grievances with management is a "labor organization" within the
meaning of the Act.3' In addition, the Board has held that "loosely
ward, or discipline other employees, or responsibily to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical na-
ture, but requires the use of independent judgment.
25. "'To be responsible is to be answerable for the discharge of a duty or obligation.
Responsibility includes judgment, skill, ability, capacity, and integrity, and is implied by
power.'" NLRB v. Fullerton Publishing Co., 283 F.2d 545, 549 (9th Cir. 1960) (quoting
Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385, 387 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 899 (1949)).
26. W. Horace Williams Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 223, 225 n.8 (1961).
27. 489 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1973).
28. Id. at 776 (emphasis in original).
29. NLRB v. Swift & Co., 292 F.2d 561, 563 (1st Cir. 1961), quoted in Marine Eng'rs
Beneficial Ass'n v. Interlake Steamship Co., 370 U.S. 173, 176 n.6 (1962). This deference to
Board expertise was evident in NLRB v. Prineville Stud Co., 578 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1978)
(over employer's contrary assertions, employees who committed unfair labor practices held
to be supervisors); NLRB v. Adrian Belt Co., 578 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
(after detailed examination of functions and responsibilities, employees held to be supervi-
sors). See also Kaiser Eng'rs v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1976) (although
evidence subject to different inferences, Board finding that employee who directed seven
employees was not a supervisor upheld); NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 405 F.2d
1169, 1172-73 (2d Cir. 1968) (question of supervisory status is one of fact; Board's finding
must be given "great weight").
30. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976).
31. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 210 n.3, 213 (1959).
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formed committees are 'labor organizations' when their purpose is to
represent employees' interests in dealing with employers.
32
A 1974 amendment to the NLRA brought employees of non-profit
health care institutions within the protections of the Act.3 3 As a com-
promise to this extension, Congress amended section 8(g) to require
that "[a] labor organization before engaging in any strike, picketing, or
other concerted refusal to work at any health care institution shall, not
less than ten days prior to such action, notify the institution in writing
. . . of that intention."3 4 The rationale behind the ten-day notice pe-
riod was to allow the institution to take steps to insure the continuity of
health care to the community and the well-being of the patients before
any job action occurred.
The Ninth Circuit, in Kapiolani Hospital v. NLRB,36 refused to
extend the notice requirement of section 8(g) to individual employees,
holding that a hospital had committed an unfair labor practice by firing
an unrepresented clerk for her refusal to cross a picket line without
giving the ten-day notice. 37 The court noted that the congressional pur-
pose for inserting the notice period was to protect the health of the
patients in the hospitals: "'A brief work stoppage by a few unorgan-
ized employees simply was not the type of disruption with which Con-
gress was concerned.' 38
The question of what constitutes a section 8(g) labor organization
arose in NLRB v. Long Beach Youth Center, Inc.3 9 The employer con-
tended that seventeen non-union employees formed a de facto labor
32. In re Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948). See also NLRB v. Washington
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 15-16 (1962) (walkout by seven employees of a machine shop
after individual complaints about the coldness of the shop were registered held to be a con-
certed action growing out of a labor dispute); NLRB v. Robertson Indus., 560 F.2d 396, 399
(9th Cir. 1976) (refusal of several employees to report to work in order to attend union
meeting held a protected activity).
33. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3946. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare recognized that
approximately 56% of all hospital employees were excluded from NLRA protections by the
then-existing non-profit hospital exemption. While it could find no acceptable reason for
this exclusion, the Committee noted that if non-profit hospital employees were to be given
the right to strike, corresponding provisions to assure continued patient care in the event of a
work stoppage must also be included in the amendment. Id. at 3948.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1976) (emphasis added).
35. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3946, 3949.
36. 581 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1978).
37. Id. at 234.
38. Id. (quoting Walker Methodist Residence & Health Care Center, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B.
1630, 1631 (1977)) (emphasis deleted).
39. 591 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1979).
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organization and thus violated the Act by failing to give notice prior to
a work stoppage. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that since the
employees signed union authorization cards at their first organizational
meeting, which occurred after the work stoppage had begun, at the
time of the commencement of the work stoppage the employees were
not a labor organization.4"
2. Administrative jurisdiction
While the Board may have jurisdiction to involve itself in a partic-
ular situation under the statutory test of "affecting interstate com-
merce," it may refuse to act because of a failure to meet the
administrative standards which it has promulgated. 41 In order to limit
the volume of cases that come before it each year, the Board has issued
a number of jurisdictional standards. It will assert its jurisdiction over
certain categories of enterprises but only if the enterprise in question
does a certain annual dollar volume of business.42 In addition to these
standards, the Board historically has refrained from asserting its juris-
diction over certain industries and is hesitant to involve itself in intra-
union disputes.43 Finally, the courts will carefully examine the Board's
involvement in what are arguably state questions."
Section 8(b)(1) of the Act provides that a labor organization shall
40. Id. at 1279. It should be noted that the court chose to ignore the April 30th meeting
of three of the employees at which the work stoppage was initially proposed, and instead
based its decision on the May 1st "organizational meeting" during which the authorization
cards were signed. Id. at 1277-78.
41. See NLRB v. Pease Oil Co., 279 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 1960).
42. The first of such jurisdictional standards, adopted in 1950, are contained in 15
NLRB ANN. REP. 5-6 (1950) and 16 NLRB ANN. REP. 15-39 (1951). These standards were
,modified somewhat in 1958, and these modifications, contained in 23 NLRB ANN. REP. 8-9
(1958), remain substantially in effect today.
43. Stelling v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 587 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1978) (claim
brought by local union members against the international and local unions); Smith v.
UMW, 493 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1974) (action to enjoin a merger of four districts comprised
of local unions); Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 400 v. Svacek, 431 F.2d 705 (9th Cir.
1970) (claim alleging violation of union constitution and bylaw in action by local union
against one of its members).
44. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gamon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959). Compare
Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978) (the Act does not foreclose state regula-
tory power over pension plans that may be the object of collective bargaining) andFarmer v.
Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (the Act held not to preempt a tort action for
damages suffered by a local member alledgedly caused by union officials) with Amalga-
mated Ass'n of Street Elec. Ry. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971) (action by
member against his union for wrongful interference with his employment relation held to be
within exclusive jurisdiction of Board; not to be considered by state court as breach of con-
tract action).
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be free to set its own rules for joining or continuing as a member,45
thereby implicity foreclosing Board jurisdiction over intra-union dis-
putes. In the 1967 case of NLRB v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing
CO.,4 6 th8 Supreme Court upheld a union rule forbidding the crossing
of a picket line during a strike: "Congress did not propose any limita-
tions with respect*to the internal affairs of unions, aside from barring
enforcement of a union's internal regulations to affect a member's em-
ployment status."'47 Implicit in the Court's decision was the fact that, if
union membership were a requirement for an individual's employment,
a different result would have been reached.48 This construction of
8(b)(1) was reaffirmed two years later in Scofield v. NLRB,49 in which
the Supreme Court upheld a union-imposed fine and suspension of
members who had violated the union's rule relating to production ceil-
ings.5
0
In extending the Allis Chalmers-Scofield rule, the Court in NLRB
v. Boeing Co." recognized the distinction between internal and exter-
nal enforcement of union rules and noted that the Board has authority
to rule on union regulations which affect an individual's employment
status but not on those regulations which deal solely with his status as a
union member.5 2 The Court stated that it would not even consider the
reasonableness of a fine imposed by the Board that did not affect either
the employer-employee relationship or other policies of the Act. 3
In NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 1179,54 the Ninth Circuit ex-
pressed an unwillingness to allow unions such latitude in enforcing in-
ternal rules. After several union members had violated union
regulations by crossing a picket line, the union levied fines and other
penalties on the violating employees. The Board subsequently deter-
mined the picket line to be illegal, and the Ninth Circuit held that pen-
alties imposed by the union constituted an unfair coercive labor
45. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2)(A) (1976).
46. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
47. Id. at 195.
48. Id. at 196-97. The Court examined the question of intra-union discipline only as it
related to "full membership" members and expressly reserved the question of the applica-
tion of the rule to those members whose membership is limited to mere payment of dues
pursuant to a § 8(a)(3) union security agreement.
49. 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
50. Id. at 430-32.
51. 412 U.S. 67 (1973).
52. Id. at 74.
53. Id. at 73.
54. 526 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1975).
1980]
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practice.
This strict examination of internal regulation enforcement was
also evident in the 1978 case of NLRB v. ILWULoca113.16 The ques-
tion before the court was whether the Board had jurisdiction to involve
itself in a dispute involving the enforcement of internal regulations.
The effect of the regulations was to bar an employee from using the
dispatch hall for ten days, thereby preventing his employment during
that period or forcing him to drop his union membership. The court
held that jurisdiction was proper because of the effect of the regulation
on the worker's employment status, the power to hear such controver-
sies being within the Board's discretionary authority. 7
Under the Act, the Board is free to assert or decline its jurisdic-
tional discretion by either promulgating rules in its administrative ca-
pacity or resolving a controversy in its adjudicatory capacity.
58
Challenges to the Board's exercise of this jurisdictional discretion gen-
erally have been unsuccessful.5 9 For example, in NLRB v. Bell Aero-
space Co.,6  the Supreme Court took issue with a Second Circuit
decision that the Board could only determine that buyers were "mana-
gerial employees" by invoking its rulemaking powers under section 6 of
the Act.61 The Court recognized the broad discretionary- language of
section 6 and held that the question at bar was particularly appropriate
for resolution by adjudication.62 Addressing the issue of the prejudicial
effect of promulgating new regulations by means of adjudication, the
Court stated that the Board was not precluded from reconsidering its
regulations in an adversarial setting because the parties had not been
adversely affected by their reliance on the pronouncements.63
55. "The internal affairs exemption from § 8(b)(l)(A) does not apply when a union's
application of its rules is contrary to national labor policy." Id. at 145.
56. 581 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1978).
57. Id. at 1322.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part that "the Board, in its discre-
tion, may by rule of decision or by published rules ... decline'to assert jurisdiction over
any labor dispute ... where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on
commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction." See also
id. § 156, which provides in relevant part that "[t]he Board shall have authority from time to
time to make, amend, and rescind ... such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this subchapter." The Supreme Court noted in NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) that "It]he choice between rulemaking and adjudi-
cation lies in the first instance within the Board's discretion."
59. See, e.g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1975).
60. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976).
62. 416 U.S. at 294.
63. Id. at 295. The Court also noted that "this is not a case in which some new liability
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The same issue was addressed by the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v.
Children's Baptist Home,64 in which the employer argued that the
Board had abused its discretion by reversing its jurisdictional policy
regarding non-profit children's homes twice within the prior three
years.6" The unfair labor practice charges asserted, however, were
based on actions that had occurred in 1974, before the jurisdictional
policy had been reversed the first time. Therefore, there was no sub-
stance to the claim of prejudice because the Board had asserted juris-
diction over the home according to its original policy and did not
change this position during the pendency of the action.6
Historically, the Board has refused to exercise jurisdiction over
private, non-profit educational institutions, 67 because the Act only
deals with industries that affect interstate commerce.6 8 Due to the in-
creasing number of these institutions and the potential for disruption of
the public's welfare resulting from labor disputes involving these insti-
tutions, the Board will now assert jurisdiction over those institutions
69
that meet certain Board regulatory standards." Initial decisions in this
is sought to be imposed on individuals for past actions which were taken in good-faith reli-
ance on Board pronouncements." Id.
64. 576 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1978).
65. In Children's Village, Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. 953 (1970), and Jewish Orphan's Home,
191 N.L.R.B. 32 (1971), the Board had asserted its jurisdiction over similar institutions. In
May 1974, the Board announced a policy of declining jurisdiction over such non-profit
childcare centers. Ming Quong Children's Center, 210 N.L.R.B. 899 (1974). Finally, in
1976, Ming Quong was overruled by Rhode Island Catholic Orphan Asylum (St. Aloysius
Home), 224 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1976), and the Board returned to its original policy of exercising
jurisdiction over these institutions.
66. 576 F.2d at 261.
67. See, e.g., The Trustees of Columbia University, 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (195 1). The Board
noted that Columbia Unviersity was a non-profit educational corporation whose sole pur-
pose was to promote education.
Although the activities of Columbia Unviersity affect commerce sufficiently to sat-
isfy the requirements of the statute and the standards established by the board for
the normal exercise of its jurisdiction, we do not believe that it would effectuate the
policies of the Act for the Board to assert its jurisdiction here.
Id. at 425. While the University's activities did affect commerce, the Board determined that
their purPose was "non-commercial in nature and intimately connected" with charity and
education. .d. at 427.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1976).
69. Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 329 (1970) (while education remains the pri-
mary goal of such institutions, universities have become involved in a number of interstate
commercial activities). See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 194-95 (1968) (upholding the
constitutionality of amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act extending coverage to
non-profit private universities and hospitals) ("It is clear that labor conditions in schools and
hospitals can affect commerce. . . . Strikes and work stoppages involving employees of
schools and hospitals . . . obviously interrupt and burden this flow of goods across state
lines.").
70. The regulatory standards that have been developed are two: first, the annual gross
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area involved secular institutions;7 in later decisions, the Board ex-
tended its jurisdiction to include religious institutions.72
In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop,73 however, the Supreme Court up-
held a reversal of the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over a religious,
educational institution. Construing the Act narrowly, the Court held
that the Board's assertion of jurisdiction was improper for there was no
sign of a clear congressional intent to include such institutions within
the Board's purview. 4
While the Board has no jurisdiction in some areas, it has exclusive
jurisdiction in others. In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gar-
mon,71 the Court announced a doctrine of preemption: if an activity is
even arguably subject to section 7 or section 8 of the Act, state and
federal courts must refuse jurisdiction and defer to the Board and its
expertise in the field of labor relations. 76 An exception to the Garmon
rule has been provided recently by the Supreme Court. In Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters," Sears
revenues of the institution must be over one million dollars and second, the institution must
have a substantial impact on interstate commerce. See Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223
N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976). See also 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (annual revenue requirement of one mil-
lion dollars for Board to have jurisdiction over private non-profit universities and colleges).
71. See, e.g., The Judson School, 209 N.L.R.B. 677 (1974); The Shattuck School, 189
N.L.R.B. 886 (1971).
72. Compare Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976) (annual income
over one million dollars; substantial interstate purchases) with Academia San Jorge, 234
N.L.R.B. 1181 (1978) (advisory opinion) (annual income of $486,000 below the Board's reg-
ulatory minimum).
The Board has stepped around the first amendment issue by finding its exercise ofjuris-
diction to be "a minimal intrusion on religious conduct and. . . necessary to obtain the Act's
objective." Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 1218 (1976) (emphasis in origi-
nal). The Board has also drawn a distinction between schools that are "completely rell-
gious" and those that are "religiously associated" and has refused to exercise jurisdiction
over institutions in the former category. E.g., Hebrew Teachers, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1974)
(no jurisdiction over an institution concerned primarily with religious activities and teach-
ings that minimally impact interstate commerce).
73. 440 U.S. 490 (1979), af'g 559 F.2d 1112 (1977).
74. Id. at 504-06. The Court resolved the case in this manner to avoid first amendment
questions that would have been raised had the Board had jurisdiction over these institutions.
Id. at 504.
The Catholic Bishop decision also casts doubts on the validity of Polynesian Cultural
Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1978), announced prior to Catholic Bishop.
The cultural center operated as a non-profit corporation, wholly owned by the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints; it based its challenge to the Board's jurisdiction on the
Seventh Circuit's holding in Catholic Bishop. .d. at 472 (citing Catholic Bishop v. NLRB,
559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), affid, 440 U.S. 490 (1979)).
75. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
76. Id. at 245.
77. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
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filed an action for trespass against the carpenters in a California state
court. Two union representatives had visited a Sears store and found
certain carpentry work was not being done by men dispatched from the
hiring hall. They requested that Sears arrange to have the work per-
formed by union members, and when no action was taken, the union
set up picket lines on Sears' property. The California Supreme Court
dismissed the case on the authority of Garmon.75 The United States
Supreme Court reversed, recognizing that "the Court has upheld state-
court jurisdiction over conduct that touches 'interests so deeply rooted
in local feeling that, in the absence of compelling congressional direc-
tion, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the states of the
power to act.' "9 The trespass action clearly fell within this exception.
The Ninth Circuit recently considered this preemption doctrine in
two cases brought under the trusteeship provisions of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act and the Labor Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959 (LMRDA).8" In Brenda v. Grand Lodge of the
International Association of AMachinists,81 the local union had brought
an action in district court challenging a trusteeship imposed by the in-
ternational on the district lodge. The international challenged the
court's jurisdiction on the ground that the NLRB had exclusive juris-
diction over unfair labor practice disputes. The court, however, upheld
federal court jurisdiction, basing its decision on congressional intent.
The LMRDA was passed "to regulate internal union practices so as to
protect the rights of individual union members." In order to "prevent
frustration of Congressional purposes" the Ninth Circuit determined
that the doctrines of preemption and primary jurisdiction must yield.82
In Burke v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc.,83 union trustees brought an action in
district court to recover money allegedly owed to union trusts by an
employer. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's determination
that it lacked jurisdiction, reasoning that "remedies for 'jurisdictional'
controversies . . . come into play only by a strike or threat of a
strike." 4 Without a labor dispute or unfair labor practice, the Board
could not exercise jurisdiction in the case, and the district court should
have assumed jurisdiction.
78. 17 Cal. 3d 893, 553 P.2d 603, 132 Cal. kptr. 143 (1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
79. 436 U.S. at 195 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
244 (1959)).
80. This act is codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976).
81. 584 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1978).
82. Id. at 314 n.2.
83. 592 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1979).
84. Id. at 545 (quoting Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261,263-64 (1964)).
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B. Procedure
Board operating procedures have not changed significantly during
the survey period. Although the Board and the Ninth Circuit continue
to adhere to the general procedures catalogued in sections 9 and 10 of
the Act,85 the Ninth Circuit has clarified certain statutory requirements
for bringing unfair labor practice claims under the Act.
1. Six-month limitation period on evidence
Section 10(b) of the Act authorizes the Board to issue a complaint
when it determines that a person or company should be charged with
an unfair labor practice, provided that the alleged practice occurs
within the six months prior to the filing of charges with the Board. 6 In
Local Lodge 1424, International Association of Machinists v. NLRB,
87
the Supreme Court noted that section 10(b) does not preclude the use
of all evidence pertaining to events occurring more than six months
before the filing and service of an unfair labor practice charge. In ap-
plying the limitation period the Court distinguished two situations. If
acts occurring within the six-month period constitute an unfair labor
practice, events occurring before may be examined and used for evi-
dentiary purposes to establish facts to prove these charges. If the con-
duct within the preceding six months "can be charged to be an unfair
labor practice only through reliance on an earlier unfair labor prac-
tice," then this evidence "cloak[s] with illegality that which was other-
wise lawful" and may not be introduced.
88
In NLRB v. Local 30 IL WU,89 the Ninth Circuit addressed the
issue of when this six-month period begins to run. A union member
had crossed his union's picket line and was fined $3,150 on September
17, 1974. Official notice of this action was not received by the member,
however, until March 6, 1975, and his unfair labor practice charges
against the union were filed on March 18, 1975, six months and one day
85. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159-160 (1976).
86. Id. § 160(b).
87. 362 U.S. 411 (1960).
88. Id. at 416-17. The union and the employer had entered into a bargaining agreement
before the union had obtained the consent of a majority of the employees. The agreement
contained a union security clause that required all employees to become union members
within forty-five days. More than six months after the agreement had been executed, unfair
labor practice charges were filed, alleging that the union lacked majority status at the time
the agreement was entered into and that continued enforcement of the agreement was ille-
gal. The Court held that the action was barred by the six-month limitation period and that it
fell into the second category.
89. 549 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1977).
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after the union had acted. The court held that the action was not
barred because the "six-month time period does not begin to run until
the laborer [is] in a position to file the unfair labor practice charge, i.e.,
upon receipt of the notice of the penalty."90
Similarly, in NLRB v. California School of Professional Pychol-
ogy,91 a teacher employed by the school attempted to organize the
faculty, and on July 23, the school notified him in writing that his con-
tract would be allowed to expire on August 31. On the following Feb-
ruary 12, the terminated employee filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the Board. The court dimissed the action because the time limit
began running as soon as the employee was able to file an unfair labor
practice charge.92 The court held that the July 23 termination letter
constituted a final decision not to rehire the employee, and became a
potential unfair labor practice.
Fraudulent concealment of facts constituting an unfair labor prac-
tice tolls this six-month limitation period. As long as the victimized
party remains ignorant of these facts, through no fault of his own, the
limitation period will not begin to run until the fraud is either discov-
ered or with reasonable diligence should have been discovered.93 This
issue was considered in NLRB v. Don Burgess Construction Corp.94 In
June 1974, Burgess Corporation formally recognized a union as the
bargaining representative for the carpenters it employed. In August
1974, the president of Burgess and the foreman of the carpenters
formed a partnership. All of the carpenters were transferred from the
corporation to the partnership. The partnership entered into a new
agreement with the union and the corporation notified the union that it
no longer employed any carpenters, would not employ any carpenters
in the future, and considered itself no longer bound to the agreement.
90. Id. at 701. The union argued that the rule of Lodge 1424 required a different result.
Recognizing that a literal application of Lodge 1424 compelled a decision favoring the
union, the court distinguished Lodge 1424 as a situation in which the activity complained of
was the continued enforcement of an agreement invalid from its inception. Id. at 700-01.
The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Nazareth Regional High School v.
NLRB, 549 F.2d 873, 883 (2d Cir. 1977). The district had notified an employee on June 13
that he would not be rehired for the next school year. The union filed an unfair labor
practice charge on December 24, alleging that the six-month period did not start to run until
September 1, the start of the new school year. The court disagreed for the June 13 action
was not tentative but was final and conclusive. Id. at 882. See also NLRB v. Plumbers &
Pipe Fitters, Local 214, 298 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1962).
91. 583 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1978).
92. Id. at 1101.
93. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (citing Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S.
342, 348 (1874)) ("This equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limitation.").
94. 596 F.2d 378 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 100 S. Ct. 293 (1979).
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The union did not object. In January 1975, the corporation employed
non-union carpenters. The union discovered this in May 1975 and filed
unfair labor practice charges in October 1975. The corporation con-
tended that the six-month limitation had started in January and was a
bar to the union's charge.95 The Ninth Circuit rejected the corpora-
tion's contention, noting that the corporation had fraudulently con-
cealed its employment of the non-union carpenters and the union
neither knew nor should have known of this hiring prior to May.96 The
court found that the corporation's actions tolled the six-month limita-
tion period and agreed to hear the charges.
While section 10(b) of the Act expressly applies the six-month pe-
riod to the filing of charges, it has been extended to bar evidence of
unfair labor practices raised as a defense to refusal-to-bargain
charges.97 In NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc.,98 the Ninth Circuit refused
to allow an employer to justify its refusal to bargain with evidence that
the union lacked majority status when first recognized as the bargain-
ing agent five years before.99 In applying the Lodge 1424 distinctions
regarding the six-month limitation period, the court determined that
the employer was essentially attempting to revive a defunct unfair la-
bor practice claim to defend a subsequent charge, and evidence of this
prior event was therefore inadmissible. 100
2. Hearings
Section 9(c) of the Act provides that the Board shall investigate
95. Id. at 382.
96. Id. at 384. The court held that the corporation and the partnership were one em-
ployer and that the carpenters, whether employed by the partnership or the corporation,
constituted a single bargaining unit. Id.
97. See NLRB v. Tragniew, Inc., 470 F.2d 669, 673 (9th Cir. 1972) (§ 10(b) barred evi-
dence of a union's loss of a certification election); NLRB v. District 30, UMW, 422 F.2d 115,
122 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 959 (1970) (union's assertion of refusal to bargain
barred as a defense to later charge of illegal picketing); Lane-Coos-Curry-Douglas Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 656, 659 n.7 (9th Cir. 1969) (trades council
barred from defending illegal picketing charge with assertion that local unions not lawfully
recognized because union contracts executed more than a year before).
98. 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2847 (1979).
99. 584 F.2d at 302.
100. Id See also NLRB v. B.C. Hawk Chevrolet, Inc., 582 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1978). In
B.C. Hawk, the employer attempted to defend his refusal to bargain on the basis that the
signing of the bargaining agreement ten months earlier was itself an unfair labor practice.
The court rejected this contention because nothing in the record indicated that the employer
could not have brought these charges within the six months following the execution of the
agreement. Id. at 494. See generally Sahara-Tahoe Corp. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 767 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2837 (1979) (following NLRB v. Tragniew, Inc., 470 F.2d 669
(9th Cir. 1972)).
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representation petitions after they are filed and shall order a hearing on
the petition if it raises questions of representation affecting interstate
commerce. If the hearing reveals such questions, an election to deter-
mine the bargaining representative shall be ordered and, in the ordi-
nary course of proceedings, certified by the Board." 1
In Alson Manufacturing Aerospace Division of Alson Industries, Inc.
v. NLRB, 02 the employer's exceptions to the results of the representa-
tion election were summarily rejected by the Board. The employer re-
fused to bargain, and the union filed unfair labor practice charges. The
court explained that the employer must present substantial and mate-
rial factual issues warranting decertification of the election before a
hearing will be granted. 3 The court found that the employer's excep-
tions could justify decertification, and the employer was reasonably en-
titled to a hearing. A hearing was ordered on the exceptions not-
withstanding the Board's policy of expeditiously processing election
objections so as to facilitate collective bargaining. 0 4
In Oshman's Sporting. Goods, Inc. v. NLRB, 05 the Ninth Circuit
refused to reverse the Board's decision not to grant a hearing. New
evidence was offered more than eight months after the hearing request
had been denied and more than five months after the Board had denied
a request to review. 10While the evidence may have presented a mate-
rial issue sufficient to justify a hearing, the court stressed the impor-
tance of the timeliness of the request for a hearing. 0 7
3. Twelve-month presumption of validity for elections
Section 9(c)(3) of the Act prohibits the Board from directing an
election in a bargaining unit which has held a valid election during the
preceding twelve months.'0 8 This section has been construed to give an
almost conclusive presumption of majority support for the union dur-
101. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976).
102. 523 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
103. Id. at 472. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(c) (1979).
104. The court stated that a party, to request a hearing, must "make a prima facie show-
ing as to the alleged facts which, if true, would require a new election." 523 F.2d at 472.
The showing required to obtain this hearing was further defined in NLRB v. L.D. McFar-
land Co., 572 F.2d 256 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 280 (1978) (hearing on representation
election denied; mere disagreement with findings of fact without offer of proof held insuffi-
cient basis for hearing; no substantial issues raised).
105. 586 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1978).
106. Id. at 703.
107. Id.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976).
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ing the year following certification. 1 9 While this section is strictly con-
strued,110 problems arise from its rather uneven application. In NLRB
v. Tri-Ex Tower Corp.,"' the Board waited ten months to certify an
election which the union had lost. Two months after certification, and
twelve months after the prior election, another election was held and
won by the union. Recognizing that the employer was placed in an
unfair position because any new economic benefits conveyed upon the
employees prior to an upcoming representation election might result in
an unfair labor practice charge, the court nevertheless found the em-
ployer guilty of an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain. The
employer based its refusal to bargain on section 9(c)(3), contending that
the twelve-month period ran from the date of certification, not from the
date of the election." 2 The court upheld the Board's approval of the
second election as within the Board's wide discretion "to effectuate the
policy of the Act that employees be represented by their chosen bar-
gaining representative."
'" 3
A different rule applies when the union wins the election. In
Brooks v. NLRB,"4 the Supreme Court held that when an election re-
sults in the union's certification, the twelve-month period runs from the
certification date." 5 The Brooks Court adopted the certification bar
with the proviso that certain "unusual circumstances" may justify an
employer's refusal to bargain during the one-year period." 6 For exam-
ple, an unusual circumstance may arise after a significant change in the
bargaining unit's size,1 7 after the certified union is dissolved, " 8 or after
the union disclaims interest in representing the employees."19 The
Ninth Circuit seldom finds such an "unusual circumstance." In NLRB
109. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954). The Court considered this presumption
conclusive in the absence of unusual circumstances and defined three such circumstances:
"(1) the certified union dissolved or became defunct; (2) as a result of a schism, substantially
all the members and officers of the certified union transferred their affiliation to a new local
or international; (3) the size of the bargaining unit fluctuated radically within a short time."
Id. at 98-99 (footnotes deleted).
110. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bums Int'l Security Sys., 406 U.S. 272,279 (1972); Inter-Polymer
Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1973).
111. 595 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1979).
112. Id. at 1. See Mallenckrodt Chemical Works, 84 N.L.R.B. 291 (1949) (12-month
period runs from date of election, not certification).
113. 595 F.2d at 2.
114. 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
115. Id. at 104. See NLRB v. Lee Office Equip., 572 F.2d 704, 706 n.l (9th Cir. 1978).
116. 348 U.S. at 98-99.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 98 (citing Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 325 (1944)).
119. 348 U.S. at 98. See WTOP, Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1237 (1955).
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v. Lee Office Equpment,2 ° the Ninth Circuit determined that evidence
that employees had "abandoned their certified union, without more' 
12 1
was not an "unusual circumstance" sufficient to rebut the presumption
of majority support. The harshness of this holding was lessened some-
what in NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc.,'22 in which the Ninth Circuit
held that the presumption could be rebutted by "clear, cogent, and con-
vincing evidence, that the union was in the minority or that the em-
ployer had a good faith reasonable doubt of majority support at the
time of refusal."123 Clearly, the presumption of majority support is
rooted in the court's considerations of employee free choice and stabil-
ity in bargaining. 24
An employer is faced with a difficult problem when he wishes to
contest the union majority during this certification period. Refusal to
bargain is clearly not the answer.' 25 The Supreme Court held in
Brooks that even if the employer has solid evidence that his employees
have deserted the certified union he must continue to bargain in good
faith, while petitioning the Board for relief, that is, the self-help remedy
of refusing to bargain with the union is not an available alternative.
This is in keeping with one of the overall policies of the Act of promot-
ing industrial peace.
126
The Ninth Circuit in Tahoe Nugget specified the suggested proce-
dure for contesting the union majority: employees are free to petition
for decertification and employers may petition for an election, "the pre-
ferred method for resolving disputes."'127 Unfortunately there remains
a significant burden on the employer who contests such an election,
and it should be noted that the Board's decisions regarding representa-
tion elections are not subject to direct appeal.1
28
C. NLRB Orders and Remedies
Sections 7 and 9 of the Act set out the general grant of Board au-
thority for representation election procedures and for proscribing un-
120. 572 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1978).
121. Id. at 706. "It appears that the union had in fact lost virtually all employee support
at the time of the refusals to bargain." Id.
122. 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978).
123. Id. at 297 (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 300-01, 303.
125. This is indigenous to the certification period, because refusal to bargain is recognized
as a method for seeking judicial review. See Valley Rock Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 590 F.2d
300 (9th Cir. 1979).
126. 348 U.S. at 103.
127. 584 F.2d at 301.
128. NLRB v. Adrian Belt Co., 578 F.2d 1304, 1308 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978).
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fair labor practices.' 2 9 Section 10 of the Act authorizes the Board to
take certain steps to prevent any person from engaging in an unfair
labor practice that affects interstate commerce.130 It remains the pri-
mary responsibility of the Board to reconcile "the inherent conflict be-
tween employee rights and bargaining stability."' 13 1 To this end, the
courts have granted the Board a significant degree of authority in fram-
ing remedies. 132 The traditional remedies utilized by the Board to rec-
tify violations of the Act by employers are bargaining orders,
reinstatement with back pay, and cease and desist orders.
33
1. Bargaining orders
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 134 the union had obtained authori-
zation cards from a majority of the employees; thereafter the employer
committed an unfair labor practice. The Supreme Court held that an
order to the employer to bargain with the union was an appropriate
remedy as the unfair labor practice had tainted the resulting election.
Noting that secret elections are the preferred manner of determining
union support, the Court recognized that "the cards, though admittedly
inferior to the election process, can adequately reflect employee senti-
ment when that process has been impeded."'' 35 Since "employee senti-
ment" was clearly indicated by the card majority, the Court concluded
that the Board's decision to issue a bargaining order was appropriate.
The Court rejected the employer's contention that a bargaining order
acted as a punishment and a restraint on the employer because "a bar-
gaining order is designed as much to remedy past election damage as it
is to deter future misconduct."'
136
The Court in Gissel identified three categories of unfair labor prac-
tices: (1) outrageous and pervasive practices, which might warrant a
bargaining order even though the union never attained majority status,
129. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976) (unfair labor practices by employers and labor organiza-
tions); id. § 159 (representative elections).
130. Id. § 160(a); id. § 160(e) (judicial review of Board rulings).
131. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, 584 F.2d 293, 304 (9th Cir. 1978).
132. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953); Virginia Elec. & Power
Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 539 (1943); Marriot Corp. v. NLRB, 491 F.2d 367, 371 (9th Cir.
1974).
133. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (bargaining order);
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (reinstatement of discharged
employee); NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941) (cease-and-desist order
issued and employer required to post notice).
134. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
135. Id. at 603.
136. Id. at 612.
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(2) less pervasive practices, which nonetheless 9till have the tendency to
undermine majority strength and impede the election process if the
union has at some point secured authorization cards signed by a major-
ity of the employees, and (3) less extensive unfair labor practices,
which, because of their minimal impact on the election machinery,
could not sustain a bargaining order.1 37 These categories have served
as the standard for several circuit courts in examining the propriety of
Board bargaining orders. 3 '
Gissel was liberally construed by the Ninth Circuit during the sur-
vey period. In NLRB v. Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc.,139 the court con-
sidered a situation in which the employer had committed significant
unfair labor practices prior to the union's obtaining a card majority."4
Recognizing that similar acts followed by a union card majority had
been deemed insufficient by the Eighth Circuit to justify a bargaining
order,14' the court held that the subsequent discharge of a union orga-
nizer and the illegal interrogation of employees were sufficiently perva-
sive to uphold the bargaining order, for this conduct had a "tendency
to undermine the majority's strength and impede the election."
142
The Ninth Circuit also upheld a bargaining order issued by the
Board on behalf of a union defeated in a representation election. In
Hambre Hombre Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 14 3 twenty-seven of forty-
four employees had signed union authorization cards, but the union
137. Id. at 613-15.
138. See, e.g., NLRB v. Broadmoor Lumber Co., 578 F.2d 238, 242 (9th Cir. 1978) (bar-
gaining order justified because employer's threats to employees about their union activity, its
granting of wage and benefit increases to discourage union organization, and the enticement
of employees to terminate their strike by offering settlement of various matters were "so
pervasive as to make resolution of employer-employee problems through normal channels
impossible"); Automated Business Sys. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 262, 266-67 (6th Cir. 1974)
(threatened closure of plant and employer's promises of benefits not so pervasive as to
weaken the employees' adherence to their union; bargaining order should be reexamined
upon evaluation of additional evidence); NLRB v. Henry Colder Co., 447 F.2d 629,631 (7th
Cir. 1971) (unlawful interrogation of employees during union organizational drive, promise
of substantial benefits if union ignored, and termination of an employee for union activity
deemed sufficient to have "polluted the 'electoral atmosphere' "; within Gissefs second cate-
gory).
139. 593 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1979).
140. Id. at 124-25. The employer had discharged two employees for union activities,
threatened to close the business if the union won the representation election, and created an
impression that the employees involved in union activities were under surveillance.
141. Arbie Mineral Feed Co. v. NLRB, 438 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1971) (union obtained
authorization card majority after employer interrogated employees about their union activi-
ties and after an employee discharged for his union activities).
142. 593 F.2d at 124.
143. 581 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1978).
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had subsequently been defeated in the representation election. Be-
tween the signing of the cards and the election, an employee, who had.
been active in union discussion, was fired. The Board, in reversing the
AL's finding that the firing did not constitute an unfair labor practice,
issued a bargaining order. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Board
and enforced the order. 44
Although the Ninth Circuit generally upholds Board bargaining
orders, it has declined to do so when a union questionably or fraudu-
lently obtains a card majority. In NZRB v. RandallP. Kane, Inc.,'45 a
majority of the company's employees had signed union authorization
cards, but the company refused to bargain. The company contended
that prospective signers had been informed that the signed cards would
merely prompt a representation election, even though they had been
used to demand recognition. The court held that the Board must con-
sider the degree to which these signers had been influenced by the elec-
tion argument before respondent could be compelled to bargain. 146
2. Reinstatement with back pay
Section 8(a)(3) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer to discriminate "in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization."' 147 Section 8(a)(4) prohibits an
employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating "against an em-
ployee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this sub-
chapter."' 148 The authority to impose the usual remedies of back pay
and reinstatement is provided by section 10(c) of the Act, which re-
quires the Board to take "such affirmative action including reinstate-
ment of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies of this subchapter."'
149
An employer who has discharged employees for union activities
can be compelled to reinstate the employee. In FibreboardPaper Prod-
ucts Corp. v. NLRB,15 0 the union contract expired and the employer
terminated all employees represented by the union. The Court ordered
the employer to reinstate the dismissed employees. Its determination
was based on the broad remedial authority of the Board and the ab-
144. Id. at 207.
145. 581 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1978).
146. Id. at 218.
147. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
148. Id. § 158(a)(4).
149. Id. § 160(c).
150. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
[Vol. 13
LA4BOR LAW SURVEY
sence of evidence "showing that the Board's order restoring the status
quo ante to insure meaningful bargaining was not well-designed to pro-
mote the policies of the Act."''
In the seminal case of F. W. Woolworth Company,'52 the Board or-
dered the employer, who had wrongfully discharged an employee for
union activities and affiliation, to make the employee whole for any
loss of pay suffered as a result of its unfair labor practice. The back-
pay remedy was to be calculated on a quarterly basis of the employee's
normal net earnings from termination until a "proper offer of reinstate-
ment" was made.' 53 The Ninth Circuit has continued to apply the
Woolworth rule in its back-pay awards. 154 For example, in Polynesian
Cultural Center, Inc. v. NLRB,'11 the court considered a situation in
which six employees had allegedly been terminated for union involve-
ment and upheld the Board's finding that liability for back pay runs
until the employer makes the employee "an unconditional offer of rein-
statement."'156 The court emphasized that the employees are not re-
quired to make an attempt to return to work and ruled that the
employer was required to make the first move towards "reestablish-
ment of the employment relationship."
1 57
In NLRB v. Mercy Peninsula Ambulance Service, Inc.,' however,
the court made a different determination. An employee was discharged
for union activity, and the Board held that he was entitled to back pay
for a nine-month period following his discharge. The court denied en-
forcement of the Board order. While the employer has the duty to pro-
duce evidence that mitigates its back-pay liability, "[a] worker who has
been the victim of an unfair labor practice is not entitled to simply
await reimbursement from his or her employer for wages lost, for 'the
statute was not intended to encourage idleness.' ,,'5 In tempering this
seemingly harsh result, the court stated that "reasonable" attempts to
151. Id. at 216.
152. 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950).
153. Id. at 293.
154. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Ass'n of Bridge Iron Workers Local 378, 532 F.2d
1241 (9th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Local 776, IATSE (Film Editors), 303 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir.
1962); NLRB v. International Ass'n of Machinists Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727, 279
F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 890 (1960).
155. 582 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1978).
156. Id. at 475.
157. Id.
158. 589 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1979).
159. Id. at 1017 (quoting Daylin, Back Pay Under the National Labor Relations Act, 39
IOWA L. REv. 104, 117 (1958)).
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secure comparable employment are sufficient.1 60 No mention of the
Polynesian Cultural Center decision, which placed the entire burden of
reinstatement upon the employer, was made in Mercy Peninsula Ambu-
lance. It appears, however, that the position of the Ninth Circuit is that
the employer is liable to the employee for back pay which accrues from
the time of termination until either an unconditional offer of reinstate-
ment is made or the end of such period during which the employee
should have reasonably sought other employment to mitigate his dam-
ages.
3. Union violations of the Act
As in the case of employer unfair labor practices, the Board's
traditional remedies against union violations of the Act are cease-and-
desist orders, reinstatement and back pay, and bargaining orders. 61
Section 10(c) provides that reinstatement and back-pay remedies may
be "required of the. . . labor organization" if it is responsible for the
discrimination suffered by the employee.162 In NLRB v. Warehouse-
men-'s Local 17,163 the union rejected a contract that contained an
agreement previously worked out by the parties, seeking instead to
have the employer sign another contract. The court enforced the
Board's order requiring the union to compensate the employer for any
out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result of executing both contracts,
reasoning that the award of compensatory damages "was a reasonable
exercise of the Board's section 10(c) power to make whole the victim of
an unfair labor practice.""
In Graphic Arts International, Local 280 v. NLRB, 165 the union,
until 1975, had negotiated an employment contract with an employer
160. 589 F.2d at 1017. The court determined that the employee made approximately
three inquiries a month for the nine-month period. "[G]iven the quantity and quality of his
efforts. . . we believe that. . . the Board [in]correctly applied the standard of 'reasonable-
ness' to which a discriminatee must be held with respect to his or her mitigation duty." Id.
at 1018 n.6.
161. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 886, 119 N.L.R.B. 222 (1957), enforced, 264 F.2d 21 (10th
Cir. 1959) (cease-and-desist order and refund of dues ordered after union failed to sign
collective bargaining agreement and withheld negotiated benefits from employees until they
had signed membership applications and dues check-off authorizations); Acme Mattress
Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1950), enforced, 192 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1951) (union and employer
jointly and severally liable for discrimination; employees reinstated with back pay).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 52-55
(1954) (because union and employer both responsible for the discrimination but employer
was not a necessary party to the complaint, back-pay order issued against the union alone).
163. 451 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1971).
164. Id. at 1243.
165. 596 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979).
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bargaining association, of which Color-Tech was a member. During
1975 the union discontinued that practice and negotiated separate con-
tracts with the individual employers and induced Color-Tech to leave
the association and sign an independent contract. During this time the
association members engaged in a lockout of union members, and
eventually a new contract was signed. The Board found the union
guilty of unfair labor practices in inducing Color-Tech to sign the in-
dependent contract and ordered the union to compensate Color-Tech
for those expenditures incurred pursuant to the independent contract,
which it would not have been obligated to make under the later associ-
ation contract. The union argued that receiving the benefits of the sec-
ond contract without having incurred the economic costs of a lockout
constituted a windfall to Color-Tech. The court held that this argu-
ment was without merit: "To reject a make-whole remedy because of
this possible windfall would mean allowing the union to benefit from
its unlawful conduct by escaping an appropriate remedy."'
166
D. Judicial Review and Enforcement
Sections 10(e) and 10(f) of the Act specify that federal appellate
courts have jurisdiction to review only "final orders" of the Board. 16 "
In its rules and regulations, the Board has provided that final orders
will be entered in unfair labor practice cases only after the issuance of a
complaint, a hearing before a trial examiner, and a decision by the
Board.
16
1. Final order requirement
The Ninth Circuit does not take a restrictive view of what consti-
tutes a final order. In the 1972 case of- Waterway Terminals Co. v.
NLRB, 16 9 the court held that an order quashing or denying a notice of
hearing was a final order despite the fact that no complaint had been
issued by the Board. This position was reatfirmed in Stromberg-Carl-
son Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 7 ' in which the employer filed an
unfair labor practice charge against a union that resulted in the Board's
issuance of a notice of hearing. Upon motion of the union, the Board
entered an order to quash the notice and denied the employer's petition
166. Id. at 910.
167. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976) (Board may petition federal appellate courts for enforce-
ment of its orders); id. § 160(f) (any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board may
petition a federal appellate court for review); AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
168. 29 C.F.R. § 101-34 (1979).
169. 467 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1972).
170. 580 F.2d 939 (9th Cir. 1978).
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for review, contending that its order was not subject to review as a final
order because no complaint had been issued, no adjudication had oc-
curred, and therefore no final issue of adjudication had been entered.1 71
Citing Waterway Terminals without comment, the court found that the
order to quash did constitute a final order and the petition for review
should have been granted.'72
2. Scope of review
Section 10(e) of the Act further provides that findings of fact by
the Board shall be conclusive "if supported by substantial evidence on
the record considered as a whole."'' 73 In Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB,174 the Supreme Court set out guidelines for courts to consider
when determining whether the Board's findings are supported by sub-
stantial evidence. The courts must examine matters in the record that
detract from the Board's finding,'75 but, if the Board has made a choice
between two conflicting outcomes, the court must abide by that deci-
sion even though a different result would obtain were the court to hear
the matter de novo.176 The court must recognize and give requisite
weight to Board findings which are based upon the Board's special ex-
pertise in the area of industrial relations. 77 Furthermore, the courts
may reverse a decision of an ALJ only when it conflicts with the clear
preponderance of the evidence, particularly regarding questions con-
cerning the credibility of witnesses. 7
Although the courts are bound by Board findings supported by
substantial evidence, they are free to overturn the decisions of the
Board when it has misapplied the law.' 79 It should be noted, however,
that an error of law on the part of an ALJ or the Board is itself not
necessarily sufficient to warrant remand of a decision. The error must
be prejudicial to support a reversal of the administrative determina-
tion.'80 The party claiming injury from the alleged error must show
this prejudice and raise this question during the course of the Board
171. Id. at 941.
172. Id.
173. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
174. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
175. Id. at 488. Accord, NLRB v. Tomco Communications Inc., 567 F.2d 871, 877 (9th
Cir. 1979).
176. 340 U.S. at 488. 4ccord, NLRB v. Hospital & Inst. Workers Local 350, 577 F.2d 649
(9th Cir. 1978).
177. 340 U.S. at 488.
178. Id. at 496.
179. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 691-92 (1951).
180. NLRB v. Lee Office Equip., 572 F.2d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 1978).
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proceedings.'"
3. Representation elections
Acquiescence to Board findings is particularly evident in certain
controversies. The Ninth Circuit generally defers to the Board's exper-
tise in labor relations in questions dealing with representation elec-
tions.'8 2 In Beck Corp. v. NLRB, 8 3 the employer asserted that, by
setting the date for a representation election on a date other than a pay
day, the Board disenfranchised twenty-six employees among a total
work force of 168. The court recognized that the question centered on
whether the Board had abused its discretion and held that "[s]uch dis-
cretion includes the determination of whether or not the opportunity
afforded all eligible voters to exercise their rights was sufficiently 'ade-
quate' or 'equal' as to reflect accurately the 'majority' required by the
labor Act."' 8 4 The court upheld the Board's action interpreting the Act
merely to require that a majority of the employees have an opportunity
to exercise their voting rights.' 5 The Act provides that representatives
be "designated or selected. . . bj; the majority of the employees."' 186 It
is not sufficient that a majority have an opportunity to exercise their
voting rights; rather a majority must select representation. The Ninth
Circuit is apparently willing to overlook the clear language of the Act
to accommodate the Board's wide discretionary authority in instances
of representation election controversies.
8 7
4. Unfair labor practices
In unfair labor practice cases, application of the "substantial evi-
dence" rule is complicated by the need to examine the findings of the
ALJ as well as those of the Board. The Ninth Circuit will not overturn
an ALJ's findings on the credibility of witnesses unless they are found
181. Vari-Tonics Co. v. NLRB, 589 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1979).
182. See NLRB v. Tri-Ex Tower Corp., 595 F.2d 1, 2 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Sauk
Valley Mfg. Co., 486 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1973); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v.
NLRB, 294 F.2d 393, 395 (9th Cir. 1961).
183. 590 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
184. Id. at 293 (citing International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 393, 395 (9th
Cir. 1961)).
185. 590 F.2d at 293.
186. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
187. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cadillac Steel Prod. Corp., 355 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1966); Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1961); Foreman & Clark, Inc. v.
NLRB, 215 F.2d 396, 409 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 887 (1954).
1980]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
to be "inherently incredible or patently unreasonable."'' 88 When the
Board's decision reverses or modifies an AL's findings, the appellate
court will uphold the Board's findings if they are supported by substan-
tial evidence,1 9 and the Board shall be free to draw its own inferences
from the testimony. 190 The AL's findings regarding credibility, how-
ever, must be given added weight because he "has the responsibility of
evaluating the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony." 191
In Loomis Courier Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 192 the court considered
the petition for review of a Board order which had found an employer
in violation of unfair labor practice provisions of the Act. The ALJ
had found that the shutdown of one of the employer's branches was
effected solely for economic reasons, not because of discriminatory
anti-union motivation. The Board reversed the finding, contending
that the permanent shutdown and discharge of the work force was a per
se violation of the Act because it was "inherently destructive of em-
ployee rights." 193 In its examination of the controversy, the court re-
stated the principles relating to the relative deference to be given the
Board's and the ALU's positions when they differ:
1) [A] reviewing court will not sustain a factual finding which
rests solely on discredited evidence; and 2) even when there is
independent, credited evidence of the Board's decision, a re-
viewing court will scrutinize the Board's findings of fact more
critically if they contradict the AL's factual conclusions than
if they accord with the AL's findings. 194
Applying these principles to the facts before it, the court declined to
enforce the order, noting that the ALJ had expressly credited the testi-
mony of the employer's general manager contradicting the union's tes-
188. NLRB v. Don Burgess Const. Corp., 596 F.2d 378, 383 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v.
Anthony Co., 557 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1977).
189. NLRB v. Pacific Grinding Wheel Co., 572 F.2d 1343, 1347 (9th Cir. 1978). See
NLRB v. Yama Woodcraft, Inc., 580 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1978) (Board adopted AL's deci-
sion in its order but court denied petition to enforce the decision holding the finding unsup-
ported by substantial evidence); Boeing Co. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1978) (Board's
interpretation concerning "recognition clause" had effect of extending a standard recogni-
tion clause into an unbargained for implied jurisdictional clause).
190. See Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1974).
191. Dalewood Rehabilitation Hospital, Inc. v. NLRB, 560 F.2d 77, 80 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977)
(quoting NLRB v. Vegas Vic, Inc., 546 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818
(1977)). See Ward v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 8, 12 (5th Cir. 1972) (quoting Russell-Newman Mfg.
Co. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 247, 249 (5th Cir. 1969)).
192. 595 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1979).
193. Id. at 494.
194. Id. at 496.
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timony upon which the Board's decision had been based. Therefore,
because the Board's finding was based on discredited testimony, invalid
assumptions, and inferences, the court concluded that it did not meet
the substantial evidence rule.195
During the survey period in cases that reversed an AL's decision,
Loomis was the only case in which the Ninth Circuit applied the prin-
ciples of relative deference to each of the tribunal's findings. In the two
other cases, 196 the court justified its increased scrutiny on the ground
that the questions before it were mixtures of fact and law. Accordingly,
the court's scrutiny is strongest when the Board's determination is
purely legal. The level of scrutiny for mixed questions of law and fact
will depend upon the distribution of legal and factual issues therein. 197
A strict application of these standards will not always be sufficient, as
consideration must be given to the inferences drawn by the ALT. For
example, in ALRB v. Warren L. Rose Castings, Inc.,19 8 the court recog-
nized that it was the Board's findings, not those of the ALJ, that were
before the court for review. Since the ALJ's findings are only a part of
the record, if the findings of the ALJ are contrary to the Board's, then
the support underlying the Board's findings is lessened somewhat, but
the basic standard of review remains the same.' 99
II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The declared policy of the National Labor Relations Act is to pro-
mote the free flow of commerce by protecting employees' rights to en-
gage in concerted activity for their "mutual aid" and "protection." 2"
This policy is implemented in section 7 of the NLRA, which gives em-
ployees the right to self-organize, to bargain collectively, to engage in
other concerted activities, and to refrain from engaging in such activi-
ties."' These rights are specifically protected by section 8 of the
NLRA.
20 2
195. Id. at 500.
196. NLRB v. Mercy Peninsula Ambulance Serv., Inc., 589 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. Tomco Communications, Inc., 567 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1978).
197. 589 F.2d at 1019 n.8 (quoting NLRB v. Tomco Communications, Inc., 567 F.2d 871,
876 n.2 (9th Cir. 1978)).
198. 587 F.2d 1005 (9th Cir. 1978).
199. Id. at 1008. If the fact-finder must rely on circumstantial evidence and inferences,
the Board is free to draw its own inferences from the evidence presented. See NLRB v.
Pacific Grinding Wheel Co., 572 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978); Shattuck-Penn Mining Corp. v.
NLRB, 362 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1966).
200. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
201. Id. § 157.
202. Id. § 158.
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A. Interference with Employees' Section 7 Rihts
Under section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, employers may not "interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the exercise of their section 7
rights.113 Section 8(a)(1)'s reach is broad,2° tempered only by amfind-
ing that the employer's actions were justified by substantial, legitimate,
business reasons.2"5 A violation of section 8(a)(1) requires no discrimi-
natory motive or anti-union animus.2°" Rather, the test is whether,
under the circumstances, the employer's conduct reasonably tends to
interfere with the employees' free exercise of their rights.207
Violations of section 8(a)(1) may be dependent or independent.9 8
Dependent 8(a)(1) violations may occur whenever another specific 8(a)
subsection has been violated, e.g., when an employer unlawfully sup-
ports a labor organization,20 9 discharges employees to discourage mem-
bership in a union,"' or discriminates against an employee for giving
testimony before the NLRB. 11 Independent 8(a)(1) violations do not
require a finding of an 8(a) subsection violation, e.g, employer trans-
gression of distribution and solicitation rules, 212 threats, 21 3 promises214
203. Id. § 158(a)(1).
204. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 526 F.2d 817, 823 (2d Cir. 1975):
[Section] 8(a)(1), like § 8(a)(3), protects an employee's right to belong to a union
without interference from an employer . . . . Section 8(a)(1) . . . is broader in
scope and covers anti-union interference in any form.
.. . [T]he coverage of § 8(a)(3) overlaps with that of § 8(a)(1). An employer
with discriminatory hiring policies violates not only the specific § 8(a)(3) mandate
against anti-union employment practices, but also the broader § 8(a)(1) prohibition
against anti-union actions of any form.
205. Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1965) ("Naturally,
certain business reasons will, to some degree, interfere with concerted activities by employ-
ees. But it is only when the interference with § 7 rights outweighs the business justification
for the employer's action that § 8(a)(1) is violated.").
206. Id. at 269.
207. See, e.g., Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 1977)
(conversations between employees and supervisor about union did not tend to restrain or
interfere with employees' exercise of § 7 rights).
208. See, e.g., NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 296-97 (9th Cir. 1978).
209. E.g., ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961) (dependent 8(a)(1) violations in con-
junction with an 8(a)(2)).
210. E.g., Great Chinese Am. Sewing Co. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1978) (depen-
dent 8(a)(1) violation in conjunction with an 8(a)(3)).
211. E.g., NLRB v. Western Clinical Lab., Inc., 571 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1978) (dependent
8(a)(1) violation in conjunction with an 8(a)(4)).
212. E.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (independent 8(a)(l) violation when
employer would not allow employees to distribute union sponsored newsletter containing
articles not immediately pertaining to work); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483
(1978) (independent 8(a)(1) violation when employer forbade employees from soliciting and
distributing union literature in hospital cafeteria during nonworking hours).
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or grants of benefits,215 surveillance, 21 6 and the promotion of decertifi-
cation petitions.
21 7
1. Distribution and solicitation rules
Employers' rules that prohibit organizational solicitation and dis-
tribution are not per se violations of section 8(a)(1), for they often serve
an employer's need to maintain production and discipline.218 Thus, an
employer may enforce no-solicitation/no-distribution rules during
working hours.2 19 Rules prohibiting solicitation or distribution in
working areas during non-working time, however, absent special busi-
ness reasons, are presumed unlawful.
220
In determining whether special business reasons exist, an em-
ployer's property and managerial rights, such as the right to conduct its
business efficiently, are balanced against the employees' right to organ-
213. E.g., NLRB v. Broadmoor Lumber Co., 578 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1978) (independent
8(a)(1) violation when employer warned of job loss if employees associated with union).
214. E.g., id. (independent 8(a)(1) violation when employer promised to meet any de-
mand for benefits in order to get rid of union).
215. E.g., NLRB v. B.C. Hawk Chevrolet, 582 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1978) (independent
8(a)(l) violation when employer instituted benefit programs which it claimed to be as good
as or better than union's).
216. E.g., Hambre Hombre Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1978) (in-
dependent 8(a)(1) violation when company officers watched union meeting from car parked
across the street).
217. E.g., NLRB v. Triumph Curing Center, 571 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1978) (independent
8(a)(1) violation when supervisor circulated decertification petition in an effort to erode em-
ployees' union support).
218. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1944). RepublicAviation
dealt only with rules affecting employees who solicited support or distributed information for
unions. Non-employee union organizers, however, may not violate a non-discriminatory
no-trespass rule unless other reasonable means of communication with the employees are
unavailable. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1956). E.g., Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205 n.41
(1978) (absent "unique obstacles," access to non-employees generally has been denied);
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 314 (1978) ("By opening up his property to employ-
ees, the employer had yielded so much of his private property rights as to allow those em-
ployees to exercise § 7 rights .... [But his private property rights] prevailed over the
intrusion of nonemployee organizers."); NLRB v. S&H Grossinger's, Inc., 372 F.2d 26, 30
(2d Cir. 1967) (union was permitted to enter the employer's premises when a majority of
employees lived on the job site and no effective alternative methods of communicating with
them existed); NLRB v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 225 F.2d 16, 18-19 (9th Cir. 1955) (em-
ployer's no-distribution rule did not violate the NLRA when employees could be contacted
by mail or were easily accessible to non-employee union organizers because they lived in a
nearby small town).
219. Such rules carry a presumption of validity unless evidence proves they were adopted
for a discriminatory purpose. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10
(1944).
220. Id.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L4W REVIEW [Vol. 13
ize and bargain collectively. Special business reasons are usually found
when the primary purpose of an employer's operation is to serve others,
e.g., in the restaurant 22I and retail marketing 222 industries. Union so-
licitation that is carried on when customers are present, even if con-
ducted during an employee's lunch hour or after working hours, could
disrupt the employer's business by driving customers away.223
Although no Ninth Circuit cases dealt with solicitation and distri-
bution restrictions during the survey period, two recent Supreme Court
cases have discussed the limits of permitted solicitation and distribu-
tion with respect to location and subject matter. In NLRB v. Baptist
Hospital, Inc., 224 the Court noted a recent NLRB decision, St. John's
Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc.,225 which had held that an em-
ployer's ban on employee solicitation and distribution is presumed in-
valid except in "strictly patient care areas," 226 absent justification that
the ban is necessary to avoid disruption of patient care.227 The Court
in Baptist Hospital held that the employer-hospital had justified its no-
solicitation rule in corridors and waiting rooms accessible to patients as
well as in "immediate patient care" areas but had not supported its ban
on solicitation in the cafeteria, gift shops, and lobby.228 In Baptist Hos-
pital, the hospital-employer had instituted a ban on all solicitation by
employees in any area accessible to the public. The NLRB had held
that the rule was too broad, restricting its enforcement to areas of im-
221. Marriott Corp. (Children's Inn), 223 N.L.R.B. 978 (1976) (ban not limited to cus-
tomer or sales areas of restaurant held overly broad); Banker's Club, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 22
(1975) (rule prohibiting solicitation in banquet room of private club held overly broad when
room was used exclusively by employees one-half hour each day).
222. Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952) (no-solicitation rule
invalid in non-selling areas of department store); In re Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 77 N.L.R.B.
1262 (1948) (no-solicitation rule on selling floors could be extended to public restaurants of
department stores).
223. In re May Dep't Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 981 (1944), enforced as modified, 154
F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946).
224. 99 S. Ct. 2598 (1979).
225. 222 N.L.R.B. 1150 (1976), enforced as modfed, 557 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1977) (de-
nying enforcement of Board's order allowing employee solicitation and distribution in hos-
pital's hallways, elevators, stairways, and waiting rooms that were accessible to patients
when numerous other employee-only areas existed).
226. "Strictly patient care areas" were defined as patients' rooms, operating rooms, and
treatment areas, including therapy and x-ray areas. 222 N.L.R.B. at 1150.
227. Id. The Court in Bapist Hospital agreed with the NLRB that substantial weight
must be given to the need to avoid disruption of patient care when balancing employers' and
employees' interests. 99 S. Ct. at 2605 (citing Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 505
(1978)).
228. Id. at 2605. Cf. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978) (employer could
not justify no-solicitation/no-distribution ban in cafeteria as being detrimental to patient
care since only 1.56% of cafeteria patrons were patients, while 77% were employees).
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mediate patient care as defined in St. John's Hospital. The Court, how-
ever, found that the ban on solicitation was necessary in the hallways
and sitting rooms of patients' floors in order for the hospital to main-
tain the tranquil atmosphere needed for the patients' recuperation.229
Yet, the ban's applicability to the gift and coffee shops and first floor
lobby was struck down because only patients considered healthy
enough to withstand the activities in those aieas were allowed to visit
them.23o
Distribution of union sponsored non-organizational material was
discussed by the Supreme Court in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB.2 3' The Court
expressly confined its ruling to the facts of the case232 when it upheld
the distribution of a union sponsored newsletter that protested a presi-
dential veto of an increase in the federal minimum wage and urged
employee action regarding a state right-to-work statute.233 The Court
held that handing out the newsletter in nonworking areas of the em-
ployer's premises during nonworking time was protected under section
7's "mutual aid and protection" clause because the veto of a federal
minimum wage increase was found to be of immediate concern to em-
ployees.234 In addition, the Court determined that incorporating a state
right-to-work statute into a revised state constitution could elevate a
scheme inimical to union security into a constitutional mandate.2 35
The Eastex Court further held that the rule announced in Republic
229. 99 S. Ct. at 2604-05. The Court noted the tremendous part that patients' psychologi-
cal attitudes play in their recovery, the increased importance of patient mobility during recu-
peration, the use of corridors on patients' floors to move the more critically ill, and the use of
the corridors and waiting rooms for conferences during times of crises. Id.
230. Id. at 2606.
231. 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
232. Id. at 575.
233. Id. at 569-70. The union newsletter consisted of four sections. The first and fourth
urged participation in and extolled the virtues of the union. The second section urged em-
ployees to ask their legislators to oppose incorporation of the state's right-to-work statute
into the state constitution. The third section noted that the President had just vetoed an
increase in the federal minimum wage and then urged employees to register to vote so that
those more sympathetic to labor could be elected. See also Kaiser Eng'rs v. NLRB, 538 F.2d
1379, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1976) (lobbying legislators for changes in national policies which
affect job security is protected by the "mutual aid and protection" clause); NLRB v. Tanner
Motor Livery Ltd., 349 F.2d 1, 3-4 (9th Cir. 1965) (employees' efforts to promote racially
non-discriminatory hiring practices are protected under "collective bargaining" and "mutual
aid and protection" clauses).
234. 437 U.S. at 575.
235. Id. at 569 ("union security is 'central to the union concept of strength through soli-
darity"' and is a mandatory subject of bargaining in states without right-to-work statutes)
(quoting Eastex, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 271, 274 (1974), enforced, 550 F.2d 198 (1977), a'd, 438
U.S. 556 (1978)).
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Aviation Corp. v. NLARB,23 6 which allowed employees to distribute
literature in nonworking areas on nonworking time, should not be lim-
ited by distinctions between types of literature.237 After balancing the
employee' and employer's interests, the Court found that the em-
ployer's only property right was the right to prevent the distribution of
literature on its property-employers cannot choose, on the basis of
content, which distributions to suppress.238
2. Interrogation and polling
Interrogation of employees by an employer does not constitute a
per se violation of the NLRA;239 rather, violations depend upon the
facts of a given case.2' If questioning occurs in an atmosphere which
236. 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945).
237. 437 U.S. at 572-74 (purely organizational literature versus literature covering all
other activity protected by § 7).
238. Id. at 573.
239. The Supreme Court has stated that "an employer's free speech right to communicate
his views to his employees is firmly established and cannot be infringed by a union" or the
NLRB. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969). This right is implemented
by § 8(c), which permits employers and unions to express any views, whether written or oral,
as long as the expressions contain no threats of reprisal, force or promises of benefits in
violation of § 8(a)(1). 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976). An employer may state his legal rights,
make objective predictions about the probable effects of unionization on his company, and
give any opinions or advice as long as the statements are neither coercive nor made under
coercive conditions. Hecla Mining Co. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 309, 314 (9th Cir. 1977) (isolated,
non-threatening statements by company officials reflected their personal opinions, not com-
pany policy, and therefore were protected by § 8(c)). Cf. NLRB v. Four Winds Indus., 530
F.2d 75, 78 (9th Cir. 1976) (employer literature contained veiled threat of job loss, rather
than mere prediction of election outcome).
While the Ninth Circuit did not consider employer conduct under § 8(c) during the
survey period, other circuits found certain actions by employers protected by this section.
E.g., Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1979) (letter to employees advis-
ing them of right to talk to attorney before talking to NLRB representative was not attempt
to frustrate NLRB investigations but was expression of opinion regarding employees' right);
NLRB v. South Shore Hosp., 571 F.2d 677 (1st Cir. 1978) ("what the union got the employ-
ees, the hospital employees would also get" was honest answer regarding company policy);
NLRB v. Douglas Div., Scott & Fitzer Co., 570 F.2d 742 (8th Cir. 1978) (isolated and joking
conversations, non-committal answers, and lack of anti-union animus indicated that em-
ployer's questions were non-coercive; rather, were simply employer's views forthrightly
communicated to employees).
240. See, e.g., NLRB v. Armstrong Circuit, Inc., 462 F.2d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam) (finding of coercion in employer questioning of employees' union sentiment was
supported by subsequent unlawful discharge); Daniel Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 805,
812-13 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965) (conversations between supervisor
and employees who were all close friends, which would support finding of no coercion, were
nevertheless coercive when considered with all other facts of the case). See also Bourne v.
NLRB, 332 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (factors to consider are prior employer
hostility, nature of information sought, identity of questioner, place and method of interro-
gation, and truthfulness of reply).
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tends to coerce or restrain the exercise of employees' section 7 rights,
then it is prohibited.241 Thus, unless certain safeguards are followed,
an employer violates section 8(a)(1) when he polls his employees about
their union sympathies.242 The court in Struksnes Construction Co.243
set forth several safeguards: (1) the poll's purpose must be to determine
the truth of a union's majority claim; (2) this purpose must be commu-
nicated to the employees; (3) the employees must be given assurances
against reprisal; (4) polling should be conducted by secret ballot; and
(5) the employer cannot have committed other unfair labor practices or
have otherwise created a coercive atmosphere.
In several cases during the survey period, the Ninth Circuit found
that employers had violated section 8(a)(1) by coercively interrogating
or polling their employees. For example, in Free-Flow Packaging Corp.
v. NLRB,24 the employer questioned his employees about their union
sympathies, threatened job loss if the union won, and promised em-
ployment benefits if the union lost.245 The court found ample testi-
mony to support the NLRB's determination that a violation of section
8(a)(1) had occurred.2 4 6 In NLRB v. Broadmoor Lumber Co.,247 the
241. NLRB v. Deutsch Co., 445 F.2d 902, 904 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 988
(1972) (interrogation is an unfair labor practice when it contains threats or promises or is
part of an overall coercive atmosphere); Conolon Corp. v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 324, 330 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 908 (1971) (interrogation must be accompanied by coercion
to constitute a violation of § 8(a)(1)); NLRB v. McCatron, 216 F.2d 212, 216 (9th Cir. 1954)
(violation occurs when questioning involves threats or promises or is part of a pattern that
tends to restrain or coerce employees).
242. Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967) (supplemental decision and order).
It is the NLRB's view that "any attempt by an employer to ascertain" employees' union
sympathies tends to cause a fear of reprisal and thus impinges on the exercise of § 7 rights.
Therefore, polling employees while a petition for an NLRB election is pending is an unnec-
essary intrusion on those rights and violates the NLRA. Id. at 1063. Polling employees to
determine a union's. claim for recognition, however, serves a legitimate interest of the em-
ployer and is lawful as long as appropriate safeguards are followed. Id.
243. 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063 (1967). See NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,
609 (1969) ("reasonable polling [to verify majority status] will not always be termed violative
of § 8(a)(1) if conducted in accordance with the requirements set out in Struksnes"). Ac-
cord, NLRB v. B.C. Hawk Chevrolet, Inc., 582 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v.
Super Toys, Inc., 458 F.2d 180, 182-83 (9th Cir. 1972).
244. 566 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1978).
245. Id. at 1131. The plant manager was instructed by the vice-president to determine
which employees had started the union organization efforts and which supported the union.
Free-Flow Packaging Corp., 219 N.L.R.B. 925, 938 (1975). During the next week, the plant
manager talked with several employees at the plant trying to ascertain the employees' atti-
tude toward the union. Similar conversations were held in subsequent weeks, but the em-
ployee-witnesses were generally unable to recall specific dates or places. Id.
246. 566 F.2d at 1131. The employer's principal contention on appeal was that the
NLRB had denied the employer due process by amending the complaint to include the
allegation of coercive interrogation. The court held that the NLRB could amend the com-
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court cited Free-Flow Packaging for the proposition that interrogation
of employees about their union activity violates section 8(a)(1). Fol-
lowing a union demand for recognition, the sales clerks had been ques-
tioned about their union activities and were threatened with job loss if
union affiliation continued.24 As in Free-Flow Packaging, the court in
Broadmoor Lumber found that the record clearly supported the
NLRB's decision.249
Polling of employees in violation of section 8(a)(1) was found in
NLRB v. B. C Hawk Chevrolet, Inc. 250 Noting the Ninth Circuit's prior
approval of the polling safeguards set forth in Struksnes Construction,
the court found that those safeguards were violated because the em-
ployer had not given the employees any assurances against reprisal;
furthermore, a public vote, rather than a secret ballot, had been
taken.251 In addition, the polling had been conducted in a coercive at-
mosphere-the employer's service manager was present and a secretary
took notes of the meeting at which the vote was taken.25 2
3. Surveillance
Another independent violation of section 8(a)(1) occurs when sur-
veillance by an employer interferes with, restrains, or coerces an em-
ployee in the exercise of his section 7 rights.253  The employee
reasonably may assume that reprisals for his pro-union activity will re-
sult from the employer's actual or implied surveillance.254 Creating the
plaint because the coercive interrogation issue was fully litigated during the original exami-
nation of the union's charges. Id.
247. 578 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1978).
248. Id. at 241. During the month after the union's demand for recognition, the own-
er/president separately questioned three salesmen about their union sympathies. The sales-
men testified that the questioning involved threats to fire employees who joined the union
and a warning to stay away from the union representative. Broadmoor Lumber Co., 227
N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125-26, 1129-30 (1977). The opinion did not mention where the question-
ing took place.
249. 578 F.2d at 241. The court noted that several clerks testified regarding the coercive
questioning, and that the ALU, who had observed their demeanor, chose to believe their
testimony rather than that of the owner/president. Id. See also NLRB v. Prineville Stud
Co., 578 F.2d 1292, 1294 (9th Cir. 1978) (as amended on denial of rehearing) (Interrogation
about union activity accompanied by threats of plant shutdown); NLRB v. Randall P. Kane,
Inc., 581 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1978) (interrogation conducted in an atmosphere of threats,
intimidation, and surveillance).
250. 582 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1978).
251. Id. (noting prior approval in NLRB v. Super Toys, Inc., 458 F.2d 180 (9th Cir.
1972)).
252. Id.
253. Eg., Alexander Dawson, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1978).
254. Oil Workers nt'l Union v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 575, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting Hen-
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impression that the employees' union activities are under surveillance
is unlawful because it may create a fear of reprisal, thus adversely af-
fecting an employee's decision to exercise his section 7 rights.255
Surveillance may also invalidate an election. In the 1978 case of
Hambre Hombre Enterprises v. NLRB,2 56 the employers, five weeks
before an election, sat in a car parked across from the site of a union
meeting. 5 7 The NLRB found that this surveillance was an unfair labor
practice and that the activity invalidated the election.
258
4. Threats and withholding of benefits
Employer statements that threaten reprisal against union support-
ers are prohibited by section 8(c). 59 During the survey period, the
Ninth Circuit found that substantial evidence supported section 8(c)
violations involving threats of job loss, 2 60 plant closure,26 1 stricter
drix Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 100, 104-05 n.7 (5th Cir. 1963)) (supervisor's attendance at
union meeting and subsequent report to employer constituted unlawful surveillance). But
see NLRB v. Computed Time Corp., 587 F.2d 790, 794 (5th Cir. 1979) (mere presence of
supervisor at organizational meeting not unlawful surveillance when there is no evidence of
interference, coercion, or restraint).
255. Efg., NLRB v. Ultra-Sonic De-Burring, Inc., 593 F.2d 123, 124 (9th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) (employer conceded it had created the unlawful impression that it was surveilling its
employees); NLRB v. Tamper, Inc., 522 F.2d 781, 785 (4th Cir. 1975) (supervisor's statement
that he knew what was going on created an unlawful impression of surveillance); NLRB v.
Hotel Conquistador, Inc., 398 F.2d 430, 434 (9th Cir. 1968) (comments concerning a list of
union workers created the impression of unlawful surveillance).
256. 581 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1978).
257. Hambre Hombre Enterprises, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 136, 143-44 (1977). The employer
did not contest the NLRB finding that the surveillance invalidated the election. 581 F.2d at
206 n.2.
258. 228 N.L.R.B. at 136-37. The NLRB had found that the unlawful surveillance and
illegal discharge were such serious and substantial invasions of the employees' § 7 rights that
the only effective remedy was a bargaining order. Id.
259. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976).
260. NLRB v. Randall P. Kane, Inc., 581 F.2d 215, 217-18 (9th Cir. 1978) (employer
threatened to replace all busboys with less expensive alien labor); Great Chinese Am. Sew-
ing Co. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 251, 253, 254 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (supervisor told union
card signers they need not return to work); NLRB v. Broadmoor Lumber Co., 578 F.2d 238,
240, 241 (9th Cir. 1978) (three employees warned of job loss if they associated with the
union); Free-Flow Packaging Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 1978) (employer
promised benefits or threatened job loss, depending on outcome of union election).
261. NLRB v. Tri-City Linen Supply, 579 F.2d 51, 54 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978) (employer
threatened that business would be sold in 30 days if union won); NLRB v. Prineville Stud
Co., 578 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1978) (threat to close down made one day after union
meeting); Great Chinese Am. Sewing Co. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1978) (presi-
dent threatened to close shop if union won). See NLRB v. Triumph Curing Center, 571
F.2d 462, 469 (9th Cir. 1978) (supervisor/union shop steward dissatisfied with union stated
plant would be closed if employees did not withdraw from union).
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working conditions, fewer benefits, and cuts in pay.
2 6 2
Withholding "well-established or previously promised benefits be-
cause of a union organizing campaign 263 or an anticipated representa-
tion election also violates section 8(a)(1). In Free-Flow Packaging Corp.
v. NLRB,264 the employer had refused to grant a wage increase prior to
a representation election. The court stated that to find a violation in
this instance, the withholding would have to constitute a change in a
previous pattern of existing employment conditions.265 The court held
that no such clear pattern existed because during the three years prior
to the alleged violation there had been only irregular wage increases.266
Examining the employer's motive in denying the increase, the court
found no anti-union animus; the employer had followed legal advice
that the granting of a wage increase just before the union election could
constitute an unfair labor practice absent a more clearly established
prior commitment to a raise.267
5. Promises or grants of benefits
Promises of benefits are also explicitly forbidden by section 8(c).
268
Thus, an employer's promise to meet any union demand for benefits if
his striking employees will return to work has been found to be coer-
cive.26 9 Similarly, an employer's promise to increase wages if the union
loses a representation election has been held to be a section 8(c) viola-
tion.27o
Grants of benefits have been compared to "a fist inside the velvet
glove"'27 because the employee can infer that the employer's economic
power will be used to harm as well as benefit him. In 1978, the Ninth
Circuit found an unlawful grant of benefits when an employer insti-
tuted additional benefit programs after a collective bargaining agree-
262. NLRB v. Randall P. Kane, Inc., 581 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1978) (employer
threatened that tough new rules, lower wages, and lost benefits would result from unioniza-
tion).
263. Free-Flow Packaging Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 1978).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1129. "'The cases make it crystal clear that the vice involved in . . . the
unlawful refusal to increase situation is that the employer has changed the existing condi-
tions of employment. It is this change which is prohibited and which forms the basis of the
unfair labor practice charge."' Id. (quoting NLRB v. Dothan Eagle, Inc., 434 F.2d 93, 98
(5th Cir. 1970)).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1128-29, 1130.
268. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976).
269. See NLRB v. Broadmoor Lumber Co., 578 F.2d 238, 241 (9th Cir. 1978).
270. See Great Chinese Am. Sewing Co. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 251, 253-54 (9th Cir. 1978).
271. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1963).
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ment had been signed, thereby showing "that the [c]ompany could do
as well as or better than the [u]nion."272
6. Employer assistance to secure union repudiation
Within the Ninth Circuit, an employer violates section 8(a)(1)
when he instigates or promotes a union repudiating document, such as
a decertification petition, particularly when accompanied by promises
or threats.273 The court reasons that such employer activities are calcu-
lated to erode union support.2 74 Whether an employer unlawfully as-
sisted its employees to repudiate their union was examined in NLB v.
Triumph Curing Center.275 A supervisor had circulated a decertilica-
tion petition without the knowledge of her employer. Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit found the employer to be in violation of section 8(a)(1)
because of the supervisor's position of authority, which could cause
other employees to believe that the supervisor spoke for her em-
ployer.276 Moreover, even without the petition, the court found sub-
stantial evidence to justify the NLRB's finding of a section 8(a)(1)
violation; various company officials had advised and aided striking em-
ployees in sending withdrawal telegrams to their union so that they
could return to work.
2 7 7
272. NLRB v. B.C. Hawk Chevrolet, Inc., 582 F.2d 491, 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1978). Medi-
cal, dental, pension, and bonus plans were enacted two to three months prior to the effective
date of the collective bargaining contract. The company service manager had stated that the
company's benefit programs would counteract the union's programs. Id. at 493. Cf. NLRB
v. South Shore Hosp., 571 F.2d 677, 681-82 (Ist Cir. 1978) (remark that "what the union got
the union employees, the hospital employees would also get" was an honest answer about
company policy to question posed at employee meeting during organizational campaign).
273. NLRB v. Sky Wolf Sales, 470 F.2d 827, 829-30 (9th Cir. 1972) (employer assisted the
circulation of decertification petitions).
274. NLRB v. Triumph Curing Center, 571 F.2d 462, 470 (9th Cir. 1978).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 471. The supervisor was also a union shop steward. Upset with her vacation
pay, she became dissatisfied with the union, ascertained how to withdraw, and circulated a
decertification petition. Testimony was received indicating she also said that benefits would
be better without the union and that the plant would close if the union was not repudiated.
Id. at 469.
277. Id. at 470. After the union went on strike to protest the employer's bargaining con-
duct, the supervisor, as well as the employer's labor negotiator and plant manager called or
sent letters to the striking employees offering them jobs if they withdrew from the union.
They assisted those employees wishing to return to work by telling them how to withdraw
and lending them use of the company telephone to facilitate their withdrawal. Id. at 469-70.
The court stated: "These incidents represent the type of promises of economic benefit and
employer assistance to secure union repudiation which are prohibited by the Act." Id. at
471.
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7. Right to representation in investigatory interviews
In NLRB v. J Weingarten, Inc.,278 the Supreme Court held that
employees have a right to representation in an investigatory interview
when the employee requesting representation reasonably believes the
investigation will result in disciplinary action. 7 9 Justice Brennan, writ-
ing for a 6-3 majority, viewed the employee's request for representation
not only as the protected activity of an individual under section 7 but
also as a safeguard of "the interests of the entire bargaining unit. 280
Thus, the Court found that an employer's denial of an employee's re-
quest for union representation during an interview investigating a food
theft and unauthorized free lunches violated the right to representa-
tion.2
81
In 1978, the Ninth Circuit discussed the Weingarten rule in Alfred
M Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB.212 To obtain the right to representation, the
court stated that (1) the interview must give rise to the reasonable belief
that disciplinary action is probable or is being seriously considered, (2)
the employee's participation must be compelled, and (3) a factual in-
vestigation remains a significant part of the interview. 283 The court
found that the right accrued at counselling sessions, which were the first
step in the disciplinary system, especially since a policy allowing union
representatives at such meetings recently had been improperly termi-
278. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
279. Id. at 257. Accord, ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975) (companion
case to Weingarten) (discharged employee was denied union representative at investigatory
interview; she and shop chairlady who persisted in seeking to represent her were ordered
reinstated under § 8(a)(1)). See generally Lewis v. Greyhound Lines-East, 555 F.2d 1053
(D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977) (union president's statement that employee was
not entitled to representation at disciplinary meeting did not breach union's duty of fair
representation since it was made prior to Weingarten); Glomac Plastics, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B.
1309 (1978), enforced, 600 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1979) (the right accrues to employees denied union
representation because of their employer's refusal to bargain in good faith).
280. 420 U.S. at 260-61 (1975).
281. Id. at 252-56.
282. 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978). The employer suspended or discharged several em-
ployees after unilaterally terminating its policy of permitting union representation at coun-
selling and disciplinary procedures. Id. at 406.
283. Id. at 410-11. The court examines an investigatory interview objectively to deter-
mine whether it may lead to disciplinary action. Id. at 410. The court, in explaining Wein.
garten, distinguished four types of interviews: counselling or training conversations which
carry no reasonable expectation of disciplinary action; investigatory interviews which may
lead to disciplinary action; disciplinary interviews which involve some investigation; and
disciplinary interviews in which the action to be taken is merely explained to the employee
and no investigation takes place. The right accrues only in the second and third types of
interviews.
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nated.284 There was no violation, however, with respect to those em-
ployees who were merely informed of predetermined disciplinary
action.
28 5
B. Employer Domination of, Inteqference with, and
Assistance to a Union
The purpose of section 8(a)(2)28 6 is to ensure that the employees'
collective bargaining representative will be able to represent fairly its
employees without fear of employer interference, domination, or sup-
port.287 While section 8(a)(2) was involved in much litigation in the
late 1930's and 1940's, actions under this section have decreased con-
siderably. 2 8 The principal issue litigated when this section was first
enacted was employer domination of a union.28 9 Currently courts are
grappling with the fine line between beneficial "cooperation" with un-
ions and unlawful "support," and the propriety of employer support of
one union when a second union is engaged in organizing or has major-
ity support.290 When dealing with the distinction between support and
cooperation, a line is drawn between an employer's actions which indi-
284. Id. at 410. Cf. Spartan Stores, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 522 (1978) (employee was unlaw-
fully discharged for refusing to participate in an investigatory interview without a union
representative present); South-Western Bell Tel. Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1223 (1977) (foreman
unlawfully threatened to take matter to higher management if employees insisted upon
union representation during individual disciplinary interviews involving investigation of al-
leged misconduct).
285. 587 F.2d at 411. Accord, NLRB v. Certified Grocers, Ltd., 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir.
1978) (no violation when purpose of meeting, at which representation was denied, was sim-
ply to issue a warning and give a disciplinary layoff notice; plant manager refused to discuss
the notice with employee); NLRB v. Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1976) (no viola-
tion when sole purpose of meeting was to notify employee of discharge). Cf. Climax Molyb-
denum Co. v. NLRB, 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978) (no violation to deny union
representative's request to meet with employees on company time prior to investigatory in-
terview which employees believed would lead to disciplinary action); Mt. Vernon Tanker
Co. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1977) (no violation for ship captain to require seaman's
unrepresented attendance at explanatory "logging"); Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 227 N.L.R.B.
1276 (1977) (employer has no obligation to postpone interview when requested union repre-
sentative unavailable but another representative whose presence could have been requested
is available; employer has prerogative to avoid delay).
286. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976).
287. Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 875 (1975).
288. R. GORmAN, BASIC TExr ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 196 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GORMAN].
289. Domination was found when the employer actually controlled the union and the
employees' participation was induced largely by fear of the consequences if they did not
support the union. NLRB v. Wemyss, 212 F.2d 465, 471-72 (9th Cir. 1954) (dictum) (em-
ployer interfered with the union by giving it preferential use of the employer's premises).
290. GORMAN, supra note 288, at 196.
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cate control over the union (support) and those actions which merely
assist employees in carrying out their freedom to choose the type of
organization they wish or which aid in complying with union requests
(cooperation).291
When two or more unions are vying for representational status,
the NLRB has declared,292 and the Ninth Circuit has enforced,293 the
rule that an employer may not recognize any union when conflicting
claims of multiple unions "give rise to a real question concerning repre-
sentation [until a union's] right to be recognized has finally been deter-
mined under the special procedures provided by the Act."2 94 The
Ninth Circuit has delineated two types of situations that raise the em-
ployer's duty of neutrality.295 The first involves multiple unions com-
peting for exclusive representation, "none of which have had prior
collective bargaining agreements with the employer." 296 In such cases,
the employer may not rely on a card check to verify a majority claim
unless the competing unions are allowed either to submit proof of their
own majority support or to discredit the first union's support.297 The
291. See, e.g., Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 1974), cer. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975) (no unlawful employer support when employer participated in
approval and operation of in-house committee system which was employee-initiated and
approved). See also ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961) (unlawful support found when
employer had bona fide but mistaken belief that union achieved majority status; employer
violated § 8(a)(2) by recognizing minority union); NLRB v. Mercy Peninsula Ambulance
Serv., Inc., 589 F.2d 1014, 1016 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979) (employer admitted violating § 8(a)(2) by
requiring employees to declare their allegiance to the union as soon as they accepted em-
ployment); NLRB v. Wemyss, 212 F.2d 465,471 (9th Cir. 1954) (dicta) (courts must examine
whether employees' union support exists through their own free choice or through fear of
reprisal); Interstate Eng'r, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 1, 4 (1977), enforced, 583 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.
1978) (§ 8(a)(2) violation found when employer supplanted employee-elected grievance
committee with one chaired by company president, scheduled the meetings, paid the mem-
bers for attending, and controlled the topics to be discussed and written meeting summaries
given to the other employees).
292. See, e.g., Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1070 (1945) (presented
with conflicting claims by rival unions, employer unlawfully disregarded duty of neutrality
by negotiating with one of the unions).
293. See, e.g., Retail Clerks, Local 770 v. NLRB, 370 F.2d 205, 207 (9th Cir. 1966)
(union's bare assertion of representation plus employer's apparent willingness to bargain did
not give rise to real question of representation; thus, recognition of second union after re-
ceipt of evidence of representation was valid).
294. Id.
295. Buck Knives, Inc. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 1319, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying Mid-
west Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1070 (1945)).
296. Id. at 1320. Eg., Intalco Aluminum Corp. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 36 (9th Cir. 1969)
(employer's recognition of minority union unlawful because competing unions were not
given a chance to submit evidence contradicting that union's majority claim).
297. Buck Knives, Inc. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 1319, 1320 (9th Cir. 1977); Intalco Aluminum
Corp. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 36, 39 (9th Cir. 1969).
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second situation involves multiple unions competing for exclusive rep-
resentation when one of them has a current collective bargaining agree-
ment that does not cover the sought after employees.298 Absent
coercion or deception, in this second situation, an employer does not
violate section 8(a)(2) when exclusive recognition is based upon a
"clear demonstration of majority support.
' 2 99
C. Discrimination by Employers
The purpose of section 8(a)(3) is to prevent an employer from en-
couraging or discouraging union membership through discriminatory
terms and conditions of employment.Y Since not all discouragement
or encouragement is a violation of this subsection,30' the employer's
anti-union animus must be shown in order to establish an unlawful
discrimination. °2
The quantum of anti-union animus required to establish an 8(a)(3)
violation has not been conclusively determined.3"3 The Ninth and First
Circuits generally require that the anti-union animus be the dominant
motive for the discharge, while the NLRB and the other circuits gener-
ally require that it merely be apart of the motive.3°1 The Ninth Circuit
298. Buck Knives, Inc. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 1319, 1320 (9th Cir. 1977). E.g., NLRB v.
Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., 507 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975)
(recognition lawful when recognized union had present contract with employer covering
other employees and clearly demonstrated majority support of the sought-after employees in
62-28 election); Fraser & Johnston Co. v: NLRB, 469 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1972) (employer
unlawfully recognized rival union at new plant when old employees transferring to new
plant were already represented by another union); NLRB v. Peter Paul, Inc., 467 F.2d 700
(9th Cir. 1972) (no violation for employer to continue bargaining with union which had
represented employees for twenty years and which demonstrated majority support after rival
union filed petition for election).
299. NLRB v. Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., 507 F.2d 411, 412 (9th Cir. 1974). But cf. Plays-
kool, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972), rev'd, 477 F.2d 66, 69-71 (7th Cir. 1973) (Seventh Circuit
disagreed with Board's position that the only requirement necessary to establish real ques-
tion of representation is that rival union's claim "not be clearly unsupportable or lacking in
substance"; that court holds that there is no question concerning representation if incumbent
union demonstrates clear majority support).
300. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
301. See Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-43 (1954) (§ 8(a)(3) outlaws "only such
discrimination as encourages or discourages membership in a labor organization").
302. Compare NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1966) (employer dis-
criminatorily refused to give vacation payments to striking employees while granting them
to non-striking employees) with Loomis Courier Serv. v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir.
1979) (plant closure supported by valid economic reasons).
303. Hambre Hombre Enterprises v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 204, 207 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978); West-
ern Exterminator Co. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1114, 1118 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977).
304. Compare NLRB v. South Shore Hosp., 571 F.2d 677, 684 (1st Cir. 1978) (NLRB has
burden of showing "the employer's dominant motive was.. .[anti-]union animus") (em-
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was asked to reconsider its standard in Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc.
v. NLRB 30 5 but declined to take a position since the decision would
have been the same under either standard.3°
A presumption of anti-union animus arises when an employer's
actions are "inherently destructive of employee rights. ' 30 7 The Ninth
Circuit has stated that this phrase is hard to define 30 8 and that viola-
tions under this standard are rare.309 In Loomis Courier Service v.
phasis added) and Western Exterminator Co. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1114, 1118 n.3 (9th Cir.
1977) (protected union activity must be the "moving cause" or "dominant motive" behind
discharge) with Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir.
1978) (discharge motivated by anti-union animus); M.S.P. Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d
166, 173-74 (10th Cir. 1977) (anti-union animus must be "whole or material part" of mo-
tive); Neptune Water Meter Co. v. NLRB, 551 F.2d 568, 569 (4th Cir. 1977) ("It is settled in
this circuit, and most of the others, that 'it is enough that a discriminatory motive was a
factor in the employer's decision.' ") (quoting Winchester Spinning Corp. v. NLRB, 402
F.2d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1968)) (emphasis added). But see NLRB v. Ayer Lar Sanitarium, 436
F.2d 45, 50-(9th Cir. 1970) ("The test is whether the business reason or the protected union
activity is the moving cause behind the discharge.. . . In other words, would this employee
have been discharged butfor his union activity?") (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
305. 582 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1978).
306. Id. at 473. Six employees were discharged after they refused to attend a meeting
with management to discuss their discontent. The court found that the close timing of the
employees' organizational activities to the subsequent discharges, together with manage-
ment's hostility to the employees' representative, clearly established the company's anti-or-
ganizational bias. In addition, the court found insufficient evidence to support a valid
business reason for the discharges. Id. at 473-74. The court stated that it required that the
discriminatory motive be the moving cause of the discharge, while the NLRB usually re-
quired a finding that, but for their union activity, the employees would not have been fired.
Id.
307. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-31 (1963) (grant of super-seniority
to non-strikers was inherently destructive). See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388
U.S. 26, 34 (1967) (dictum) (no proof of anti-union motive necessary when employer's dis-
criminatory conduct was "'inherently destructive' of important employee rights").
308. Loomis Courier Serv. v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1978). In NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967), the Supreme Court described the standard
of proof necessary to find conduct "inherently destructive" as one that requires the employer
to both foresee and intend the consequences of his actions. The Ninth Circuit has stated
further that cases finding conduct to be "inherently destructive" usually involve far-reaching
negative effects on employees' section 7 rights or involve conduct based solely on participa-
tion in union activity. Portland Willamette Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 1331, 1334 (9th Cir.
1976).
309. Loomis Courier Serv. v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1978). Few cases in the
Ninth Circuit have relied on the holding of Erie Resistor or on the dicta of Great Dane
Trailers, note 308 supra, to support a finding of "inherently destructive" behavior. See, e.g.,
Kaiser Eng'rs v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1976) (employee unlawfully dis-
charged for drafting letter sent to legislators in effort to protect jobs); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v.
NLRB, 390 F.2d 338, 343 (9th Cir. 1968) (employee discharged for making pro-strike com-
ment; this was directly related to protected activity and thus "inherently destructive"). But
cf. Western Exterminator Co. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1114, 1117 n.2, 1118 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977)
(isolated discharge is not "inherently destructive;" NLRB must balance employer's and em-
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NLRB,3 10 the court rejected the NLRB's finding of inherently destruc-
tive conduct and agreed with the factual findings of the ALJ when he
held that the employer did not violate sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). The
employer stopped delivery operations at one of its branches due to high
operating costs and terminated all the persons employed there. Picket-
ing began at other branch sites, and in order to avoid a much larger
financial loss, the employer reopened the branch. The NLRB deter-
mined that the employer intended a temporary closure to discourage
union activities. In re-examining the evidence, however, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found substantial business reasons for the closure and reversed the
Board's finding.31
1. Discrimination in hiring and rehiring
Persons protected by section 8(a)(3) include applicants for employ-
ment, as well as persons already employed.312 The Ninth Circuit found
that employment was unlawfully denied in Alexander Dawson, Inc. v.
NLRB 313 as a result of the applicants' prior union affiliation or activi-
ties. 314 The court enforced the NLRB order requiring the employer to
offer those applicants employment in the positions they would have
had absent discrimination and to make those applicants whole through
back pay.
315
Reemployment was discriminatorily denied in Polynesian Cultural
Center, Inc. v. NLRB 316 because the job applicant was denied reem-
ployment due to her support of six discharged employees. As in Alex-
ander Dawson, the court in Polynesian Cultural Center enforced the
ployees' interests; thus courts may uphold employer's conduct despite "inherently destruc-
tive" characterization); Portland Willamette Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 1331, 1334 (9th Cir.
1976) (distinguishing Erie Resistor) (granting retroactive pay increases to non-strikers had
no continuing consequences, thus not "inherently destructive").
310. 595 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1979).
311. Id. at 499-500.
312. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 183-85
(1941) (employer unlawfully refused to hire applicants because of their union activities);
Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 467, 474 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978) (discrimina-
tory refusal to hire and discriminatory termination are both violations of § 8(a)(3)); K.B.&J.
Young's Super Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 463, 466 n.4 (9th Cir. 1967) (well estab-
lished that § 8(a)(3) discrimination refers to applicants as well as existing employees).
313. 568 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
314. Id. at 1304. The employer had an active policy to remain non-union. Toward that
end, it interrogated applicants regarding their present union status and sympathies and in-
formed them of its non-union policy when interviewing them for jobs. Alexander Dawson,
Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 165, 172-73 (1977).
315. 568 F.2d at 1302, 1304.
316. 582 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1978).
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NLRB order requiring the employer to offer the applicant a job sub-
stantially equivalent to the one she would have had if hired earlier and
to make her whole through back pay.
317
2. Discharge
Terminating an employee to discourage or encourage union in-
volvement is strictly forbidden by section 8(a)(3).3 18 During the survey
period, the Ninth Circuit held that several specific acts constituted dis-
criminatory discharges. An employee was discharged just hours after
being seen distributing union cards and literature and discussing union
proposals in NLRB v. Warren L. Rose Castings, Inc. 31 9 Conflicting tes-
timony regarding a reprimand for tardiness and absences was the only
business justification presented.32 °
Prominent union supporters were terminated in NLRB v. Randall
P. Kane, Inc. 321 and Great Chinese American Sewing Co. v. NLRB.
322
In the former case, the employee was discharged after a year of union
promotion because the owner was "tired of... [the employee's] inter-
fering with the day-to-day operation of the place." 323 In the latter case,
the employer stated that it discharged the most prominent union sup-
porter for lack of work.324 After admitting that the reason was false,
the employer's second justification, unsatisfactory performance, was
disproved when it was shown that the employee was employed over
two years, received two or three wage increases, and had a good per-
formance record.325
Asserting his right to discuss a union meeting with another em-
ployee on company time, an employee was fired several hours later by
the co-owner of the business in Hambre Hombre Enterprises, Inc. v.
NLRB.326 Although the co-owner may not have had any knowledge of
the employee's union activity, "the supervisor's knowledge of that ac-
317. Id. at 476.
318. See NLRB v. California School of Profess. Psych., 583 F.2d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.
1978) (complaint barred by six-month statute of limitations; employer's alleged discrimina-
tion began with notice of nonrenewal of teacher's contract) (clearly stated hiring and firing
decisions per se violate §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) when used to discourage assertion of § 7
rights).
319. 587 F.2d 1005 (9th Cir. 1978).
320. Id. at 1007.
321. 581 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1978).
322. 578 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
323. 581 F.2d at 218.
324. 578 F.2d at 255.
325. Id.
326. 581 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1978).
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tivity, her hostility to the union, and her role in the discharge" sus-
tained a finding of discriminatory motive attributable to the
company.
327
Discharging non-union employees for engaging in various con-
certed activities also constitutes a violation of section 8(a)(3). 321 In
Kapiolani Hospital v. NLRB,3 29 a non-union employee was discrimina-
torily discharged for refusing to cross a picket line set up by other
union-represented employees. 330 The employee was not required to
give a ten-day notice of her work stoppage required by section 8(g)
because unrepresented employees do not fall under the term "labor or-
ganizations" as referred to in that section.331 The employer also argued
that the discharge was justified because the employee had failed to give
two hours notice of her absence as required by hospital policy. This
argument was rejected by the court when it noted that two prior viola-
tions had been excused and the current one also would have been ex-
cused had the employee reported for work.332
3. Replacement and reinstatement of strikers
Striking employees are explicitly protected from discrimination
under the NLRA.333 Economic strikers334 have a right to reinstatement
upon their unconditional request to return to work unless their jobs
have been filled by permanent replacements335 or the employer has jus-
327. Id. at 207.
328. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233 (1963).
329. 581 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1978).
330. Id. at 234. See also Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 467, 473
(9th Cir. 1978) (court upheld NLRB determination that § 8(a)(3) violation occurred when
six employees were terminated for engaging in protected activities). But Vf. NLRB v. Long
Beach Youth Center, Inc., 591 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1979) (§ 8(a)(3) violation not dis-
cussed when 17 non-union employees were terminated for engaging in protected work stop-
pages).
331. 581 F.2d at 233-34. The court reviewed the Board's discussion of the legislative
history of § 8(g), 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1976), enacted as a compromise for bringing certain
health care employees within the coverage of the NLRA. Accord, NLRB v. Long Beach
Youth Center, Inc., 591 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1979) (unorganized employees at residen-
tial facility for the emotionally disturbed were not required to give 10-days notice of work
stoppage per § 8(g)).
332. 581 F.2d at 234.
333. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) ("employee" defined); id. § 158(a)(3) (prohibiting em-
ployer discrimination). See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345, 347
(1938) (striking employees remain employees for remedial purposes of NLRA).
334. Striking employees engaged in a lawful strike are called economic strikers unless
they are protesting the employer's unfair labor practices. See notes 815-1030 infra.
335. Eg., NLRB v. Broadmoor Lumber Co., 578 F.2d 238, 242 (9th Cir. 1978); General
Teamsters Local 162 v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 665, 667-69 (9th Cir. 1978).
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tiflable business reasons for his refusal.336 Unfair labor practice strik-
ers,337 however, are entitled to reinstatement whether or not they have
been permanently replaced.3
Economic strikers were discriminatorily refused reinstatement in
NLRB v. Murray Products, Inc. 339 The employees elected a new union,
and, in bargaining for an initial contract, the negotiations reached an
impasse. The employees then went on strike. Replacements were hired
on the condition that their jobs would be temporary. When the strikers
later requested their jobs back, the employer told them their positions
were filled. The company argued that while the replacements were ini-
tially temporary, once the employer decided that a settlement was im-
possible, it decided to treat the replacements as permanent employees.
The court stated that such a unilateral, undisclosed company decision
could not change the new employees' original temporary status. Thus,
the employer's refusal to reinstate the strikers was discriminatory.
Distinguishing between economic and unfair labor practice strik-
ers, the Ninth Circuit, in NLRB v. Top Manufacturing Co.,34 declared
that economic strikers become unfair labor strikers on the day the
strike is expanded to include unfair labor practice protests.342 In Top
Manufacturing, the employees began an economic strike after unsuc-
cessful negotiations for a new collective bargaining contract. Less than
a month later, the employer unlawfully refused to bargain with the
union. The court found that the striking employees had not been per-
manently replaced at that time and thus were entitled to immediate
reinstatement upon their unconditional request to return to work.343
When a discriminatory refusal to reinstate a striker is found, the
Ninth Circuit has said that an employer has a backpay obligation to
that employee covering the period from the unlawful refusal to the re-
instatement or a valid offer of reinstatement. 34" When reviewing the
validity of a reinstatement offer, one element to examine is whether the
336. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1969).
337. Unfair labor practice strikers are called such when they protest an employer's unfair
labor practices. See notes 815-1030 infra.
338. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956) (absent contractual or stat-
utory provision to contrary, unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to reinstatement with
backpay regardless of replacements) (unfair labor practice strikers unlawfully refused rein-
statement after making unconditional request to return to work).
339. 584 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1978).
340. Id. at 939.
341. 594 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
342. Id. at 225.
343. Id. at 224-25.
344. NLRB v. Murray Prods., Inc., 584 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 1978).
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offer gives the employee a reasonable time to respond.345 In Murray
Products, the employer had lied about the lack of openings available
for the returning strikers, and subsequently made offers to the strikers
while they were on the picket line, requiring an immediate response.
The strikers were threatened that their names would be crossed off a
seniority list if they refused. The court held that the immediate re-
sponse requirement was not reasonable.3" The employees could have
interpreted the employer's actions as an indication that, if they did not
immediately accept the offer, they could lose their jobs permanently or
their reinstatement or seniority rights.3 47 In addition to reasonable re-
sponse time, the terms of the offer must also be examined. In Top Man-
ufacturing, letters offering reinstatement had been sent to unfair labor
practice strikers, but the court found them insufficient because the of-
fers were conditioned upon future job vacancies.348
4. Discrimination based on NLRB testimony
Section 8(a)(4) makes it an unfair labor practice "to discharge cr
otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed
charges or given testimony under" provisions of the NLRA.349 This
section is interpreted broadly to uphold the congressional purpose of
allowing all persons with information about unfair labor practices to be
able to report them without fear of reprisal.350 Thus, an employee who
testifies before the NLRB is protected whether his testimony is volun-
tary or given under subpoena.351
D. Restraint and Coercion by Unions
Section 8(b)(1) prohibits two types of union activity. Subsection
8(b)(1)(A) prohibits unions from restraining or coercing employees in
the exercise of their rights guaranteed by section 7.352 Subsection
345. Id.
346. Id. at 941. The court indicated that an exception to their finding could occur in the
presence of "unusual circumstances."
347. Id. at 942.
348. 594 F.2d at 225. The court noted the offers would have been valid if directed to
economic strikers.
349. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976).
350. E.g., NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972) (employee's voluntary statement
to NLRB field examiner protected).
351. Id. at 124. Accord, NLRB v. Western Clinical Lab., Inc., 571 F.2d 457,460 (9th Cir.
1978) (requiring employee to use accrued vacation benefits while testifying constitutes unfair
labor practice).
352. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976). Although designed to parallel section 8(a)(1), sub-
section 8(b)(1)(A) has been construed more narrowly, so that only union activity involving
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8(b)(1)(B) prohibits a union from restricting an employer's free choice
of representation "for the purposes of collective bargaining or the ad-
justment of grievances." '353 When conduct is being examined for possi-
ble violations of 8(b)(1)(A) or (B), the effect of the alleged coercive
actions is examined rather than the intent with which the acts are
done.354 Furthermore, the coercion need not be effective to sustain a
violation.355
1. Initiation fee waivers during election campaigns
In NLRB v. Savair Manufacturing Co.,36 the Supreme Court held
that a union's offer to waive initiation fees for all employees who
signed union authorization cards prior to an election violated the em-
ployees' section 7 rights because it bribed employees into making a
false showing of union support during an election campaign.357 Inter-
preting Savair, the Ninth Circuit has stated that a "temporary waiver
of dues for all employees does not" result in such unlawful coercion. 358
Such a waiver is coercive only when it is offered as an inducement for
pre-election support.359
No violation of the Savair rule was found in the majority of Ninth
Circuit cases during the survey period which dealt with initiation fee
campaign statements.360 In NLRB v. Aladdin Hotel Corp.,361 however,
violence, intimidation, and threatened or actual reprisal are prohibited. E.g., NLRB v.
Drivers Local Union 639, 362 U.S. 274, 290 (1960). And unlike section 8(a)(1), violations of
other 8(b) subsections do not create dependent violations of subsection 8(b)(l)(A). Id.
353. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1976). The purpose of subsection 8(b)(1)(B) is to prevent a
union from exerting pressure on an employer's collective bargaining and grievance adjust-
ment representatives, thus jeopardizing those interests. American Broadcasting Cos. v.
Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411, 429 (1978).
354. American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411, 429-30 (1978) ("carry-
over" effect violates § 8(b)(1)(B)); ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738-39 (1961) (good
faith belief no defense and scienter not required for § 8(b)(1)(A) violation).
355. National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 945, 961 (6th Cir. 1972).
356. 414 U.S. 270 (1973).
357. Id. at 277.
358. NLRB v. Wabash Transformer Corp., 509 F.2d 647, 649 (9th Cir. 1975) (emphasis in
original).
359. Id. See also NLRB v. Aaron Bros. Corp., 563 F.2d 409, 412-13 (9th Cir. 1977) (no
proof offered that union waiver of fees was conditioned upon pre-election support).
During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit twice was presented with the issue of
whether a union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) merely by declaring that any pre-election fees
paid by the employees were non-refundable if the union lost the election. Vari-Tronics Co.
v. NLRB, 589 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); NLRB v. Aladdin Hotel Corp., 584
F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1978). The court refused to discuss the issue because the employer had
failed to raise it in a timely manner, 589 F.2d at 993, and because the NLRB order was not
enforced on other grounds, 584 F.2d at 893.
360. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 1979)
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the court found that the manner in which the fee waiver was issued was
so confusing that it fell under the Savair prohibition.362 A letter sent to
Aladdin employees before the election promising a fee reduction "for
this organizing campaign!' was interpreted by the NLRB to include pe-
riods both before and after the election. The court disagreed, however,
stating that a reasonable interpretation of the offending phrase was that
it referred only to that period prior to the election, thus violating the
Savair rule.
363
2. Union-sponsored threats and violence
As with employers, union-sponsored threats of reprisal or violence
are forbidden by section 8(c).3 4 Furthermore, threats and acts of vio-
lence designed to intimidate the exercise of employees' section 7 rights
violate section 8(b)(1)(A).365 For example, the Ninth Circuit found
that the union was guilty of threats and violent acts, including personal
injury, in NLRB v. International Association of Bridge Workers Local
433.366 One union official was physically beaten for dispatching men
in another official's territory And union members were threatened or
physically assaulted when they complained of discriminatory hiring
hall practices. In addition, the court found that the union official in
charge of the hiring hall acquiesced to the threatened elimination of
NLRB witnesses by remaining silent and smiling.
Representation elections will be set aside when the court finds that
threatening rumors or acts of violence significantly impair the employ-
ees' exercise of their section 7 rights.3 67 The employer's standard of
(employees specifically advised that waiver was available to all signees before collective bar-
gaining agreement would be signed); Levitz Furniture Co. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 983, 983 (9th
Cir. 1978) (waiver sent to all employees was good for 30 days after contract was signed);
NLRB v. Spring Road Corp., 577 F.2d 586, 589 (9th Cir. 1978) (no nexus found between
pre-election support and waiver of initiation fees); NLRB v. L.D. McFarland Co., 572 F.2d
256, 259 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 911 (1978) (the phrase "any member" inter-
preted by NLRB to mean "any incoming member").
361. 584 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1978).
362. Id. at 893.
363. Id. The court stated that employees would "almost certainly" interpret the letter as
applying only to the period before the election, noting that an "organizing campaign is gen-
erally thought of as being over once the election is held." Id. at 892.
364. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976).
365. See, e.g., Union de Operadores y Canteros de la Industria del Cemento de Ponce,
231 N.L.R.B. 171 (1977).
366. 600 F.2d 770, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1979). Though the acts were not specifically alleged in
the original complaint, the court upheld the NLRB's right to find an unfair labor practice
when the issue had been fully litigated. See note 246 supra.
367. See Heavenly Valley Ski Area v. NLRB, 552 F.2d 269, 272-73 (9th Cir. 1977) (evi-
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proof is high and the Ninth Circuit is reluctant to set aside elections
when the questionable conduct cannot be directly attributed to the
368union.
When examining union election conduct, the Ninth Circuit exam-
ines whether the conduct is coercive and so related to the election that
it has a "probable effect" on employees' voting decisions.369 When no
such evidence is presented, the court will order an evidentiary hearing,
as it did in Valley Rock Products, Inc. v. NLRB.37° In that case, the
hearing was deemed necessary to determine whether a recent election
had been affected by a union official's assault on two company men in a
bar frequented by employees shortly before the election.371 Even
though several employees may have been aware of the assault prior to
the election, the court stated that it could not rule on the issue without
an evidentiary hearing and testimony indicating the probability of a
"coercive effect" on the employees. 372
3. Breaching the duty of fair representation
A union breaches its duty of fair representation only when its con-
duct toward members of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, or in bad faith.373 Section 7 gives employees the right to
be free from such union actions, and a violation of that right is prohib-
ited under section 8(b)(1)(A).
374
dentiary hearing denied on alleged union campaign misrepresentations because election
process was not "significantly impaired").
368. NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 1979) (insufficient
evidence to prove union started rumor of immigration inspection); NLRB v. Spring Road
Corp., 577 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1978) (evidentiary hearing denied when employer failed to
sustain burden of showing union interference with employees' choice of representative);
NLRB v. Heath Tec Div., 566 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 832 (1978)
(employer unable to prove union responsibility for deportation rumors when it relied on
unsuccessful attempt to subpoena NLRB records and agents).
369. Valley Rock Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 590 F.2d 300,302 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing NLRB v.
Golden Age Beverage Co., 415 F.2d 26, 32 (5th Cir. 1969)).
370. Id. at 304.
371. Id. at 301-02. The union's business agent and chief organizer accosted the company
vice president six days before the election, and accosted the company president in the same
bar the night before the election. He later pled guilty to two charges of disturbing the peace.
372. Id. at 303. Cf. NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977) (violent attack on supervisor in front of employee
notified employee of what could befall him if he did not support union); NLRB v. Local 140,
United Furniture Workers, 233 F.2d 539, 541 (2nd Cir. 1956) (employees, hearing of violent
assault by union organizers on company president and son, would reasonably regard it as
warning of what would happen to them if they did not support union).
373. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967) (union did not breach duty by denying em-
ployee the right to arbitration in absence of proof of employer's bad faith conduct).
374. Construction Drivers Local 83 v. NLRB, 590 F.2d 316, 317 (9th Cir. 1979) (per
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A systematic and continuous pattern of section 8(b)(1)(A) viola-
tions was found in NLRB v. InternationalAssociation of Bridge Workers
Local 433.375 The court found that by openly making multiple "back-
door" referrals,3 76 the union was wielding "its power arbitrarily, [giv-
ing] notice that its favor must be curried, thereby encouraging
membership and unquestioned adherence to its policies."37 7 The Ninth
Circuit disapproved of the standard of proof used by the NLRB. A
"specific intent to discriminate on the basis of union membership need
not be shown," since the NLRA is violated whenever the union acts
unreasonably, arbitrarily, or invidiously with regard to a member's em-
ployment.
378
A similar disagreement regarding the standard of proof occurred
in NLRB v. InternationalAssociation of Bridge Workers Local 75.379 In
Bridge Workers Local 75, an employee was denied a job referral to an
employer specifically requesting him because, according to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, he lacked the tenure for such a referral.
The employee blamed the refusal on union animosity from an earlier
quarrel. He also felt that, since the union had already made an excep-
tion to the agreement by allowing him to work at the jobsite without
going through the normal referral process, it should do so again. The
court summarized the NLRB's position: the refusal was merely a pre-
text, based in fact on arbitrary and irrelevant grounds. As a result, it
was a violation of sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2).310 The Ninth Circuit
curiam), enforcing 233 N.L.R.B. 509, 511 (1977) (duty breached after union member com-
plained and union retaliated by refusing to give member job referrals); Kling v. NLRB, 503
F.2d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 1975) (union breached duty when it arbitrarily sought seniority
reduction and constructive discharge of employee); Local Union 12, United Rubber Work-
ers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 17 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967), rehearing
denied, 389 U.S. 1060 (1968) (union breached duty when it refused to process grievances of
black members).
375. 600 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1979).
376. A union "backdoors" job referrals when it gives jobs to favored members and thus
bypasses the prescribed referral procedures in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at
774.
377. Id. at 777 (citing Laborers & Hod Carriers Local 341 v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 834, 839-40
(9th Cir. 1977)).
378. Id. at 776-77. This conflicts with the NLRB's position that a discriminatory motive
is presumed whenever a union, which is operating under an exclusive hiring hall agreement,
refuses to give referrals to a qualified employee. Id. at 777 n.5.
379. 583 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1978).
380. Id. at 1096-97. The NLRB noted several instances illustrative of the union officials'
negative attitude toward the employee, as well as the union's own prior waiver of the con-
tract provisions for the employee. Relying on these incidents, the NLRB found that the
refusal was based on personal dislike while the union hid its animus behind the terms of the
contract.
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held, however, that because the employer enforced the terms of its col-
lective bargaining agreement without discretion, the court could not ex-
amine the union's motive. As to the union's prior waiver of the
contract provisions, the court noted that it was an "extraordinary" inci-
dent and could not justify a second waiver simply because one had
already occurred.381
4. Union dues and fines
Section 8(b)(1)(A) imposes no controls on a union's internal af-
fairs, except as they affect a member's employment status.382 The pur-
pose of this provision is to "insulate employees' jobs from their
organizational rights. 38 3 Thus, the NLRB has authority to oversee
only the enforcement of external union rules.384 The propriety of tak-
ing internal disciplinary action against a union member that affects his
employment status was discussed in NLRB v. International Longshore-
men's Union Local 13.385 After the employee neglected to pay union-
levied fines, the union refused to accept his tender of dues, dismissed
him from the jobsite, and then prevented his use of the dispatch hall.
The court held that this effectively deprived the employee of work,
which directly affected his employee status rather than his status as a
union member, and thus constituted a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A).386
5. Unlawful bargaining by minority unions
Accepting exclusive bargaining authority for a unit of employees
at a time when the union lacks majority status or when there is a com-
peting union"' is a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) because such recog-
381. Id. at 1097.
382. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 195 (1967) (no violation for union
to impose fines on union members who are doing regular work during strike).
383. Radio Officer's Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
384. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 428-30 (1968) (if a rule frustrates or invades over-
riding policy of NLRA, it violates § 8(b)(1) when enforced).
385. 581 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979).
386. Id. at 1323.
387. ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738 (1960) (union unlawfully accepted exclusive
bargaining authority when it enjoyed only minority support even though no other union was
recognized or represented a majority). See NLRB v. Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., 507 F.2d
411, 412 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (competing union did not violate
§§ 8(b)(1)(A) & 8(b)(2) when it clearly demonstrated numerical majority support without
coercion or other unfair practice). See also 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) ("Representatives des-
ignated or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees
in a unit shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining ....
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nition hampers the employees' ability to choose their representative. 388
Furthermore, neither subsequent attainment of majority status nor a
good faith belief in majority support will affect an 8(b)(1)(A) viola-
tion.389
Whether a union represented certain employees and was therefore
able to impose an agency shop fee on them was discussed in NLRB v.
Hospital & Institutional Workers Local 250.390 For twenty years, agree-
ments between the union and employer exempted physical, speech, and
occupational therapists from mandatory union membership but pro-
vided that, if they chose to join, they were required to maintain their
membership. In 1974, an agency shop provision was included in the
new agreement that required therapists to become union members or
pay a monthly fee as a means of ensuring their contribution to the cost
of representation. The court found that the language of the pre-1974
union agreements, together with substantial testimony that the ther-
apists did not want the union, supported the NLRB's determination
that the union unlawfully tried to assume jurisdiction over employees it
did not represent.39 '
6. Interference with the employer's choice of representatives
Section 8(b)(1)(B) is narrowly focused to prohibit union restraint
or coercion of an employer's right to select representatives freely for
collective bargaining and grievance adjustment. Thus, in Plorida Power
& Light v. Electrical Workers, 92 the Supreme Court held that a union
may discipline supervisor-members who cross a picket line during a
strike and perform bargaining unit work.393 In describing the limits of
section 8(b)(1)(B), the Court stated that the section could only be vio-
lated when a supervisor's conduct as grievance adjuster or collective
bargainer will be affected adversely by union discipline.3 94
A union's disciplinary powers over supervisor-members who elect
to work during a strike was questioned in American Broadcasting Com-
panies v. Writers Guild.3 95 Producers, directors, and story editors were
388. ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738-39 (1960). Accord, Komatz Constr., Inc. v.
NLRB, 458 F.2d 317, 322 (8th Cir. 1972) (recognition of union which does not represent
majority impairs employees' "section 7 rights to choose their own representative").
389. ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 736, 739 (1960).
390. 577 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1978).
391. Id. at 652-53.
392. 417 U.S. 790, 803 (1973).
393. Id. at 813.
394. Id. at 804-05.
395. 437 U.S. 411 (1978).
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notified by their employers that during an upcoming strike they would
be required to perform their regular supervisory functions, including
adjusting grievances, although they would not be asked to perform
work covered in the union contract. Various penalties were subse-
quently imposed upon them by the union. The Court held that union
discipline of those supervisor-members who crossed the picket line only
to perform their supervisory work and adjust grievances deprived the
employer of the opportunity to select effective representatives freely.
396
The Court reasoned that an employer's economic rights under section
8(b)(1)(B) override a union's right to resort to economic sanctions dur-
ing a strike.397
E. Discrimination by Unions
Unions are prohibited by section 8(b)(2) from causing or attempt-
ing to "cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in viola-
tion of section 8(a)(3) or to discriminate against an employee with
respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or
terminated on some ground other than his failure" to pay his union
dues and initiation fees.398 The term "employee" also includes job ap-
plicants who are discriminatorily denied employment in violation of
section 8(a)(3). 399 The Ninth Circuit has stated that to support a viola-
tion, it must be shown that the union has attempted to cause or did
cause an employer to discriminate and that the discrimination tended
to encourage or discourage union membership."° It must also be
shown that the employer has been approached directly or that some
pattern of action has been aimed at him to cause him to discriminate.401
As in section 8(a)(3), "discrimination" refers to any term or condition
of employment, including tenure and hire.4°2
In two cases, the Ninth Circuit found that when the respective un-
396. Id. at 429-31. Accord, NLRB v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 501,
580 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (union violated § 8(b)(l)(B) by fining employees
who performed only supervisory work during strike). See Graphic Arts Int'l Local 280 v.
NLRB, 596 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 1979) (union violated §§ 8(b)(1)(B) and 8(b)(3) when it
banned overtime work until employer agreed to bargain with union individually and leave
multi-employer bargaining association).
397. Id. at 430-31.
398. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976).
399. See note 312 supra and accompanying text.
400. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 340, 301 F.2d 824, 825 n.l (9th
Cir. 1962) (local union refused to refer member of another union to job, as required by
contract, because of preference for own members).
401. Glasser v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 1968).
402. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976); id. § 158(a)(3).
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ions violated section 8(b)(1)(A) by prohibiting employees from choos-
ing their own representatives, they also violated section 8(b)(2). In
NLRB v. Hospital & Institutional Workers Local 250, the violation oc-
curred when the union agreed with the hospital to include all ther-
apists, including those previously exempted, in a new agency-shop
provision." In NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 588, the violation oc-
curred when the union demanded representation and obtained a cross-
check agreement that effectively eliminated the desires of a smaller unit
represented by another union.404
Joint violations of section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) were also found
in NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Union Local 13 when a
union which jointly administered a hiring hall with a multiple-em-
ployer representative threatened to and did prohibit an employee from
working because he did not pay his union fines and assessments when
due."° And, in NLRB v. International Association of Bridge Workers
Local 433, the union violated both sections when it backdoored job
referrals.4"6 The Ninth Circuit found, however, that when a union re-
fused to violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement regard-
ing its hiring hall referral practices, as in International Association of
Bridge Workers Union Local 75, there was no violation of either sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) or 8(b)(2), even though it had just violated those same
terms for the same employee as an isolated, temporary, emergency
measure.
40 7
III. THE REPRESENTATION PROCESS AND UNION RECOGNITION
A. Appropriate Bargaining Units
Congress has given the NLRB wide latitude to determine what
constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit." 8 In making such determi-
nations the Board applies the six factors listed by the Supreme Court in
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB:4 9 (1) similarity of employee
skills, interests, duties, and working conditions within the prospective
unit, (2) functional integration of the plant, including interchange and
contact among prospective unit employees, (3) the employer's organiza-
tional and supervisory structure, (4) the employees' desires, (5) prior
403. 577 F.2d 649, 650-51 (9th Cir. 1978).
404. 587 F.2d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 1978).
405. 581 F.2d 1321, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979).
406. 600 F.2d 770, 777 (9th Cir. 1979).
407. 583 F.2d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1978).
408. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
409. 313 U.S. 146, 153 (1941).
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bargaining history, and (6) the extent of union organization among the
employees.
1. Departmental units
While some employee units are organized by craft,4 1° others repre-
sent departments or divisions that have no craft identity.411 In such
industries, the Board tends to approve smaller bargaining units even
though larger storewide units might also be appropriate4l2-- unless the
presumption of the appropriateness of the smaller departmental units is
adequately rebutted.413
During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit determined that a de-
partmental unit of drug store employees within a supermarket was ap-
propriate. In NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 588,4 14 the challenging
union argued that it was inappropriate to sever such a unit from the
storewide unit. The court found the smaller unit to be appropriate
based on bargaining history and the employer's organizational struc-
ture.4 15 Thus, the court rejected the contention that storewide units are
the only appropriate units for retail stores.41 6
In industrial settings, after bargaining units are established, the de-
termination of whether additional employees belong in a unit with of-
fice employees or with production employees is based on the six factors
in Pittsburgh Glass. The decision is a factual one and precedent can be
found for inclusion in either unit.4 17 Two cases which raised this issue
410. See Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966).
411. See American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954) (employees of engi-
neering department constituted an appropriate unit despite the fact that they were not
craftsmen).
412. J.C. Penney Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 446 (1972); J.C. Penney Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 708 (1972)
(separate unit approved for employees of auto center service department); Montgomery
Ward & Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 598 (1964) (separate unit approved for automotive services per-
sonnel).
413. John Wanamaker, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 452, 453 (1972).
414. 587 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1978).
415. Id. at 988.
416. Id. Accord, NLRB v. Food Employers Council, Inc., 399 F.2d 501, 505 (9th Cir
1968) (snack bar employees found to be an appropriate separate unit); Retail, Wholesale,
and Dep't Store Union v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 301, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (non-selling employees
of a department store, except office clericals, formed an appropriate unit).
417. Compare NLRB v. Mar Salle, Inc., 425 F.2d 566, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (admission
clerks who interview patients and record data excluded from production unit); Jelco, Inc.,
209 N.L.R.B. 827, 827-28 (1974) (material expediter and assistant materials purchaser ex-
cluded from production unit) and Kroger Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1055 (1973) (mail clerks
excluded from production unit) with NLRB v. Hoerner-Waldorf Corp., 525 F.2d 805, 807-08
(8th Cir. 1975) (sales office trainee excluded from office clerical unit because he did not share
a "sufficient community of interest" with other unit members) and Adams Corp., 172
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in the Ninth Circuit reached opposite conclusions. The court in NLRB
v. Adrian Belt Co.41 relied primarily on similarity of skills to find that
a clerical employee was appropriately placed in a production unit. She
shared a community of interest with employees in the production unit
because: (1) she was primarily involved with the preparation, transfer,
and maintenance of inventory and production control records for the
production employees, (2) like the production workers, she was paid an
hourly rate, got time and a half for overtime, punched a time clock, and
took her breaks in the factory area, and (3) when business was slow, she
actually performed production work.419
The Ninth Circuit used all six Pittsburgh Glass factors to deter-
mine that fourteen previously unrepresented clerical employees be-
longed in a unit with office workers in Pacftc Southwest Airlines v.
NLRB.420 The appellate court found as follows: (1) differences be-
tween the skills and duties of the production and clerical employees
exceeded similarities, (2) there was only a slight interchange between
the two groups, (3) the employer's organizational framework would
have supported including these employees in the production unit but
the court felt a separate unit would be most likely to further the em-
ployer's interest, (4) the employees had voted to be included in the pro-
duction unit, (5) the bargaining history favored the formation of a new
unit because the production unit's union had never sought to represent
the clerical workers, and (6) the extent of union organization favored
inclusion in the production unit.4 21 The court in Pacjlc Southwest Air-
lines distinguished its holding from that in Adrian; in the latter there
was more interchange between the clerical employee and production
workers, and the clerical employee had the same hours and rest breaks
as the production workers.422 Furthermore, in Pacoc Southwest Afr-
lines the Ninth Circuit rejected a mechanical application of the long-
standing NLRB rule that, when one of the unions seeking to represent
plant clericals already represents the employer's production workers,
the plant clericals are allowed an election and will be added to the ex-
N.L.R.B. 552 (1968) (employee included in production unit because she (I) spent three
hours a day performing work out of her office on the production floor, (2) the office where
she worked overlooked the production floor, (3) she continued to punch a time clock, and (4)
she worked in a white uniform like the production workers, not in street clothes like the
clericals).
418. 578 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
419. Id. at 1312.
420. 587 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1978).
421. Id. at 1042-45.
422. Id. at 1041.
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isting unit if they so choose.423 The court reasoned that the application
of this rule to cases like the instant one would be inconsistent with the
Act's intent to allow employees freedom to choose their bargaining rep-
resentatives.424
2. Multi-location units
When an employer has more than one location or plant, unit de-
termination is made on the basis of the Pittsburgh Glass factors42 5- -
although a single-facility unit is presumptively appropriate. 426 Single-
location units were held appropriate for a restaurant with two locations
in Victoria Station, Inc. v. NLRB . 42 7 Due to the employer's organiza-
tion and supervisory structure, there was very little employee in-
terchange between restaurants 428 and a wide geographic distance
between restaurants.429 The court also noted the presumption that
"single units are appropriate for bargaining. '430  The court distin-
guished an earlier Board decision, which had held that single restau-
rant units were inappropriate for the same restaurant chain, by
reasoning that the scope of managerial control at individual restaurants
had been expanded considerably.431 The local managers were given
the power to retain control over day-to-day conditions of employment
and screen applications, hire, fire, and discipline employees, grant
merit salary increases, grant vacations, decide staffing schedules, and
train and evaluate probationary employees.432
A broad unit which included both of the employer's construction
corporations was held appropriate in NLRB v. Don Burgess Construc-
tion Corp.433 based on community of interest between the employees:
423. Id. at 1039 (citing Fisher Controls Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 514 (1971); In re Chrysler
Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 55 (1948)).
424. Id. at 1043-44.
425. Columbia Univ., 222 N.L.R.B. 309, 309 (1976).
426. Haag Drug Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 877, 877 (1968) (presumption could be overcome by
showing that day-to-day interests of employees have merged with those of employees in
other stores).
427. 586 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1978).
428. There was an eight percent annual transfer rate between restaurants. Id. at 675.
429. Id. See generally NLRB v. Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1963)
(single-office unit of debit insurance agents held appropriate because of common interests,
common working conditions, common supervision and isolation from other branch offices).
430. 586 F.2d at 675; NLRB v. Lemer Stores Corp., 506 F.2d 706, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1974)
(presumption that a single store in a "chain" is an appropriate bargaining unit).
431. 586 F.2d at 674.
432. Id. at 674-75. See NLRB v. Chicago Health & Tennis Clubs, Inc., 567 F.2d 331, 340
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978).
433. 596 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1979).
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they possessed the same skills, performed the same functions, shared
the same general working conditions, and usually worked at the same
site.434 The two separate corporations were held to be a single em-
ployer for purposes of the Act,435 but the court would not impose the
contract signed by one employer on the employees of the other unless
the two together constituted an appropriate unit. After rejecting other
arguments by the employer,436 the court held the multi-location unit
appropriate and enforced the contract.
B. Representation Proceedings and Elections
1. Representation without consent
Non-union employees cannot be added to a pre-existing bargain-
ing unit without their consent. In NLRB v. Hospital Workers Local
259,437 non-member therapists were added to the bargaining unit by a
contract between the union and the employer. The court held that
these employees were entitled to an election to determine whether they
should be included in the unit, basing its decision on the bargaining
history between the parties and the clear language of previous agree-
ments which recognized the union as the "exclusive bargaining agent
only of those therapists who were union members. 438
434. Id. at 386.
435. Burgess Construction (BC) had signed a contract with the carpenter's union, but
when its owner and his foreman formed V & B Builders (VB), a partnership, all the
carpenters were transferred to the latter. VB signed a master agreement with the union
during the next contract period but BC did not. The union accepted BC's refusal to sign an
agreement based on BC's assurance that it would not hire carpenters. Later, however, BC
did begin employing non-union carpenters.
The court held that BC and VB were a single employer based on the application of the
following criteria: (1) there was a strong interrelation of operations; (2) both enterprises
were managed separately at the worker level, but Burgess controlled both at the policy level,
and both used his contractor's license; (3) there was centralized control of labor relations
because Burgess made all policy decisions about labor relations and signed both agreements;
and (4) Burgess owned 70% of BC and 50% of VB. Id. at 385.
436. The court pointed out that an "accretion" argument was not appropriate because the
issue was not absorption into an existing unit but whether the two existing groups consti-
tuted a single appropriate unit. Id. at 386 n.5. The court also held that it was not required
to find the only appropriate unit (citing Gallenkamp Stores Co. v. NLRB, 402 F.2d 525, 532
(9th Cir. 1968)) and that the parties did not intend to exclude BC employees from coverage.
Id. at 387.
437. 577 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1978).
438. Id. at 651.
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2. Conduct invalidating elections
a. waiver of initiation fees
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Savair Manufacturing Co. 4 3 9 held
that an election will be set aside when, prior to the election, a union
offers to waive initiation fees for all employees who sign union authori-
zation cards, if this offer interferes with employees' free choice in the
election."' During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit was presented
with six cases in which it defined when such interference was sufficient
to set aside an election. Four of the cases in which elections were up-
held merely required application of the settled Ninth Circuit rule al-
lowing initiation fee waivers if they are offered to all employees and are
held open until a contract is signed.44 This rule assumes that such
offers are not conditioned on a showing of pre-election support for the
union.442
For example, in NLRB v. L.D. McFarland Co. 443 an offer to waive
initiation fees reasonably could have been interpreted as either a per-
missible across-the-board waiver or an impermissible waiver aimed
only at employees who joined the union before the election. The offer
stated: "THERE WILL BE NO INITIATION FEE FOR ANY MEM-
439. 414 U.S. 270 (1973).
440. Id. at 272 n.4. In support of its holding, the Court offered the following rationales:
(1) by offering inducements that were operative only prior to the election, the union was in
effect "buying the endorsements" of employees, thereby giving a false impression to other
employees of union support; (2) employees might feel obligated to support the union as a
result of having signed authorization cards; and (3) even though the waiver of fees was
offered for the purpose of inducing employees to sign authorization cards, under the ruling
in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), a union may gain certification through
the mechanism of authorization cards in lieu of an election. This could allow a union to be
certified on the basis of improperly induced signatures. 414 U.S. at 277-80.
441. The four cases were: NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 661, 663 (9th
Cir. 1979) (conflicting rumors did not invalidate election); Levitz Furniture Co. v. NLRB,
587 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (initiation fee waiver was offered to all employees,
good until 30 days after a contract was agreed to, and in no way conditional upon support of
the union and could not be considered a vote for the union); Vari-Tronics Co. v. NLRB, 589
F.2d 991, 992 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (investigation disclosed that the offer was to re-
main open both before and after the election until a bargaining agreement was reached);
NLRB v. Spring Road Corp., 577 F.2d 586, 589 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978) (the evidence indicated
that the union made an across-the-board waiver which would apply to all employees on the
payroll when the contract was signed). Accord, Warner Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 190,
196-97 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); NLRB v. Dunkirk Motor Inn., Inc.,
524 F.2d 663, 665 (2d Cir. 1975); NLRB v. S. & S. Product Eng'r Serv., Inc., 513 F.2d 1311,
1312-13 (6th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Wabash Transformer Corp., 509 F.2d 647, 649-50 (8th Cir.
1975); NLRB v. Con-Pac, Inc., 509 F.2d 270, 272-73 (5th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Stone &
Thomas, 502 F.2d 957, 958 (4th Cir. 1974).
442. NLRB v. Aaron Bros. Corp., 563 F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
443. 572 F.2d 256 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 911 (1978).
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BER PRESENTLY WORKING IN THE PLANT. THERE WILL
BE NO MONTHLY DUES UNTIL A CONTRACT IS NEGOTI-
ATED." 4  The court held that this offer was permissible because the
term "member" was limited to incoming members. The court rejected
the employer's contentions that the phrase was impermissibly ambigu-
ous and that it was intended to refer only to employees who became
members prior to the election."
The only case which did result in an election being set aside also
involved the construction of an ambiguous phrase. In NLJB v. Aladdin
Hotel Corp.4 the ambiguity concerned how long the offer would re-
main open. Prior to the election, the union reduced its initiation fee
from $50 to $25 as an inducement to obtain new members. The letter
offering this reduction to employees stated that the reduction was au-
thorized "for this organizing campaign," dues would be held in escrow
and applied to the first month after a labor agreement was reached, and
if an election were held and the union defeated, all monies would be
kept by the union.' 7 The court struck down the dues reduction offer
because a "responsible" interpretation of the phrase by employees
would have led them to conclude that the fees would be reduced only if
they joined the union prior to the election." The offer was invalidated
despite the union's contention that it did not intend the phrase to have
the meaning given to it by the court.449
444. Id. at 258-59.
445. Id. at 259. The court attempted to distinguish Inland Shoe Mfg. Co., 211 N.L.R.B.
724 (1974), finding that in Inland the word "charter" was put in front of "member." 572
F.2d at 259. The NLRB in Inland had held that when a term is ambiguous, as "charter
member" was found to be, the union has a duty to clarify it or suffer the consequences. 211
N.L.R.B. at 725.
446. 584 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
447. Id. at 892.
448. Since an organizing campaign usually ends with an election, the court found that it
was reasonable for the employees to so conclude. Id. Western Refrigerator Co., 213
N.L.R.B. 227 (1974), held that "campaign" included both the pre- and post-election periods
for purposes of waiver. Western Refrigerator is distinguishable from Aladdin on the ground
that the latter referred to an "organizing campaign" while the former merely referred to a
"campaign."
449. At union meetings prior to the election, a union official stated that the waiver would
apply after the election. These statements were not sufficient to overcome the union's bur-
den to clarify the ambiguity. 584 F.2d at 893. The Board's contrary position on this issue is
evident in Smith Co., 215 N.L.R.B. 530, 530 (1974), in which an ambiguous phrase, "waived
during a new organization," was cured by a union representative's statement that "anyone
who came in after the plant became union would have to pay." Id. at 533 (emphasis in
original).
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b. misrepresentations
The effect of misrepresentations on the validity of a representation
election is an area of labor law currently undergoing much scrutiny and
causing considerable uncertainty.450 In Hollywood Ceramics Co.,451 the
NLRB held as follows:
[A]n election should be set aside only where there has been a
misrepresentation or other similar campaign trickery, which
involves a substantial departure from the truth, at a time
which prevents the other party or parties from making an ef-
fective reply, so that the misrepresentation, whether deliberate
or not, may reasonably be expected to have a significant im-
pact on the election. However, the mere fact that a message is
inartistically or vaguely worded and subject to different inter-
pretations will not suffice to establish such misrepresentation
as would lead us to set the election aside. Such ambiguities,
like extravagant promises, derogatory statements about the
other party, and minor distortions of some facts, frequently
occur in communication between persons.452
On April 8, 1977, the Board, after much criticism from commenta-
tors,4 5 3 reversed itself in Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc. , holding
that it would "no longer set elections aside on the basis of misleading
450. See note 453 infra and accompanying text. Section 8(c) of the Act provides that
"expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in
written, printed, graphic or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice under any provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of
reprisal or force or promise to benefit." 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976). This section does not
apply to election cases. See Field, Representation Elections, Films and Free Speech, 25 LAB.
L.J. 217, 220 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Field].
451. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
452. Id. at 224 (footnotes omitted). It has been suggested that the application of these five
tests-substantiality, materiality, timing, source and voter's independent knowledge-turns
on a variety of subjective considerations which provide the Board with the flexibility to
uphold elections that might have been invalidated under a "laboratory conditions" stan-
dard. The Board's application of the tests has necessarily been somewhat ambivalent. R.
WILLIAMS, P. JANUS, & K. HUHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT, 56-57 (La-
bor Relations and Public Policy Report No. 8, 1974) [hereinafter cited as NLRB REoULA-
TION].
453. After examining a series of cases in which the Board found violations by employers
who showed the film "And Woman Must Weep," Field, supra note 450, urged the Board to
conduct empirical research to determine the validity of its conclusions about the deleterious
effect of such propaganda on voters. The concern was whether the high cost in administra-
tive time is justified by any real effect on the outcome of an election. Id. at 230.
In another criticism, the Board was urged even more vehemently to cease regulating
election campaign practices because this holding was based on false assumptions regarding
the influence of various campaign tactics upon voters. This study's conclusion was based on
empirical data gathered during political elections and the authors' sample of 31 representa-
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campaign statements." '455 One and one-half years later, in General Knit
of California456 the Board further complicated the law by reinstating
the Hollywood Ceramics rule. The net result of the Board's flip-flop on
this issue has been to place employers, unions, and courts in doubt as to
which standard to apply in cases being litigated during the transition
periods.
The only case decided by the Ninth Circuit since General Knit,
NLRB v. Hepa Corp. ,457 held that the Hol) wood Ceramics test was
applicable because the Board's decision concerned a union certified
before Shopping Kart had been decided.45 8 In fact, Shopping Kart has
not significantly influenced the outcome of any Ninth Circuit case dur-
ing the period under review. In three cases the court found reasons
why it should not be applied,459 and in a fourth, in which it was appli-
cable, the court invalidated the election on other grounds' 461
tion elections. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELEC-
TIONS 146-47 (1976).
Furthermore, Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under
the NationalLabor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 92 (1964), suggested that the Board
make revisions in its regulations so as to make the determination of prohibited misrepresen-
tation simpler and more closely related to the goals which the prohibition is intended to
serve.
454. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
455. Id. at 1313. The Board, however, retained its option to continue to intervene in
instances "where a party has engaged in such deceptive campaign practices as improperly
involving the Board and its processes, or the use of forged documents which render the
voters unable to recognize the propaganda for what it is." Id.
456. 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (Dec. 6, 1978).
457. 597 F.2d 166 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
458. Id. at 168. The Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Mosey Mfg. Co., 595 F.2d 375, 377-78
(7th Cir. 1979), was faced with an analogous problem which it remanded to the Board for
reconsideration in light of General Knit.
459. NLRB v. Spring Road Corp., 577 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1978) (Shopping Kart not
applicable because "[e]vidence that fails to meet the Hollywood Ceramics standard inevita-
bly will not satisfy the narrower Shopping Kart test"); NLRB v. Tri-City Linen Supply, 579
F.2d 51, 57 n.13 (9th Cir. 1978) (Shopping Kart not applicable because there was held to be
no misrepresentation); Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1978) (Shopping Kart need not be applied because the misrepresentations did not violate the
stricter standards of Hollywood Ceramics). The Oshman court expressed its approbation of
the Shopping Kart decision in dictum: "It is tempting to ... go farther than the Board did
in Shopping Kart, holding that we will no longer sustain orders setting aside elections, or set
aside orders sustaining them, in cases of threats as well as in cases of claimed misrepresenta-
tion in election campaigns." 586 F.2d at 702. The court resisted the temptation because "it
is the Board, not the courts, that is presumed to be expert in this field." Id.
460. In Natter Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 948, 950 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1128 (1979), the employer's misrepresentation was included in a flyer which falsely
stated that the NLRB had found the union guilty of unfair labor practices. The court held
that this misrepresentation did interfere with the election, setting aside the election because
"in instances where a party has engaged in such deceptive campaign practices as improperly
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Under General Knit and Hollywood Ceramics, misrepresentations
will not invalidate an election if they are found to be mere "puffing"46
or insubstantial departures from the truth.462 The alleged misrepresen-
tation in NLRB v. Spring Road Corp. 463 was a union campaign promise
that if the union were selected, the employees would have better wages
and benefits and more secure jobs. Applying the Hollywood Ceramics
rule, the court found this to be mere "puffing" because its fulfillment
was dependent on contingencies beyond the control of the union and
therefore "less significant than if made by an employer.
''464
In two other cases, misrepresentation charges were dismissed due
to the absence of evidence that a false statement had been made. The
court in NLRB v. Pac#fc International Rice Mills, Inc. 4- held that em-
ployee testimony about union representatives' alleged misstatements
was internally contradictory and inconsistent, and thus there was insuf-
ficient evidence to prove that any misstatements were communicated to
employees. 416 In NLRB v. Tri-City Linen Suppy, 467 the union repre-
sented that, if they won the election, the resulting contract would give
the employees fifty dollars a week more than they would otherwise
have expected to earn. The witnesses' testimony was unclear as to
whether the union representative merely said that the union would try
to get the higher paying contract or whether he assured the employees
that the union would get it. The Ninth Circuit found that the union did
not make a firm promise, and thus no misrepresentation had oc-
curred.468
The Ninth Circuit will set aside an election only when the source
of the misrepresentation is either the union or the employer, because
only if the statements are attributable to one of these parties is it likely
involving the Board and its processes. . . " misrepresentations will continue to be cause to
set aside elections. Id. (quoting 228 N.L.R.B. at 1313). See Formco, Inc., 233 N.LR.B. 61,
62 (1977) (election set aside because of interference with Board processes).
461. Southern Foods, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1968).
462. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 224 (1962).
463. 577 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1978).
464. Id. at 588. See NLRB v. Hepa Corp., 597 F.2d 166, 168 (9th Cir. 1979) (union
misstatements regarding the benefits which the union could provide members held not "ma-
terial or substantial"); Rex-Hide, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 168, 101 L.R.R.M. 1038, 1039 (April 27,
1979) (union misrepresentations about the employer's obligation not to give a raise during
the campaign, and union distribution of false and misleading information concerning wages
negotiated by the union at another company held to be "normal election propaganda" and
"not substantially or materially misleading").
465. 594 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1979).
466. Id. at 1326.
467. 579 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1978).
468. Id. at 57.
[Vol. 13
LABOR LAW SURVEY
that an election outcome will be affected.469 For example, in NLRB v.
Mike Yurosek & Sons, Inc. 470 a rumor had circulated that, if employees
did not vote in favor of the union, the union would give the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) the names of all illegal alien em-
ployees. The INS had been discussed during the campaign, but the
exact content and source of these discussions were unclear. The court
held that, since the rumors were not attributable to the union, there was
no actionable misrepresentation and the election should be upheld.471
The Hollywood Ceramics standard provides that if the party alleg-
edly injured by the misrepresentation has an adequate opportunity to
make an effective reply, the incident will not be fatal to the election.
472
Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc. v. NLRB 473 involved two separate mis-
representation charges. In the first charge, the Teamsters union wrote a
letter to the employer (and distributed it to employees) citing "U.S.
government" statistics on the prevailing area wage rates. Actually, the
figures were not compiled by the federal government but were wages
which other Teamsters were earning in that area for comparable labor.
The court held that this misrepresentation was harmless because the
employees were interested in what the Teamsters could get for them,
and not in government statistics, and the employer had had an oppor-
tunity to respond to the misrepresentation.474 The second misrepresen-
tation charge posed a more serious problem, however, because it
involved "the Board and its processes. 475 The union organizer sent a
letter that falsely stated that a previous election had been set aside be-
cause of the employer's lies and false promises. The election actually
had been set aside pursuant to an agreement between parties, and the
Board had never ruled on the union's earlier charges. The court held
this misrepresentation to be harmless because only one person received
the letter containing the falsehood476 and the employer had sufficient
time to reply to the charge, even though it did not do SO.
477
469. NLRB v. Heath Tee Division, 566 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
832 (1978); NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing
NLRB v. Aaron Bros. Corp., 563 F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1977)).
470. 597 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1979).
471. Id. at 663. Accord, NLRB v. Heath Tec Division, 566 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 832 (1978) (citing Heavenly Valley Ski Area v. NLRB, 552 F.2d 269
(9th Cir. 1977)).
472. See note 452 supra and accompanying text.
473. 586 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1978).
474. Id. at 704.
475. Id. at 706.
476. It would have taken a change of three votes to upset the election. Id. at 701.
477. Id. at 706. But see Fontaine Truck Equip. Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 164, 101 L.R.LRM.
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c. threats and violence
In 1978-79, the Ninth Circuit decided four cases in which employ-
ers sought to have elections set aside due to alleged acts or threats of
violence. In each of the four cases the court held that there was no
unlawful interference with the elections. In NLRB v. Spring Road
Corp. ,478 the court held that affidavits describing pre-election rumors of
vandalism were insufficient to require a hearing because the union
could not be connected with the alleged incidents.4 79 Similarly, in
NLRB v. Hepa Corp.,480 the court upheld an election on the ground
that the threats of violence were committed without union authoriza-
tion.48 1 In Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc. v. NLRB,482 one employee
asked another what would happen if he crossed a picket line during a
strike. The second employee answered that various violent acts might
occur. The union won the election, which the Ninth Circuit subse-
quently refused to invalidate because the person making the threats
was not a union agent and there was "no atmosphere of coercion and
fear of reprisal. ' 483 In the fourth case, Valley Rock Products, Inc. v.
NLRB,4 8 4 the NLRB granted a union sponsored motion for summary
judgment even though the employer claimed that the union used vio-
lence to win the election. The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed and
remanded because violence had occurred and the perpetrator was a
union official.485
d other violations
Electioneering near a polling place traditionally has been forbid-
den by the NLRB, 486 but it has not been easy to determine the exact
area within which this activity is prohibited.487 The employer in Rob-
1047 (April 23, 1979) (union held to have interfered with the election when it distributed a
pamphlet, on the morning of the election, in which the employer's profits were misrepre-
sented).
478. 577 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1978).
479. Id. at 588. The court found Ninth Circuit support for the proposition that the activi-
ties must be connected to the union or the employer in NLRB v. Aaron Bros. Corp., 563
F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1977), and NLRB v. Heath Tee Division, 566 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th
Cir. 1978).
480. 597 F.2d 166 (9th Cir. 1979).
481. Id. at 167.
482. 586 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1978).
483. Id. at 703.
484. 590 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1979).
485. Id. at 303.
486. Claussen Baking Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 111, 112 (1961); Continental Can Co., 80
N.L.R.B. 785, 786 (1948).
487. NLRB REGULATION, supra note 452, at 258. See NLRB v. Aaron Bros. Corp., 563
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errs Tours, Inc. v. NLRB 8 argued that union supporters had cam-
paigned within the restricted area by talking to employees in the "line
of march to the polls. '489 Although the court was unable to dispose of
the case because the Board record had not been sufficiently developed,
the court did announce that polling place campaigning is lawful unless
the acts interfere with voters' peaceful reflection at the polls.
490
The issue of who may not be approached within the prohibited
area was addressed in NLRB v. L.D. McFarland Co.491 Although the
court found the contention untimely, it indicated in dictum that conver-
sations with non-voters are always permissible, even if they occur
within the prohibited area.492
The Board has a policy against furthering or encouraging racial
discrimination, and in Natter Manufacturing Corp. v. NLRB, 493 an em-
ployer sought to challenge a local union's certification on the ground
that the international union and other affiliated locals engaged in dis-
criminatory practices. The court held that the employer had not made
out a prima facie case because the local in question was not "domi-
nated by the International or a tainted local."494 The Ninth Circuit did
not decide if it would uphold the Board's new rule (granting certifica-
tion to allegedly discriminatory unions and postponing the hearing of
F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1977) (campaigning within 100 feet of the polls and shouting by
employees in the vicinity of the polling area did not destroy laboratory conditions); Locust
Indus., Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 717 (1975), enforced sub nom. Owens v. NLRB, 535 F.2d 1324
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (mer.) (union did not interfere with election when a union activist stood
within 65 feet of the door to the polling area and conversed with prospective voters); Marvil
Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1260 (1968) (scope of non-electioneering area not a
fixed distance; rather, it is within the discretion of the Regional Director).
488. 578 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1978).
489. Id. at 244.
490. Id. The court said that campaigning 150 feet from the polls might be within the
prohibited area if the circumstances were such that the voters were disturbed.
491. 572 F.2d 256 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 911 (1978).
492. Id. at 260. The employer had relied on Milchem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362 (1968), to
support the proposition that conversation was objectionable within the non-electioneering
perimeter regardless of its content or speakers. The court in McFarland distinguished that
case on the ground that what was actually prohibited in Milehem was "prolonged conversa-
tions between representatives of any party to the election and voters waiting to cast ballots."
Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
493. 580 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1978). When NatterMfg. was at the administrative level, the
Board was following a policy of denying certification to labor unions which engaged in
racial discrimination. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 138 (1974). While the
case was pending on appeal, the Board reversed itself and decided not to deny certification
on this ground any longer. Henceforth allegations of union discrimination would be re-
solved during subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings. Handy Andy, Inc., 228
N.L.R.B. 447 (1977).
494. Id. at 951-52.
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the discrimination issue until a later unfair labor practice proceed-
ing)49 5 because in this case the discrimination issue had been raised at
an unfair labor practice proceeding. The court, however, did allude to
the possibility that it might not uphold the new Board rule.496
3. Bars to conducting elections
a. statutory bar
Section 9(c)(3) of the Act497 states that "[n]o election shall be di-
rected in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which, in the
preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held."
It is the clear policy of the Board that this statutory period begins to
run on the day of balloting and not on the day certification is
granted.498 In NLRB v. Tri-Ex Tower Corp.,4 9 9 for example, the em-
ployer was certified as the election winner ten months after the day of
balloting.s° Another election was held only two months after the certi-
fication but more than twelve months following the first ballot. The
court reluctantly upheld the second election because it placed the em-
ployer in a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" position during
the ten months the Board was deliberating.5°'
b. pending unfair labor practice proceedings
The Board has a general policy against proceeding in a representa-
tion case while an unfair labor practice charge is pending, unless the
charging party files a request to proceed 2.50  That rule was dispositive
in NLRB v. T-Ci-y Linen Supply,5 °3 in which the employer challenged
an election because it was scheduled during the pendency of an unfair
495. Id. at 951 n.2.
496. The court noted the Eighth Circuit's holding that the Constitution prohibits the
Board from certifying a discriminatory union, Mansion House Center Mgt. Corp., 473 F.2d
471 (8th Cir. 1973), and pointed out that the question was still open in the Ninth Circuit.
580 F.2d at 951 n.2.
497. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976).
498. E.g., R.L. Polk & Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1171, 1171 (1959); Kolcast Indus., Inc., 117
N.L.R.B. 418, 419 (1957); Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 84 N.L.R.B. 291, 292 (1949).
499. 595 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1979).
500. The reason for the Board's delay was unknown. Id. at 1.
501. Id. (citing NLRB v. Dorn's Transp. Co., 405 F.2d 706, 715 (2d Cir. 1969)). The
employer was faced with the insoluble dilemma that during the post-election, pre-certifica-
tion period a wage increase might be considered an unfair labor practice while a failure to
give such an increase could provide the union with invaluable propaganda.
502. Louis-Allis Co. v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 1972); Pullman Indus., Inc.,
159 N.L.R.B. 580, 583-84 (1966); Carlson Furniture Indus., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 851, 853
(1966).
503. 579 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1978).
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labor practice charge. Since the union had filed a request to proceed
with the representation proceedings at the time the unfair labor prac-
tice charge was filed, the election's validity was upheld."° The court
rejected the argument that a Board decision to allow an election to be
held during an unfair labor practice investigation is per se an abuse of
its discretion. 5
4. Eligibility to vote in representation elections
Employees who are employed in a unit during the payroll period
immediately preceding the date of the direction of an election are eligi-
ble to vote, as long as they are still employed when the election is
held.50 6 The determination of who is still employed varies from indus-
try to industry, but generally those who have a substantial continuing
interest in their employment are allowed to vote.50 7
a. employees on layoff
The NLRB has held that an employee on layoff has a substantial
continuing interest in his employment if he has a reasonable expecta-
tion of recall and has not quit or been terminated. 8 The determina-
tion of whether an employee has a "reasonable expectation of recall" is
a question of fact dependent on the peculiarities of each situation.
50 9
For example, in NLRB v. LD. McFarland Co.,5" the putative voter
was ineligible to vote because he was a temporary employee who had
been permanently laid off and was working elsewhere. In NLRB v.
Adrian Belt Co.,5" an employee was laid off because work was slow
and subsequently was hospitalized for treatment of an illness. Her su-
pervisor told her that it was a good time to be in the hospital since work
was slow. The employee returned to work on election day and sought
504. Id. at 57.
505. Id. n.14.
506. Carl B. King Drilling Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 557 (1967); Columbia Pictures Corp., 61
N.L.R.B. 1030 (1945); Vultee Aircraft, Inc., 24 N.L.R.B. 1184 (1940).
507. See cases cited in note 506 supra.
508. American Motors Corp., 206 N.L.R.B. 286, 291 (1973); Miami Rivet Co., 147
N.L.R.B. 470, 483 (1964).
509. Laid off voters held eligible to vote: Kustom Electronics, Inc. v. NLRB, 590 F.2d
817 (10th Cir. 1978); Allstate Mfg. Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 155, (1978) (only one employee had a
reasonable expectancy of reemployment); Acme Indus. Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 249 (1976) (em-
ployees told they could expect recall in 3 months). Laid off voters held ineligible to vote:
Resident Home, 239 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 99 L.R.R.M. 1443 (Oct. 13, 1978) (positions had been
eliminated for economic reasons); Tomadur, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 706 (1972).
510. 572 F.2d 256, 260 (9th Cir. 1978).
511. 578 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1978).
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to vote. At that time her supervisor told her there was no work and
suggested she continue on disability or unemployment. The court held
that she was eligible to vote because it had not been established by
overt action or clear communication from the employer that the em-
ployment relationship was terminated."1 2 Even though the employee
had violated the call-in rule,513 she maintained a reasonable expecta-
tion of recall because usually employees who violated the call-in rule
were not immediately terminated, and the supervisor's remarks to the
employee indicated a leave of absence rather than a layoff.
5 14
The Ninth Circuit overruled the Board by finding an employee on
leave eligible to vote in Valley Rock Products, Inc. v. NLRB.5 5 The
employee had requested a leave of absence on February 6 for personal
reasons. It was granted in writing a week later and covered a period
not to exceed one year. He voted in the election which was held in
July. Although during his leave he was self-employed hauling logs, he
was allowed to vote in the July election. The court held that he was an
employee at the time of the election because of the presumption that an
employee on leave is still an employee516 and because of the company's
letter granting him the leave.517
b. supervisors
A supervisor"1 8 is not eligible to vote in representation elections
because section 2(3) of the Act clearly excludes them from the defini-
512. Id. at 1308 (citing Trailmobile Div., Pullman, Inc. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 419 (5th Cir.
1967). Cf. Bio-Science Labs. v. NLRB, 542 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1976) (the rule was applied in
the context of the 12-month right to vote when on an economic strike).
513. Employees were required to call in each day to see if work was available. 578 F.2d
at 1309.
514. Id.
515. 590 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1979).
516. Id. at 303-04 (citing NLRB v. Adrian Belt Co., 578 F.2d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 1978)).
517. Id. at 304.
518. A supervisor is defined in the Act as follows:
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other em-
ployees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of in-
dependent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1975). See GAF Corp. v. NLRB, 524 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1975) (em-
ployee not a supervisor even though he was promoted to acting foreman for an "indefinite
period"); Harold Jackson, 239 N.L.R.B. No. 137, 100 L.R.R.M. 1094 (Dec. 21, 1978) (writing
of service orders does not make a wreck driver/mechanic a supervisor); Simley Corp., 233
N.L.R.B. 391, (1977) (employee held not a supervisor).
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tion of an "employee"5"9 and only "employees" are eligible to vote.5 20
Two voters were challenged on the ground that they were supervisors
in NLRB v. Adrian Belt Co.521 One of them, Beltran, was found to be a
supervisor on the basis of the following facts: (1) when the owners were
away, he was left in complete charge of the work; (2) when the owners
were present, he directed the work of other employees;5" (3) his salary
greatly exceeded the hourly wages paid to other employees; (4) he re-
ceived a commission based on the total shop production;52 3 and (5) he
was not required to punch a time clock, worked longer hours than
other employees, and was free to leave without permission.
5 24
Similarly, a factual dispute over whether the second voter was in-
troduced to other employees as a foreman was not sufficient to under-
mine his supervisory status, which was supported by the following
factors: (1) despite the fact that he was paid hourly, he was responsible
for the direction of most of the work at the plant during the absence of
the owner; (2) he directed the work of three delivery employees; 525 (3)
he opened the shop daily; (4) he was responsible for reassigning em-
ployees to complete rush orders; (5) he relayed the owner's instructions
in Spanish to employees; and (6) he attempted to resolve grievances
before referring them to the owner.
5 26
C. Representation Without an Election
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,527 the Supreme Court considered
the conditions which warrant the issuance of a bargaining order with-
out an election. The Court focused its inquiry on the propriety of a
519. "The term 'employee'... shall not include... any individual employed as a su-
pervisor." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
520. See note 506 supra and accompanying text.
521. 578 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1978).
522. This was one of the factors found determinative by the Seventh Circuit in NLRB v.
Henry Colder Co., 416 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1969) and by the NLRB recently in Liberty Mkts.,
Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1486 (1978).
523. A 1% override commission arrangement for the putative supervisor in NLRB v.
Henry Colder Co., 416 F.2d 750 (1960), also supported the Seventh Circuit's determination
in that case.
524. 578 F.2d at 1311. The court found Ninth Circuit support for this position in NLRB
v. Fullerton Publishing Co., 283 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1960), where the county editor of a
newspaper was held to be a supervisor because he had full authority over the assignments
for his department's reporters, planned their work schedules, determined what news to use,
and was held fully accountable for the product and performance of the reporters in his
department. Id. at 550-51.
525. This factor was also supportive of similar findings in Liberty Mkts., Inc., 236
N.L.R.B. 1486 (1978), and NLRB v. Henry Colder Co., 416 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1969).
526. 578 F.2d at 1312.
527. 395 U.S. 575 (1968).
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bargaining order when an employer engages in anti-union activities
and the union asserts majority status on the basis of authorization
cards.
528
The Supreme Court delineated three categories of cases in which
the Board might consider granting a bargaining order without an elec-
tion. The Court distinguished between unfair labor practices that are
outrageous and pervasive, those that are less extensive yet substantial,
and those that are minor.5 29 As to the activity characterized as "outra-
geous," "pervasive" or "exceptional," the Court sanctioned the use of
the bargaining order.530 The Court even intimated that in such circum-
stances there might be no need to inquire about union majority sta-
tus.5 31 Regarding "minor" employer misconduct, the Court noted that
such conduct is always insufficient to justify a bargaining order.532 The
Court expressly approved of bargaining orders in "less extraordinary
cases marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have
the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election
processes. 533 A bargaining order is an appropriate remedy when the
holding of a fair election has been precluded by the improper acts of
the employer.134 Preliminarily, however, the Board is obligated to find
that the union at one point enjoyed a majority status.535
1. Majority representation
The initial point of inquiry, therefore, is whether or not a majority
of employees signed union authorization cards. The validity of such
cards is to be measured by the standard adopted by the Court in Gissel.
An authorization card is presumed valid unless the employee can
"demonstrate that the solicitors told the employees that the sole pur-
pose of the card was to obtain a union election." 536 Employees are
bound "by the clear language of what they sign unless that language is
528. Authorization cards are used as an indicator of union majority status. For example,
they may be regular union membership cards, NLRB v. Federbrush Co., 121 F.2d 954 (2d
Cir. 1941), applications for membership, NLRB v. Valley Broadcasting Co., 189 F.2d 582
(6th Cir. 1951), authorizations for check-off of union dues, Lebanon Steel Foundry v.
NLRB, 130 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 659 (1942), or cards that explicitly
designate the union as the signer's bargaining representative, NLRB v. Stow Mfg., Co., 217
F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955).
529. 395 U.S. at 613-15.
530. Id. at 613-14.
531. Id. at 613.
532. Id. at 615.
533. Id. at 614.
534. Id. at 614-15.
535. Id. at 614.
536. Id. at 584.
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deliberately and clearly canceled by a union adherent with words cal-
culated to direct the signer to disregard and forget the language above
his signature."5" 7
In NLJB v. Randall P. Kane, Inc.,538 the Ninth Circuit held that it
is the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the card solicitation
rather than the use of specific words that determines if a union agent
effectively negated the card's language through his solicitation." '539 In
adopting the totality of the circumstances test, the Ninth Circuit sig-
nalled that it was not willing to honor the authorization cards merely
because an employee was not told that the "sole" function of the card
was to enable a union election.' 4° The Kane court determined that
there was inadequate evidence on whether the union had a card major-
ity and remanded the case to the Board to make this determination
based upon the totality of the circumstances. 41
2. Unfair labor practices
a. with a card majority
In the three Ninth Circuit cases in which a card majority was
demonstrated, the Board granted Gissel bargaining orders. In NLRB v.
Prineville Stud Co.,542 the court determined that the employer's unfair
labor practices warranted the issuance of a bargaining order. The em-
ployer interrogated employees regarding their union activity,
threatened to close the plant unless union activity ceased, and finally
closed the plant. In Great Chinese American Sewing Co. v. NLRB,54 3
the unfair labor practices were even more extensive than those commit-
ted in Prineville. In addition to interrogating employees and threaten-
ing closure, the employer promised a wage increase if the union was
rejected, threatened to withhold paychecks until union cards were sur-
rendered, and threatened to discharge union adherents. Because of
537. Id. at 606.
538. 581 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1978).
539. Id. at 220.
540. The signer's subjective state of mind is not relevant to the determination of an au-
thorization card's validity. NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360, 365-67 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970) (court refused to invalidate the card of a signer who
thought its only purpose was to secure an election). The subjective belief of the signer had
been determinative in at least one circuit prior to Gissel. NLRB v. J.M. Machinery Corp.,
410 F.2d 587, 591 (5th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Southland Paint Co., 394 F.2d 717, 730 (5th Cir.
1968).
541. 581 F.2d at 220.
542. 578 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1978).
543. 578 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
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such practices, the employer negated the possibility of a fair election.544
Therefore, a bargaining order was permissible under the circumstances.
The Board's bargaining order was also enforced in NLRB v. Ultra-
Sonic De-Burring, Inc . 45 The employer discharged two employees for
union activity, threatened to cease business operations if the union won
a majority, and created the impression that union activities were under
surveillance. The court noted that the test to determine the propriety of
a bargaining order is not whether the employer misconduct actually
undermined the union majority, but rather whether it had a tendency to
do so. 54
6
b. with no card majority
In NLRB v. Randall P. Kane, Inc., the court briefly addressed the
question of whether a bargaining order may issue in the absence of a
union majority. While recognizing the language in Gissel suggesting
that, even without a union majority, bargaining orders might be proper
if the employer's misconduct were exceptional, the court found that the
employer's activities were not of the requisite magnitude.5 47 Thus, for
a bargaining order to issue, the court required the union to show a
majority of authorization cards.548 Neither the Board nor any court
has issued a bargaining order on such grounds, although the Board has
recently held that it has the authority to do so. 549 The Ninth Circuit
joins the Board and the Fifth Circuit550 in alluding to the permissibility
544. Id. at 256.
545. 593 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
546. Id. at 124.
547. 581 F.2d 215, 220 (9th Cir. 1978).
548. Id.
549. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 179, 101 L.R.R.M. 1278, 1279-80
(June 12, 1979) (a majority of the Board held that its remedial authority may include the
power to issue a bargaining order even in the absence of a prior showing of majority support
for the union, but did not find such an order appropriate in the case). See Herbert Halperin
Distrib., Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 239, 239 n.3 (1977), enforced, 84 LC t 10,645 (4th Cir. 1978)
(mem.) (declined to decide that a bargaining order can never be imposed as a remedy, while
holding that unfair practices involved were not outrageous or pervasive enough to justify
one); Pinter Bros., Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 921, 922 (1977), enforced, 84 LC 1 10,898 (2d Cir.
1978) (Gissel cited for the proposition that cards are not the only method for selecting a
bargaining representative); Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 49, 70 n.55 (1977), enforce-
ment denied, 574 F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1978) (Board has not yet seen fit to grant a bargaining
order without a majority status); Richard L. Cannady (Bob White Target Co.), 189 N.L.R.B.
913, 926 (1971), enforcement denied, 466 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1972) (hearing examiner be-
lieved unfair practices were so "outrageous" and "pervasive" that a bargaining order would
be appropriate without inquiry into majority status; however, the union had a majority).
550. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830
(1971).
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of such an order, while declining to grant one.5
D. Withdrawal of Recognition
1. During the certification year
For one year after the date of certification, a certified union enjoys
an irrebuttable presumption of majority status, even if evidence of a
union's loss of majority is brought forward.5 An exception to this rule
occurs when "unusual circumstances" are present.5 5 3 For example, in
NLRB v. Lee Office Equ#7ment, 54 the employer sought to defend his
refusal to bargain with the union on the grounds that the union's loss of
all support and past misconduct constituted unusual circumstances.
The court agreed that the union had lost all support because at least
four of the ten unit employees wrote to the union indicating their desire
to no longer be represented in bargaining. The court held, however,
that neither the loss of all support5 55 nor past misconduct, without
more, constitutes unusual circumstances.55 6 If an employer reasonably
believes that it cannot continue bargaining with a union due to special
circumstances, it can seek relief from the Board in the form of a peti-
tion for revocation of certification. 5 7
Voluntary recognition, as opposed to Board certification, creates
an irrebuttable presumption of majority status for a "reasonable pe-
riod" from the date of recognition. 58 In NLRB v. Broadmoor Lumber
Co.,559 for example, the employer saw the appropriate authorization
cards, the employer and union representative held a number of meet-
ings, and the employer told the union representative to prepare a pro-
posed contract. The court held that these facts were sufficient to
support the Board's determination that the employer had voluntarily
551. NLRB v. Randall P. Kane, Inc., 581 F.2d at 220.
552. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954).
553. Id.
554. 572 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1978).
555. Id. at 706. See Inter-Polymer Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir.
1973) (absent "unusual circumstances" an employer must bargain even if the union has lost
its majority status); NLRB v. Holly-Gen. Co., 305 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1962) (company
must bargain, absent "unusual circumstances," even though a majority of employees has
repudiated the union); Ajax Magnethermic Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 317 (1977), enforced, 591
F.2d 1209 (6th Cir. 1979) (employee turnover and changes in "conditions" not "unusual
circumstances"); Tyler Pipe & Foundry Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 784 (1966) (fact that only 8% of
the employees participated in a strike after an election did not overcome the presumption).
556. 572 F.2d at 706.
557. Id. at 707. 4 9 1
558. Brooks v. NLRB, 348S. 96, 102 (1954).
559. 578 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1978).
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recognized the union. 6°
2. After the certification year
The NLRB consistently has held that, after the certification year
has elapsed, the presumption of majority status can be rebutted conclu-
sively by an employer's reasonable good faith doubt as to the continu-
ing majority status of the union.5 61 The District of Columbia Circuit,
however, holds that even a reasonable good faith doubt is not enough
to rebut the presumption if the union has majority status at the time of
the refusal to bargain. 62
Several of the cases heard by the Ninth Circuit during the survey
period dealt with the relevance of an employer's motivation in deter-
mining whether that employer had a reasonable good faith doubt.
NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc. 5 63 held that the employer's subjective mo-
tivation for challenging the union's majority status is not the proper
basis for a determination. The proper standard is whether objectively
there is a good faith basis for the challenge. 5" An employer's motiva-
tion can be important as evidence, however, because as long as union
support is lacking and the employer knows about it, he is justified in
withdrawing recognition-even if his only motivation is to get rid of
the union . 65 Thus, the court in NLRB v. Cornell, Inc. 566 used the em-
ployer's anti-union sentiment to support an otherwise established lack
of good faith doubt.567
During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit upheld Board rulings
that the employer bears the burden of proof on the reasonable doubt
560. Id. at 241-42.
561. Ingress-Plastene, Inc., 430 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1970); Orion Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 633
(1974), enforced, 515 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1975); Automated Business Sys., 205 N.L.R.B. 532
(1973); Bally Case & Cooler Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1968), enforced, 416 F.2d 902 (6th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 910 (1970); Lloyd McKee Motors, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 1278
(1968).
562. IAM Lodges 1746 & 743 v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1058 (1970).
563. 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2849 (1979).
564. Id. at 299 (citing Automated Business Sys. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1974)).
See NLRB v. Vegas Vic, Inc., 546 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1978);
Segger, The MajoriHy Status of Incumbent Bargaining Representatives, 47 TUL. L. REV. 961,
984 (1973).
565. 584 F.2d at 300 n.24. The court explained that in situations in which the employer's
actions are not inherently destructive of a union majority, evidence of the employer's anti-
union motivation can be determinative.
566. 577 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1978).
567. The employer indicated a desire to use an attorney to break the contract and tried to
delay the election. Id. at 518. See NLRB v. Top Mfg. Co., 594 F.2d 223, 224 n.1 (9th Cir.
1979).
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question,5 68 that the evidence must be objective, 569 and that the various
factors marshalled in support of the employer's argument will be
treated cumulatively. 7 ° The court in Tahoe Nugget, however, pointed
out that in most of the cases in which an employer has been found to
have a reasonable doubt, there was one factor which unequivocally
pointed to a decline in union support.571 In every case on this issue
during the survey period, the Ninth Circuit found that employers im-
properly withdrew recognition from their unions. Due to this unanim-
ity, the following discussion is organized according to those factors
which employers have offered to support their contention that they had
a reasonable doubt.
a. employee turnover
Substantial employee turnover is a factor frequently mentioned by
employers to support their position, but the NLRB consistently has
maintained that this factor is not persuasive because there is a pre-
sumption that the new employees will support the union in the same
ratio as the former employees did.572 Other circuits 573 as well as the
Ninth 574 agree with the Board.
568. NLRB v. Top Mfg. Co., 594 F.2d 223, 224 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget,
Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 300 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2849 (1979).
569. NLRB v. Cornell, Inc., 577 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing Terrell Mach. Co. v.
NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088, 1090 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970)); NLRB v. Little
Rock Downtowner, Inc., 414 F.2d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 1969).
570. Pioneer Inn Assoc. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 840 (9th Cir. 1978). Accord, Star Mfg.
Co., 220 N.L.R.B. 582 (1975), enforced in part, 536 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1976).
571. 584 F.2d at 305. The cases on point were National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 494
F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1974) (decertification petition); NLRD v. Gallaro, 419 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.
1969) (7 of 10 employees petitioned for decertification); LAM Lodges 1746 & 743 v. NLRB,
416 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1058 (1970) (union admitted support
was lacking).
572. Windham Community Memo. Hosp., 230 N.L.R.B. 1070 (1977); Surface Indus., Inc.,
224 N.L.R.B. 155 (1976); Cutten Supermarket, 220 N.L.R.B. 507 (1975); King Radio Corp.,
208 N.L.R.B. 578 (1974), enforced, 510 F.2d 1154 (10th Cir. 1975); Johns Swift Co., 133
N.L.R.B. 185 (1961), enforced, 302 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1962); National Plastic Prods. Co., 78
N.L.R.B. 699, enforced, 175 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1949).
573. Teamsters Local 769 v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (decline in checkoff
authorization also present); NLRB v. Leatherwood Drilling Co., 513 F.2d 270 (5th Cir.
1975) (union silence for 5 to 10 months before withdrawal of recognition also present); In-
gress-Plastene, Inc. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Little Rock
Downtowner, Inc., 414 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1969).
574. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 306 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 2849 (1979); Pioneer Inn Assoc. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1978).
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b. lack of union membersho
Lack of union membership is insufficient by itself to establish the
requisite doubt."' The Ninth Circuit's accord is evident in Pioneer Inn
Associates v. NLRB576 and in Sahara-Tahoe Corp.77 in which the
court stressed that union membership is not synonymous with union
support.
c. union inactivity
Union inactivity is another oft-cited justification for an employer's
refusal to bargain. According to the Board and other circuits,57 it is no
more persuasive than employee turnover or lack of union membership.
The Ninth Circuit in Pioneer Inn agreed that it is a factor to be consid-
ered5 79 but noted that in the instant case the union had resumed its
activity prior to the withdrawal of recognition. In Sahara-Tahoe, after
a period of inactivity, the union likewise began to show renewed inter-
est in the employees.5 ° In Tahoe Nugget the union had not processed
any grievances in the years immediately preceding the employer's re-
fusal to bargain, but there was no evidence that any grievance was war-
ranted. Infrequent inspections of the premises by union agents and
non-attendance by employees at a meeting held in the spring of 1974,
although de minimis, could not support a contention that the union
failed to meet its responsibilities under the contract.58 '
575. NLRB v. North Am. Mfg. Co., 563 F.2d 894 (8th Cir. 1977); Teamsters Local 769 v.
NLRB, 532 F.2d 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Washington Manor, Inc., 519 F.2d 750
(6th Cir. 1975); Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977); Strange & Lindsay Beverages,
Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 1200 (1975); Orion Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 633, enforced, 515 F.2d 81 (7th
Cir. 1975); Cantor Bros., 203 N.L.R.B. 774 (1973); Massey Ferguson, Inc., 184 N.L.R.B. 640
(1970), enforced, 447 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Terrell Mach. Co., 173
N.L.R.B. 1480 (1969), enforced, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1970).
576. 578 F.2d 835, 840 (9th Cir. 1978).
577. 581 F.2d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing NLRB v. Vegas Vic, Inc., 546 F.2d 828 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977)).
578. Held insufficient in NLRB v. North Am. Mfg. Co., 563 F.2d 894 (8th Cir. 1977);
NLRB v. Leatherwood Drilling Co., 513 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1975); Grand Lodge, 233
N.L.R.B. 143 (1977); Nevada Club, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1977); Cut & Curl, Inc., 227
N.L.R.B. 1869 (1977).
579. The ALJ had incorrectly found this factor sufficient to displace the presumption of
majority status. 578 F.2d at 838, 839 (citing Star Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 1192, 1194
(7th Cir. 1976); Sierra Development Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 22 (1977), enforced, 604 F.2d 606 (9th
Cir. 1979)).
580. 581 F.2d at 771.
581. 584 F.2d at 307.
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d employee dissatisfaction
One of the most widely mentioned of al factors is employee dis-
satisfaction with the representative union. The court, in NLRB v. Cor-
nel, Inc.,582 found that employee assertions of dissatisfaction are only
one basis upon which reasonable doubt may rest and are insufficient by
themselves. In most of the cases cited by the employer, employee dis-
satisfaction had been accompanied by evidence of some identifiable
acts of the majority to support the assertion of dissatisfaction.5 83 The
court requires such identifiable acts for two reasons: to reduce the like-
lihood that the minority who complain are mistaken and to avoid al-
lowing a minority to undermine a majority supported union. 84 No
such identifiable act was found in Cornell.
585
In three other cases, dissatisfaction was discounted because it came
from management.586 In NLRB v. Top Manufacturing Co.,587 however,
the court found that there was objective evidence of dissatisfaction:
nine of the unit employees crossed picket lines during the strike and
five expressed dissatisfaction with the union. The court held that these
complaints were not necessarily a clear indication that the complain-
ants no longer wanted union representation, especially since the com-
plaints were by a relative few;5 88 the return to work was a necessity for
two individuals and there was no indication it was a rejection of tte
union on the part of the others.
e. unwillingness to agree to an election
The employer in NLRB v. Cornell, Inc."59 asserted that the union's
unwillingness to agree to an election supported the employer's reason-
able doubt of majority status. Although this factor was determinative
in a Seventh Circuit decision,590 the Ninth Circuit distinguished that
582. 577 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1978).
583. Id. at 516 nn.4-9.
584. Id. at 516.
585. The employees had communicated their dissatisfaction to the company's general
manager (only 4 or 5 of them, according to the employer's testimony), but these employees
were not called to testify and the court drew an inference from this against the employer
because it bore the burden of proof. Id. at 517.
586. NLRB v. Morse Shoe, Inc., 591 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget,
Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 305-06 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2849 (1979); Pioneer Inn
Assocs. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 840 (9th Cir. 1978).
587. 594 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1979).
588. Id. at 224-25 (citing NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 2849 (1979)); Pioneer Inn Assocs. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1978)).
589. 577 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1978).
590. NLRB v. Laystrom Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 799, 801 (7th Cir. 1966).
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case from Cornell on the ground that two reasonable inferences could
be drawn from a union's unwillingness to agree to an election: either
the union doubts its own majority or the union doubts the employer's
good faith in questioning the union's majority.5 91 The Seventh Circuit
had cited past union practices to support its inference that the union
doubted its own majority. In Cornell, however, the Ninth Circuit in-
ferred that the union doubted the good faith of the employer.
592
f withdrawalfrom a multi-employer unit5 93
There is a growing list of authority that the presumption of major-
ity support survives the withdrawal of an employer from a multi-em-
ployer unit.5 94 The employer in NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc. 195 argued
that because recognition of the union was based on majority support
within the larger multi-employer unit, an employer's withdrawal from
that unit removed any presumption that might have attached in the
larger unit.5 96 The court rejected this reasoning and held that the pre-
sumption could be inferred from the employer's own conduct in volun-
tarily recognizing the union.597 Furthermore, none of the other factors
used by the employers to support their reasonable doubt were found to
be sufficient, e.g., filing an election petition by the employer,598
financial difficulties of the union,5 99 and bargaining history.6°°
591. 577 F.2d at 517-18.
592. Id.
593. A multi-employer unit consists of a group of employers joined together to help offset
the bargaining strength of powerful unions. FRIEDEN, THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT AND
MULTI-EMPLOYER BARGAINING 4-5 (1949).
594. NLRB v. Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, 582 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1130 (1979); NLRB v. Acme Iron Works, Inc., 582 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1978);
Eugene's, 232 N.L.R.B. 366 (1977); Club Cal-Neva, 231 N.L.R.B. 22 (1977), enforced, 604
F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1979); Barney's Club, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 414 (1976). See cases cited in
Morales, Presumption of Union's Majority Status in NLRB Cases, 29 LAB. L.J. 309, 313 n.27
(1978).
595. 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2849 (1979).
596. Id. at 302.
597. Id. at 303. The court found support in the Act's policy of preserving industrial peace
via maintenance of the status quo; if majority status did not survive withdrawal, unions
would be encouraged to avoid multiple party bargaining, an "effective device for promoting
industry-wide peace." Id. at 304. Voluntary recongition was also a determinative factor in
Sahara-Tahoe Corp., 581 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1978).
598. NLRB v. Top Mfg. Co., 594 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Brooks v. NLRB, 348
U.S. 96, 103, 104 n.18 (1954)); Bally Case & Cooler, Inc. v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 902, 905 (6th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 910 (1970)).
599. Sahara-Tahoe Corp., 581 F.2d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget,
Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 307 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2849 (1979) (union being placed
in trusteeship not probative of lack of support).
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IV. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
A. The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith
Section 1 of the NLRA declares that the policy of the United
States is to protect commerce "by encouraging the practice and proce-
dure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers
of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating
the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection."60 1  To implement this policy, section 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA602 provides that an employer 0 3 commits an unfair labor prac-
tice if it refuses to bargain collectively with the representatives6°4 of its
employees. 05 Similarly, a labor organization commits an unfair labor
practice in violation of section 8(b)(3) for refusal to bargain collectively
with the employer.60 Together, these statutory provisions60 7 establish
a continuing reciprocal duty between an employer and the representa-
tive of a majority of its employees to bargain collectively and in good
faith.60 8 This mutual bargaining obligation extends to the "wages,
600. NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 307-08 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 2849 (1979).
601. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
602. Id. § 158(a). Employer conduct which violates § 8(a)(5) necessarily coerces and re-
strains employees in their § 7 rights and thus derivatively violates § 8(a)(1). See GORMAN,
supra note 288, at 132.
603. Under 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976), the term "employer" includes "any person acting
as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly," but expressly excludes "the United States
or any wholly owned Government corporation, any Federal Reserve Bank, persons subject
to the Railway Labor Act, labor organizations and their agents and officers, or any State or
political subdivision thereof." (emphasis added). See Local 370, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs v. Detrick, 592 F.2d 1045, 1046 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (county government not
an "employer" within meaning of NLRA). See also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U.S. 490 (1979) (church-affiliated schools not within jurisdiction of NLRB; Board there-
fore without authority to issue bargaining order).
604. The term "representative" includes any labor organization or individual. 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(4) (1976).
605. The term "employee" under § 152(3) includes "any employee" and is not limited to
the employees of a particular employer, it includes those employees whose work has ceased
due to a current labor dispute or unfair labor pratice. The term "employee" specifically
excludes agricultural laborers, domestic servants, individuals employed by their parents or
spouse, independent contractors, and employees and supervisors subject to the Railway La-
bor Act. Id.
606. Id. § 158(b)(3).
607. See also 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) (collective bargaining defined); id. § 159(a) (em-
ployees' exclusive representative defined).
608. See generally SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, ABA, THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW 271-439 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA LABOR LAW]; Cox & Dunlop, The Duty To
Bargain Collectively During the Term of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1097,
1099-1101 (1950); Duvin, The Duty To Bargain Law in Search ofoPlicy, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
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hours and other terms and conditions of employment" of employees in
the "unit appropriate for such purposes."
60 9
1. Indicia of good and bad faith
a. totaliy of conduct
Neither party satisfies its bargaining obligation by engaging in a
"mere superficial pretense at bargaining. ' 610 The duty to bargain in
good faith requires that both parties actively participate in the negotia-
tions so as to manifest a present intent to reach the basis for an agree-
ment.611 In judging a party's compliance with sections 8(a)(5) and
8(b)(3), the NLRB and the courts look to the entire course of the par-
ties' bargaining conduct, rather than any single element, to determine
248, 266 (1964); Fleming, The Obligation To Bargain in Good Faith, 16 Sw. L.J. 43, 43-46
(1962).
Prior to the establishment of the National Labor Relations Board, the aim of early
legislation and case law was to curtail open hostility as a result of unionization, rather than
trying to prevent labor-management disputes by encouraging compromise and good faith
negotiation. Enacted in 1935, the Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), was seen as a
way to resolve the power imbalance between employer and employees by creating a statuto-
rily enforceable right to organize. ABA LABOR LAW, supra note 608, at 272-74. Only two
duties of collective bargaining were imposed by the original Act-a section 8(5) duty of the
employer to "bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees" and a section
9(a) duty to bargain "in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment." Id. at 273. Critics soon claimed that the one-sided nature of the
Wagner Act failed to give employers and employees a corresponding protection against a
union's unjust actions. Id. at 27-29. Therefore, in 1947, the Taft-Hartley Amendments ad-
ded a "good faith" requirement into § 8(d). Id. at 275. Section 8(d) was perceived as a
means of creating an objective good faith standard by which the courts and the Board could
analyze both parties' bargaining posture. The addition of § 8(b)(3) also was seen as a means
of creating a reciprocal duty upon the union to bargain in good faith with the employer. See
Cox, The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958).
609. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157,
164 (1971).
610. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 688 (9th Cir. 1943).
611. Id. at 686 (parties have an "obligation. . .to participate actively in the delibera-
tions so as to indicate a present intention to find a basis for agreement, and a sincere effort
must be made to reach a common ground"); NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d
874, 885 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941) (duty to bargain in good faith implies
"an open mind and a sincere desire to reach an agreement in a spirit of amity and coopera-
tion"). See NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1960) (quoting
Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1959)) (" 'duty on both sides ... to
enter into discussion with an open and fair mind, and a sincere purpose to find a basis of
agreement' "); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 154 (1956) (the duty "obligate[s] the
parties to make an honest effort to come to terms; they are required to try to reach an agree-
ment in good faith") (Frankfurter, J., concurring); NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110
F.2d 632, 637 (4th Cir. 1940) (Act requires negotiation "in good faith with the view of reach-
ing an agreement if possible").
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whether a violation of the NLRA has taken place.612 The question is
one of "mixed fact and law" and the courts will not lightly disregard
the Board's overall appraisal of the situation. 1 3
During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit followed the "totality
of conduct" doctrine in determining whether the employer and/or the
union had bargained in bad faith.614 In NLRB v. Pacfc Grinding
Wheel Co.,615 the court applied the "totality of circumstances" ap-
612. In NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941), the Supreme Court
adopted the "totality of conduct" standard to determine whether the employer or the union
had bargained in good faith. The Court stated that:
conduct, though evidenced in part by speech, may amount in connection with other
circumstances to coercion within the meaning of the Act. If the total activities of
an employer restrain or coerce his employees in their free choice, then those em-
ployees are entitled to the protection of the Act. And in determining whether a
course of conduct amounts to restraint or coercion, pressure exerted vocally by the
employer may no more be disregarded than pressure exerted in other ways.
Id. at 477. Generally, the Board and the courts apply a case-by-case "totality of conduct"
approach to evaluate the parties' bargaining conduct. Eg., Jasta Mfg. Co., 246 N.L.R.B.
No. 16, at 34-36 (Oct. 12, 1979) (employer's conduct included coercive employee interroga-
tion, threats of plant closure, layoffs, loss of business, and encouraging employees to per-
suade others to change opinions about the union; held to be "so pervasive and outrageous
that a bargaining order should issue"); NLRB v. Milgo Indus., Inc., 567 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.
1977) (employer's overall conduct included delayed bargaining, low wage offers, unilateral
control of working hours, seniority restrictions, limited bulletin board use, and refusal to
give five-minute, end-of-day, wash-up period, resulting in the issuance of a bargaining or-
der); Continental Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 44,48 (2d Cir. 1974) ("ITIhe determination of
intent must be founded upon the party's overall conduct and on the totality of the circum-
stances, as distinguished from the individual pieces forming part of the mosaic."); NLRB v.
General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 756 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970) (em-
ployer "charged with an overall failure to bargain in good faith, compounded like a mosaic
of many pieces, but depending not on any one alone. They are together to be understood to
comprise the 'totality of circumstances.' "); NLRB v. B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 410 F.2d
463 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) ("Whether or not an employer's bargaining conduct reveals
such a strategy is a question to be determined from an assessment of the totality of his
conduct.").
613. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
887 (1953). See also Kellwood Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir. 1970) (court
adopted Board's finding of employer unfair labor practice).
614. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, Local 280 v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. Pacific Grinding Wheel Co., 572 F.2d 1343, 1348 (9th Cir. 1978). See also NLRB
v. Tomco Communications, Inc., 567 F.2d 871, 883 (9th Cir. 1978) (Board and the courts
must "look at the sum of the evidence, not merely pieces"); NLRB v. Dent, 534 F.2d 844,
846 (9th Cir. 1976) (good faith determined by examining circumstances of each case, includ-
ing "previous relations of the parties, antecedent events explaining behavior at the bargain-
ing table, and the course of negotiations"); NLRB v. Holmes Tuttle Broadway Ford, Inc.,
465 F.2d 717, 719 (9th Cir. 1972) (good faith determined by drawing inferences from the
conduct of the parties as a whole); NLRB v. Stanislaus Implement & Hardware Co., 226
F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1955) ("A state of mind such as good faith is not determined by a
consideration of events viewed separately. The picture is created by a consideration of all
the facts viewed as an integrated whole.").
615. 572 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978).
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proach to the duty to bargain and found that an employer had been
guilty of bad faith bargaining. Following six months of protracted ne-
gotiations, the union had gone out on strike. Before the strike, the
company had violated a settlement agreement covering a prior unfair
labor practice charge and had communicated directly with its employ-
ees in order to bypass the union. Immediately after the strike, the com-
pany unilaterally lowered its wage offers, proposed that the union
security clause and other pro-union contractual terms be eliminated,
and refused to provide the union with relevant data upon request. The
court concluded that, "[v]iewed separately, each of the actions indi-
cate[d] only hard bargaining by the company." Taken together, how-
ever, there was "substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion
that after the union went out on strike, the company's main goal was to
punish, not to bargain with the union." '616
In Graphic Arts International Union, Local 280 v. NLRB,6 7 the
Ninth Circuit held that the totality of the union's conduct indicated a
failure to bargain in good faith with ten independent employers in vio-
lation of section 8(b)(3). The court found that the unilateral imposition
of individualized contracts, the refusal to discuss bargaining proposals
and modifications, and the unilateral imposition of an overtime ban,
demonstrated the union's violation of the bargaining obligation.18
b. surface bargaining
In evaluating the parties' bargaining posture, the Board and the
courts distinguish between "surface" and "hard" bargaining.619 Sec-
616. Id. at 1349.
617. 596 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979).
618. Id. at 907-10.
619. West Coast Casket Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 624 (1971), enforcedinpart, 469 F.2d 871 (9th
Cir. 1972), provides a good example of surface bargaining. The Board found that the em-
ployer's bargaining was consistent in its attempt "to sabotage any effective bargaining." The
company's "surface bargaining" strategy included: isolating union representatives from
contact with the plant, refusing to meet at any place other than company "territory," insis-
tence on the presence of a reporter to take a verbatim transcript, insistence on unreasonable
delays in the scheduling of meetings, frivolous objections to certain union proposals, and
rejection of substantially all of the union's proposals and "hard line" counterproposals.
Viewed in its entirety, the company's conduct indicated a desire to "push the union to the
wall and avoid an agreement." 192 N.L.R.B. at 637. See also Greensboro News Co., 222
N.L.R.B. 893 (1976), enforced, 549 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (union's adamant
insistence on inclusion of arbitration clause and overall conduct, "which negated any inten-
tion of reaching an agreement," violated § 8(b)(3)); West Coast Liquidators, Inc., 205
N.L.R.B. 512 (1973), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Selvin, 527 F.2d 1273, 1277-78 (9th Cir.
1975) (employer who summarily rejected union proposals without offering counterproposals
guilty of surface bargaining).
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tion 8(d) of the NLRA states that the duty to bargain requires that an
employer meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with the
union, but this obligation does not compel the parties to reach an
agreement, agree to a proposal, or make a concession.6 20  From the
context of the employer's total conduct, it must be decided whether the
employer who "meets" and "confers" with a labor organization is law-
fully engaged in hard bargaining to achieve a desirable contract or in
surface bargaining to frustrate the possibility of reaching an agreement.
In NLRB v. Reed & Prince Manufacturing Co.,621 the First Circuit
adopted the Board's test to distinguish between surface and hard bar-
gaining. In Reed, the Board had found that an employer was guilty of
surface bargaining because its final offer included "terms which no
'self-respecting union' could be expected to accept. ' 62 2 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, however, has declined to apply the Board's "self-respecting union"
test. In NLRB v. Tomco Communications, Inc. ,623 the Ninth Circuit
rejected the Board's finding that an employer had engaged in general
bad faith bargaining. The Board had based its conclusion upon the
combined effect of the company's economic and non-grievance propos-
als, overall bargaining tactics, and an illegal lockout that had penalized
employees for their unionization and collective bargaining.6 24 The
court reasoned that the company's economic package represented
620. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 104-09 (1970)
(under § 8(d), NLRB does not have power to compel either party to agree to a contract
checkoff clause or any other substantive provision of collective bargaining agreement);
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952) (§ 8(d) expressly provides that
"the obligation to bargain collectively does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession").
621. 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
622. Id. at 139. The Second Circuit also adopted the Board's test in Vanderbilt Prods.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 297 F.2d 833, 834 (2d Cir. 1961) (per curiam). The employer not only incor-
porated an extensive set of terms which no "self-respecting union could brook," into its
substantive proposals, but also conditioned all negotiations upon the acceptance of its offer.
Id. at 833.
623. 567 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1978). Following a Board certified election, the company and
the union reached an impasse in negotiations. The employer threatened economic action if
the union failed to accept its last offer, which included a minimal wage increase, a reduction
in sick leave, and rejection of an existing grievance procedure concerning shop steward par-
ticipation. Id. at 877-83.
624. The court noted that the surface bargaining cases, upon which the Board had relied,
were distinguishable on their facts. These decisions included NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg.
Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953) and NLRB v. Holmes Tuttle
Broadway Ford, Inc., 465 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1972). They were distinguished because they
involved more "aggravated" behavior. The court characterized the instant case as one in-
volving "hard bargaining between two parties who were possessed of disparate economic
power: a relatively weak Union and a relatively strong Company." 567 F.2d at 883-84.
LOYOLA4 OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
"some improvement in economic benefits. ' 625 Declining to apply the
Board's "self-respecting union test" for good faith negotiations, 626 the
court instead evaluated the "reasonableness" of the employer's total
bargaining posture in light of its economic position and overall bar-
gaining proposals.627 The court concluded that the company's natural
desire to use its economic power "to retain as many rights as possible"
coupled with its proposed increases in the level of employee benefits,
could not be characterized as surface bargaining.628
c. proposals and demands
In determining whether a party has violated its bargaining obliga-
tion, the NLRB considers the nature of a party's bargaining proposals
and demands. 629 The proposal or demand must amount to a foreclo-
sure of future negotiations before the courts will draw an inference of
bad faith bargaining.630 In Graphic Arts International Union, Local 280
v. NLRB,631 the Ninth Circuit recently upheld the Board's determina-
tion that a union had failed to bargain in good faith with ten independ-
ent employers by taking "an intransigent, insincere and cavalier
attitude toward the negotiations" and "improperly employ[ing] eco-
625. Id. at 877. Moreover, the company had the right to insist on mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining, viz., a management rights clause, a no-strike clause, a waiver of past
practices clause, and an integration or zipper clause, even to the point of impasse. Id. at
878-80. Conceding that several of the offsetting provisions in the company's final offer were
"harsh," such practices were merely "evidence of sharp draftsmanship." Furthermore, ab-
sent abuse, the company was allowed to retract previous concessions prior to the union's
acceptance. Id. at 882-83.
626. Id. at 883-84. The court characterized the Board's test as "com[ing] perilously close
to determining what the employer should give by looking at what the employees want." Id.
at 883.
627. Id. at 884.
628. Id. at 883-84.
629. In NLRB v. Holmes Tuttle Broadway Ford, Inc., 465 F.2d 717, 719 (9th Cir. 1972),
the Ninth Circuit held that the Board may look-to the content of the bargaining proposals as
part of its review of the relevant circumtances. See H.K. Porter Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1370,
1372 (1965), enforced sub nom. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 851 (1966), 385 U.S. 1036 (1967) (employer's refusal to agree to a dues
checkoff proposal was evidence of bad faith). On remand, the Board ordered the employer
to grant the checkoff provision. 172 N.L.R.B. 966 (1968), a ffdper curam, H.K. Porter Co. v.
NLRB, 414 F.2d 1123 (1969), rev'd as to remedy, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (Board is without au-
thority to compel agreement on substantive contractual provisions).
630. See Queen Mary Restaurants Corp. v. NLRB, 560 F.2d 403, 409 (9th Cir. 1977)
(quoting Fraser & Johnston Co. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 1259, 1263 (9th Cir. 1972)) (" 'adhering
to an untenable legal position during the course of negotiations is inconsistent with the obli-
gation to bargain in good faith' ").
631. 596 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979).
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nomic power to thwart negotiations." '632 The union's unilateral imposi-
tion of bargaining proposals was tantamount to a foreclosure of
negotiations in light of other evidence indicating its refusal to bargain
in good faith.633 Drawing the line between bad faith "obstructionist
intransigence" and merely "hard bargaining," the court rejected the
union's contention that it had "strenuously bargained for its proposals
[in good faith] and had the economic clout to back up its demands
[without violating the Act]." 634
2. The duty to furnish information
The duty to bargain in good faith includes an employer's obliga-
tion to provide requested information to the union so that the union
can perform its function as a collective bargaining agent. 635 The
union's good faith request for information, however, is a prerequisite to
the employer's duty to bargain.636 The union must demonstrate that
the information requested is either relevant to bargaining issues or use-
ful to the effective enforcement and administration of the existing col-
lective bargaining agreement. The relevancy requirement is broadly
interpreted by the courts.637 Generally, an employer's defense to this
632. Id. at 907.
633. Id. at 907-09, 908 n.5. The union had also committed an unfair labor practice iy
seeking to force one of the independent employers to leave a multi-employer bargaining
association in violation of § 8(b)(1)(B) and § 8(b)(3) of the NLRA.
634. Id. at 907-08 (citing Queen Mary Restaurants Corp. v. NLRB, 560 F.2d 403, 407,
411 (9th Cir. 1977)) (employer refused to bargain in good faith by opposing security and
hiring hall proposals "as a matter of moral principle").
As a general rule, a party bargains in bad faith if it unilaterally imposes conditions that
are patently unreasonable to the other party. Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Graphic rArts also
found that the union had violated § 8(b)(l)(B) (unfair labor practice for union to restrain or
coerce employer in selection of his collective bargaining representatives) and § 8(b)(3) of the
NLRA because the purpose and effect of the union's unilateral action was to induce the
employer to "pull out of [the multi-employer association] and bargain individually with the
Union." Id. at 909.
635. E.g., NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg.
Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956); NLRB v. Twin City Lines, Inc., 425 F.2d 164, 167 (8th Cir.
1970); Cone Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 445, 450 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903
(1969).
636. E.g., NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg.
Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956); NLRB v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 410 F.2d 953, 957 (6th
Cir. 1969).
Although § 8(d) does not expressly provide for access to relevant information, case au-
thority has characterized the union's right to demand this information as a "statutory right."
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 1963). See also Kroger
Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 512 (1976).
637. E.g., NLRB v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 352 U.S. 938 (1956) (per curiam) (failure to
furnish wage information constitutes unfair ibor practice); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB,
347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965) (duty to provide wage information on employees outside collec-
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duty will be rejected if it is based on claims of confidentiality6 38 or priv-
ilege.
63 9
While the NLRB requires an employer to disclose the methodol-
ogy behind its employee promotion tests, 4° it was not until 1975 that
the Board ordered an employer to disclose to a union preparing for
arbitration the tests taken and scores achieved by particular employ-
ees.' 4 1 In 1979, however, the Supreme Court reversed this Board order
in Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB."2 The Supreme Court was confronted
with two issues on appeal."13 First, Detroit Edison questioned the pro-
priety of the Board's order requiring that it disclose copies of the test
battery and answer sheets directly to the union. Second, the company
questioned the Board's determination that it had violated sections
8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) by refusing to disclose, without individual employ-
ees' written consent, the test scores linked with the employees'
tive bargaining unit); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963)
(employer required to provide time-study material used in setting wage rates and incen-
tives); NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 1963) (union has right to
wage information when negotiating for higher wages); International Woodworkers, Locals
6-7 v. NLRB, 263 F.2d 483, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (union entitled to wage information when
negotiating new contract); NLRB v. Oregon Coast Operators Ass'n, 246 F.2d 280 (9th Cir.
1957) (per curiam) (employer required to provide information on equipment specifications);
Autoprod, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 773 (1976) (employer must provide employee addresses); B.F.
Goodrich Gen. Prods. Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 228 (1975) (duty to furnish information of em-
ployer's cafeteria operation); Skyland Hosiery Mills, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1600, 1601 (1954)
(employer violated § 8(a)(5) by refusing to provide wage insurance information). Cf NLRB
v. Western Elec., Inc., 559 F.2d 1131 (8th Cir. 1977) (employer can refuse to furnish data
concerning employees not transferred into bargaining unit); Nordstrom, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B.
601 (1977) (employer may refuse to supply union with list of employees who had worked
during a strike).
638. E.g., General Elec. Co., 466 F.2d 1177, 1185 (6th Cir. 1972) (wage information);
NLRB v. Frontier Homes Corp., 371 F.2d 974, 979 (8th Cir. 1967) (selling-price lists); Cur-
tiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 68-69 (3d Cir. 1965) (job evaluation and wage
data). See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 311 n.9 (1979) (White, Brennan, &
Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
639. NLRB v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956, 959 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955),
352 U.S. 917 (1956) (no confidential privilege to refuse to disclose information on employee
merit wage increases).
640. Equitable Gas Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 300 (1977).
641. Detroit Edison Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 1024 (1975), enforced, 560 F.2d 722 (6th Cir.
1977), vacated and remanded, 440 U.S. 301 (1979).
642. 440 U.S. 301 (1979). Justice Stewart delivered the majority opinion.
643. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in enforcing the Board's order without modifi-
cation, found that all the requested items were relevant to the union's grievance and there-
fore ordered the company to turn over the material directly to the union. The court
reasoned that the restrictions set by the administrative law judge on the union's use of the
materials, including the requirement that the materials be used solely to process and arbi-
trate grievances and then be returned, guaranteed the tests security and validity. 560 F.2d at
726.
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names.644
The Court held that the Board had abused its remedial discretion
by ordering the company to turn this information over to the union."5
The Court reasoned that the remedy selected by the Board failed to
protect the security of the tests, for the union could not have been sub-
ject to a contempt citation if it disobeyed the restrictions placed on it,
barring it from disclosing test information to employees who had taken
or were likely to take the tests. ' 6
The Court also held that the Board's order was erroneous.6 47 The
employer's willingness to disclose test scores only upon receipt of indi-
vidual employees' written consent satisfied its statutory duty under sec-
tion 8(a)(5). The Court reached its decision by balancing the sensitive
nature of the testing information, the reasonableness of the company's
offer, and the company's lack of intent to undermine the union. 48 The
Court therefore rejected the Board's conclusion that the company had
failed to bargain in good faith;" 9 the interests served in conditioning
disclosure on the consent of individual employees justified any impair-
ment of the union's role in processing employee grievances.
650
An employer who claims financial inability to meet a union wage
demand has a duty to provide financial data to substantiate its claim. 5'
During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit considered an employer's
644. 440 U.S. at 312.
645. Id. at 316-17. The company's duty to supply information under § 8(a)(5) and the
type of disclosure that satisfies the duty depends upon the "facts and circumstances of the
particular case." Id. at 314 (citing NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956)).
646. Id. at 314-17. Another problem inherent in the Board's remedy was the danger of
inadvertent leaks by the union, for the union was not a party to the enforcement proceedings
in the court of appeals. The scope of the Board's enforcement order under § 10(e) of the
NLRA is limited by FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d), which makes an injunction binding only "upon
the parties to the action. . . and those in active concert or participation with them." Argua-
bly, this would not have included the union. Moreover, NLRB regulations provide for con-
tempt sanctions against a respondent only. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1019, 101.14-.15 (1976). Finally,
the Board's General Counsel could refuse to issue a complaint by exercising its unreview-
able discretion. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
647. 440 U.S. at 319-20.
648. Id.
649. Id. Justices White, Brennan and Marshall joined in a well-reasoned dissent. They
expressed deference to the Board's "difficult and delicate" task of balancing competing
claims "to effectuate national labor policy" and approved of the Board's remedial order.
The Justices felt that the majority overrated the hazards of direct release to the union and
underrated the interests that would have been vindicated by the release. Id. at 321-25.
650. Id. at 319.
651. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956). See NLRB v. Western
Wirebound Box Co., 356 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1966) (employer failed to bargain in good faith by
not providing cost figures to union).
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financial-inability defense in NLRB v. Pacfc Grinding Wheel Co.652 In
Pacfc, the court stated that if a union requests information at a hear-
ing, but fails to follow up on its request, the employer's mere failure to
produce the data does not violate its duty to bargain in good faith.653
The court noted, however, that the company's initial refusal to release
existing data on local and industry wage scales would be considered in
evaluating whether the company had breached its good faith obliga-
tion. 4
3. Impasse
The duty to bargain in good faith is suspended when irreconcilable
differences arise in the parties' bargaining positions after extensive ne-
gotiations.655 The Board and the courts recognize that an impasse also
permits an employer to make unilateral changes in working conditions
that are consistent with its rejected offers to the union.65 6 Generally, a
deadlock on a single issue does not vitiate the employer's bargaining
duty as to other issues. 6 5 7 An exception to this rule occurs when the
parties deadlock over a "critical issue," thereby creating a situation "as
impassable. . . as an inability to agree on several or all issues. 658
In NLRB v. Yama Woodcraft, Inc. ,659 the parties had reached a
bona fide impasse on economic issues during contract negotiations.
Prior to impasse, the company had attended bargaining sessions, made
contract proposals to the union, and reached agreement with the union
on many noneconomic issues. When negotiations on critical economic
issues reached a deadlock, however, and the union went out on strike,
the employer no longer was obligated to bargain on noneconomic is-
652. 572 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978).
653. Id. at 1348-49. The company justified its regressive wage proposals on the "reces-
sion" and on the claim that its wages were competitive in the local community and in the
grinding wheel industry. Id. at 1346.
654. Id. at 1348-49.
655. Schatzki, The Employer's Unilateral Act-A Per Se Violation-Sometimes, 44 Tax.
L. Rav. 470, 495-501 (1966).
656. See NLRB v. Southern Coach & Body Co., 336 F.2d 214,217 (5th Cir. 1964) (unilat-
eral wage increases, without a bona fide bargaining impasse, constitutes refusal to bargain in
good faith); NLRB v. Intracoastal Terminal, Inc., 286 F.2d 954, 958 (5th Cir. 1961) (unilat-
eral changes in policy, which were not within bargaining negotiations, not a permissible
activity even after an impasse); Falcon Tank Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 333 (1971) (assuming an
impasse, employer violates NLRA with wage increases that exceed those offered to union
during bargaining).
657. Pool Mfg. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 540, 549 (1946), a 'd, 339 U.S. 577 (1949).
658. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 627 n.13
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
659. 580 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1978).
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sues. The court held that the company did not violate sections 8(a)(5)
and 8(a)(1) by "making its contract offer directly to its employees and
in unilaterally effectuating that offer."
660
4. Defenses to the duty to bargain
a. the construction industry proviso
Section 8(f) was added to the NLRA by the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.661 Pursuant to that section, an
employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry
may enter into a pre-hire agreement with a union that has not attained
majority status prior to the execution of the agreement. This is an ex-
ception to the general rule that an employer commits an unfair labor
practice by recognizing a minority union.662 Moreover, the presump-
tion of a union's majority status during the term of a collective bargain-
ing contract does not apply to pre-hire agreements, and both parties
may require a representation election at any time.6
The Supreme Court in Local 103, InternationalAssociation of Iron
Workers v. NLRB6  resolved a disagreement between the NLRB and
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the
proper construction of section 8(f) in relation to sections 8(b)(7)(C)
665
and 8(a)(5). 666 The Court upheld the Board's determination that it was
an unfair labor practice for an uncertified construction union lacking
majority status to engage in extended picketing in an effort to enforce a
pre-hire agreement with the employer.667 Under section 8(b)(7)(C), a
union which is not the certified representative of the employees in a
bargaining unit commits an unfair labor practice if it pickets an em-
ployer with "an object" of "forming or requiring the employer to recog-
nize or bargain with the union as the representative of his employees,"
and fails to file a petition for an election under section 9(c) within 30
days.66s Adopting the Board's reasoning,669 the Court concluded that
660. Id. at 944.
661. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976).
662. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737-38
(1961).
663. Bear Creek Constr. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1285, 1285-86 (1962).
664. 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
665. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976).
666. Id. § 158(a)(5).
667. 434 U.S. at 340-41.
668. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976).
669. 434 U.S. at 341. The Board relied on R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693
(1971), enforcement denied sub nom. Local 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB,
480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In RJ Smith, the Board had held that an employer does
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section 8(b)(7)(C) was violated since the purpose of the picketing was
to force or require the employer to recognize or bargain with the mi-
nority union.670
b. suspension during illegal or unprotected acti ity
The employer's duty to bargain collectively with the representative
of its employees has been characterized as a continuing one.67' It has
also been recognized, however, that an employer's duty to bargain in
good faith may be suspended when a labor organization engages in
illegal or unprotected activity.672 Thus, the Board and the courts con-
sistently hold that an employer may use union violence and illegal
strikes and slowdowns as defenses to refusal-to-bargain charges.673
The employer's illegal and unprotected union activity defense was
a highly litigated subject during the survey period. Two recent Ninth
Circuit decisions demonstrate that third party misconduct, which is not
linked directly to the union, does not suspend the employer's bargain-
ing obligation. In NLRB v. Hepa Corp. ,674 the court refused to attri-
bute to a newly certified union the misconduct of "in-plant organizing
committee" members because those persons had acted without union
authorization. 675 Enforcing the Board's bargaining order and summary
judgment against the company, the court found that the employer had
not commit an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(5) by unilaterally terminating the bargain-
ing relationship if the union fails to obtain majority status after the execution of a § 8(f) pre-
hire agreement.
670. 434 U.S. at 352. The Court distinguished Building & Constr. Trades Council, 146
N.L.R.B. 1086, 1087 (1964) (§§ 8(b)-8(c) does not bar extended picketing by a majority
union to enforce a contract). The dissenters, Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens, felt
that the majority's construction of § 8(f) allowed the employer and the Board to dismiss a
pre-hire agreement "as a nullity." 434 U.S. at 352-53.
671. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 342 (1939).
672. Arundel Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 525, 527 (1974) (no duty to bargain during illegal strike
that violated contractual no-strike provision).
673. E.g. United Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers, Local 1113 v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338,
341, 344 (D.C. Cir.), cent. denied, 350 U.S. 981 (1955) (no violation in employer's refusal to
bargain after union called walkout despite no-strike clause); Marathon Elec. Mfg. Corp., 106
N.L.R.B. 1171, 1180 (1953), aj7'd, 223 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (union called strike in
breach of contract and forfeited its bargaining rights). Cf. NLRB v. Insurance Agent's Int'l
Union, 361 U.S. 477, 495-96 (1960); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 741 n.7 (1962) (union-
instigated slowdown during contract negotiations will not justify employer's refusal to bar-
gain); NLRB v. Ramona's Mexican Food Prods., Inc., 531 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam) (even tortious union tactics do not relieve employer of duty to bargain in good
faith).
674. 597 F.2d 166 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
675. Id. at 167. The employer failed to produce evidence that connected the union to the
third party misconduct. The company had introduced "hearsay evidence" and speculative
rumors that could not serve to invalidate the election. Id. at 167-68.
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violated sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) and refused to suspend its duty to
bargain.676 Similarly, in NLRB v. Miramar of California, Inc. ,677 the
court required the employer to bargain following an election. A union
misconduct defense was rejected. The company failed to present prima
facie evidence that "the alleged statements and conduct of the Union's
adherents were instigated, authorized, solicited, ratified, condoned, or
adopted by the Union.
6 78
The Ninth Circuit reached a different result in Valley Rock Prod-
uicts, Inc. v. NLRB.6 7 9 In Valley Rock, the court denied the union's
motion for summary judgment because the employer had raised sub-
stantial and material issues of fact regarding a union official's pre-elec-
tion conduct and the validity of one employee's election ballot. The
company's duty to bargain was suspended pending an evidentiary
hearing on the issues.680
In General Teamster, Local 162 v. NLRB,68" 1 the Ninth Circuit re-
jected an employer's "mistaken belief" defense to its duty to bargain.
The employer was a party to the union's collective bargaining agree-
ment with an employer association. He was not an association mem-
ber, however, and a no-strike provision in the agreement did not apply
to employers with non-member status. Following an economic strike
against the employer's office, the employer withdrew recognition from
and repudiated its contract with the union. The court held that the
employer had violated sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) by repudiating the
contract, reasoning that it was not excused by the "mistaken belief that
it had the benefit of the [employer association] contract's no-strike pro-
visions.
6 2
In NLRB v. Pacjfc International Rice Mills, Inc.,683 the employer's
676. Id. at 167.
677. 601 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1979).
678. Id. at 424 nn. 4 & 5. The Court's review of three affidavits submitted by the com-
pany failed to show that union agents had sanctioned the alleged verbal threats, coercion,
and knife exhibitions by company employees. Id. at 424-25.
679. 590 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
680. Id. at 304 (company contended physical attack by union organizer on company of-
ficers had deleterious effect on voters' minds; ballot cast by bargaining unit employee). Ac-
cordRobert's Tours, Inc. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 242,242-43 (9th Cir. 1978) (unauthorized voter
list and campaigning at polling area temporarily excuse employer's duty to bargain; eviden-
tiary hearing necessary). See also NLRB v. Tri-City Linen Supply, 579 F.2d 51 (9th Cir.
1978) (employer's defense denied; no evidence in record of union misrepresentation or in-
timidation); NLRB v. L.D. McFarland Co., 572 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1978) (employer's defense
denied; no evidence of improper waiver of fees and dues in exchange for votes).
681. 568 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978).
682. Id. at 668.
683. 594 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1979).
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defense to a refusal to bargain charge was based on an allegation that
the hearing officer was biased against the employer because of the of-
ficer's membership in the National Labor Relation Board's Employees'
Union. The court rejected that defense, reasoning that Executive Order
11491 gave each federal employee, including National Labor Relations
Board employees, the right to participate in labor organizations.68 4
Moreover, substantial evidence in the record clearly showed the hear-
ing officer's impartiality.685
The Ninth Circuit recently rejected race and sex discrimination
defenses to the duty to bargain that were raised by an employer and a
union. In Graphic Arts International Union, Local 280 v. NLRB,686 the
court rejected the union's claim that it was justified in refusing to bar-
gain with certain independent employers who were allegedly guilty of
race and sex discrimination. Based upon the "peculiar facts" of the
case, the court found that the union had been "perfectly willing to bar-
gain with the independents-discrimination or not-as long as they ac-
cepted the terms 'proposed' by the Union. 687 The union had not
asserted the defense of discrimination until it had been charged with an
unfair labor practice for refusing to consider the employer's bargaining
proposals. The court found that the union's protest was a subterfuge to
mask its own bad faith bargaining.
688
Similarly, in Natter Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB,689 the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected an employer's race and sex discrimination defenses and
found that the employer had violated section 8(a)(5) by refusing to bar-
gain with a union local. The employer had failed to establish a prima
facie case that the union local seeking certification was dominated by a
discriminatory international union or a "tainted" local.690 The em-
ployer, therefore, was not entitled to a Board hearing on the discrimi-
nation charge.691
5. Loss of union's majority status
Generally, the NLRA requires that an employer recognize and
bargain with the representative chosen by a majority of his employees
684. Id. at 1327 (citing 3 C.F.R. § 510 (1971)).
685. Id.
686. 596 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979).
687. Id. at 911.
688. Id. at 913-14.
689. 580 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1128 (1979).
690. Id. at 952.
691. Id. at 952 n.4.
[ ol. 13
19801 LABOR LAW SURVEY
in an appropriate bargaining unit, absent unusual circumstances.6 92
The union enjoys an almost conclusive presumption of majority sup-
port during the certification year.693 An employer may not refuse to
bargain during this twelve month period even though it may be evident
that the union has lost majority support.694 Furthermore, the Board
and the courts agree that a certified union, following the certification
year, continues to enjoy a presumption of majority status.6 95 Nonethe-
less, an employer may raise the incumbent union's loss of majority sup-
port as a defense to the duty to bargain. Such a defense, however, must
be based upon either "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence of an
actual loss of majority support or sufficient "objective considerations"
to support a reasonable good faith doubt of the union's majority sta-
tus.
6 96
In NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc. ,697 the Ninth Circuit reiterated the
guidelines that govern the continuing presumption of union majority
status.698 In Tahoe, a multi-employer unit had voluntarily recognized a
692. E.g. WTOP, Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1237 (1955) ("defunct" union is an "unusual
circumstance"); Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 325, 327 (1944) ("unusual cir-
cumstance" when certified union is dissolved).
693. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954). 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976) provides
for the "certification bar" rule, which states that "no election shall be directed in any bar-
gaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid
election shall have been held." The Board has acknowledged the existence of "unusual
circumstances" as an exception to this rule. See cases cited at note 692 supra.
694. NLRB v. Bums Int'l Security Serv., 406 U.S. 272, 279 n.3 (1972); Brooks v. NLRB,
348 U.S. 96 (1954); Inter-Polymer Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1973);
NLRB v. Holly-General Co., 305 F.2d 670, 674 (9th Cir. 1962).
695. E.g., NLRB v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 431 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1970).
696. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cornell, Inc., 577 F.2d 513, 515-16 (9th Cir. 1978) ("good faith
doubt of the union's continuing majority status... [must be] reasonable and supported by
objective considerations"); Star Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir. 1976);
Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030, 1035-37 (8th Cir. 1976) (renewed employee
support for union "evaporated" any "rational basis" for employer to doubt the majority
status of the union); NLRB v. Vegas Vic, Inc., 546 F.2d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 818 (1978); NLRB v. Tragniew Inc., 470 F.2d 669, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1972); Ref-
Chem Co. v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1969); Celanese Corp. of America, 95
N.L.R.B. 664, 672 (1951).
697. 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2847 (1979). In Tahoe, a volun-
tary association of restaurant and casino employers entered into a contract with a union.
Two independent employers joined the association soon after it opened for business. Upon
subsequently withdrawing, the same two independents refused to bargain with or recognize
the union, based upon a reasonable doubt of the union's majority. Id. at 296.
698. Id. at 297-300. The Tahoe court stated that
[t]o sustain an 8(a)(5) charge, the General Counsel must show the union repre-
sented a majority of the unit employees when the employer refused to bargain.
The Board employs two presumptions obviating an evidentiary showing of major-
ity status. For a reasonable time, usually one year, after certification or voluntary
recognition, majority support is irrebuttably presumed absent "unusual circum-
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union as collective bargaining agent. The court held that the timely
withdrawal of two single employers from that unit did not rebut the
presumption of continuing union majority support within the single
employer units. 699 The court noted that the employer had not estab-
lished the seven "objective considerations" that would have demon-
strated a decline in union support.700 Absent such a showing, the single
employers had unlawfully refused to bargain with the union. 0
B. The Subjects of Bargaining
The scope of bargaining includes "wages, hours and other terms
and conditions of employment. '70 2 While the Wagner and Taft-Hart-
stances." After one year, the presumption becomes rebuttable. Absent sufficient
countervailing proof, the presumption establishes, without more, the employer's
duty to bargain.
The presumption is rebutted if the employer shows by clear, cogent, and con-
vincing evidence, that the union was in the minority or that the employer had a
good faith reasonable doubt of majority support at the time of the refusal.
Id. at 297 (citation omitted).
699. Id. at 304.
700. Id. at 304-08. The single employers tried to establish the following: (1) employee
discontent, (2) high employee turnover, (3) union inactivity, (4) low membership, (5)
financial difficulties, (6) a bargaining history of employee-led challenges to union represen-
tation, and (7) admissions of lack of union support. The court characterized the employers,
evidence as being "subjective," "ambiguous," and "unreliable." Id. at 308.
701. During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit rendered six other decisions involving
the same presumption within different factual contexts; the court consistently applied the
Tahoe Nugget guidelines. NLRB v. Top Mfg. Co., Inc., 594 F.2d 223, 224-25 (9th Cir. 1979)
(employee expressions of dissatisfaction with union not the type of "objective criteria" nec-
essary to support reasonable doubt of majority status); NLRB v. Morse Shoe, Inc., 591 F.2d
542, 546 (9th Cir. 1979) (company failed to establish either "actual loss of majority" or
"objective criteria"; manager's affidavit of employee's desire to quit union insufficient);
NLRB v. B.C. Hawk Chevrolet, 582 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1978) (employer not allowed to
rebut presumption after voluntary recognition nine months prior to refusal to bargain); Sa-
hara-Tahoe Corp. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 767, 771-72 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917
(1979) (employer violated §§ 8(a)(5) & 8(a)(1) by withdrawing recognition from and refus-
ing to bargain with uncertified, voluntarily recognized union; evidence of high turnover,
union inactivity, low membership, financial difficulties, and membership drive did not sup-
port reasonable doubt defense); Pioneer Inn Assocs. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 839-40 (9th Cir.
1978) (employer's evidence of four "objective considerations" (inactivity, dissatisfaction,
membership rate, turnover) rebutted by record or found to be "too vague"); NLRB v. Lee
Office Equip., 572 F.2d 704, 706-07 (9th Cir. 1978) (evidence of union's loss of support plus
employer's reasonable belief of union misconduct not an "unusual circumstance" justifying
employer's refusal to bargain during certification year).
702. When the National Labor Relations Act (the Wagner Act) was passed in 1935, § 8(5)
established a duty to bargain for employers covered under the Act but did not enumerate the
subjects of collective bargaining. Instead, § 8(5) referred to § 9(a), which in turn stated that
the representatives designated or selected by employees in an appropriate unit shall be the
exclusive representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to "rates to
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment." This was the entire
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ley Acts created no express division of subject matter into mandatory
and nonmandatory bargaining subjects, in 1958 the Supreme Court
clearly made this distinction in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-
Warner Corporation."3
In Borg- Warner, the Supreme Court affirmed and adopted the ap-
proach of the NLRB and the circuit courts of appeals in classifying
bargaining issues as mandatory (those over which the parties must bar-
gain), permissive (those over which the parties may bargain), and ille-
gal or prohibited (those over which the parties cannot bargain).7M The
majority concluded that the mandatory duty to bargain under the
NLRA was limited to those subjects falling within the statutory phrase
"wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment" set forth
in section 8(d).70 The Court therefore found that it was an unfair la-
bor practice for an employer to insist upon the inclusion of a "ballot"
clause and a "recognition" clause as a condition to its executing a col-
lective bargaining agreement."°6 Neither clause dealt with "wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment" and thus were
not mandatory subjects of bargaining. Although the employer had a
right to propose these two lawful clauses, insistence on their inclusion in
the collective bargaining agreement was tantamount to a refusal to bar-
gain in violation of section 8(a)(5).7 07
Although NLRB decisions following Borg- Warner continue to ap-
ply the mandatory-permissive distinction,7 ° s subsequent Supreme
basis for determining the required scope of bargaining under federal law. NLRA, ch. 372,
49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976)). In 1947, Congress added
§ 8(d), which briefly defined the procedural requirements of collective bargaining but made
no serious attempt to describe specifically the subject matter of bargaining, except to incor-
porate the essential phrases of § 9(a), omitting only "rates of pay" and adding the words
"terms" to conditions of employment. NLRA Amendments, ch. 120, § 8(d), 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976)).
In 1947, a majority of both the House Committee on Labor and Education and the
House of Representatives supported a bill listing the definitive subjects of bargaining. The
bill, however, was defeated in the Senate. See Feinsinger, The NLRA and Collective Bar-
gaining, 57 MICH. L. Rv. 807 (1959).
See generally Oldham, Organized Labor, the Environment, and the Taft-Hartley Act, 71
MICH. L. Rav. 936 (1973); Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargaining Unit Work
he Searchfor Standards in Defning Scope f the Duty to Bargain, 71 COLUM. L. Rav. 803
(1971); Comment, Application of the Mandatory-Permissive Dichotomy to the Duty to Bargain
and UnilateralAction: A Review and Re-evaluation, 15 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 918 (1974).
703. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
704. Id. at 348-50, 351-62.
705. Id. at 348-49.
706. Id.
707. Id. at 349.
708. Eg., National Football League Mgmt. Council, 203 N.L.R.B. 958 (1973) (safety con-
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Court decisions have further qualified-the scope of the duty to bargain
under the NLRA.
70 9
In Ford Motor Company v. NLRB,71 ° the Supreme Court recently
ditions & artificial turf are mandatory); Bralco Metals, Inc., 214 N.L.RB. 143 (1974) (elimi-
nation of daily early morning catering trucks is mandatory); Missourian Pub. Co., Inc. 216
N.L.R.B. 175 (1975) (free coffee is mandatory); Columbia Printing Pressmen & Assts. Union
252, 219 N.L.R.B. 268 (1975) (interest arbitration is permissible); Gas Machinery Co., 221
N.L.R.B. 862 (1975) (Christmas bonuses are mandatory); Cheese Barn, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B.
418 (1976) (ratification procedures are mandatory); Wayne's Olive Knoll Farms, Inc., 223
N.L.R.B. 260 (1976) (health and welfare fund contributions and pensions are mandatory);
Capital Times Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 651 (1976) (unilateral imposition of code of ethics not
mandatory subject of bargaining); International Harvester Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 85 (1976) (uni-
lateral decision by employer to remove job classification from bargaining unit held a
mandatory subject because of impact on earnings of unit employees).
709. In Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), the Court held that
work to be contracted out, previously performed by members of an existing bargaining unit,
was a subject of mandatory bargaining. The Court based this holding upon three factors:
(1) contracted-out work was within the "literal meaning" of the phrase "terms and condi-
tions of employment" under § 8(d) of the NLRA; (2) the industrial practice of bargaining
over contracted-out work brought the subject within the scope of mandatory bargaining; and
(3) bargaining over such a subject would promote the reduction of industrial strife. Id. at
211-12 & n.7.
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion emphasized what he viewed as the "disturbing
breadth" of the majority opinion. To Justice Stewart, § 8(d) defined "a limited category of
issues subject to compulsory bargaining." Id. at 220. Mandatory collective bargaining
should therefore include "the various physical dimensions of a person's working environ-
ment," viz., hours, amount of work, periods of relief, safety practices, freedom from discrim-
inatory discharge, seniority rights, retirement age determinations, and employment security.
Id. at 223. Section 8(d), however, should be interpreted to exclude as mandatory those
"managerial decisions which are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise
or which impinge only indirectly upon employment security." Id. at 225.
A managerial decision may be subjected to a bargaining requirement if it affects the
terms and conditions of employment. The issue was raised in Allied Chem. & Alkali Work-
ers, Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971). The majority opinion held
that retired workers are not "employees" within the meaning of the NLRA and their retire-
ment benefits are not mandatory subjects of bargaining within the § 8(d) phrase "terms and
conditions of employment." Id. at 178. "[T]he question is not whether the third-party con-
cern is antagonistic to or compatible with the interests of bargaining-unit employees, but
whether it vitally affects the 'terms and conditions' of their employment." Id. at 179. The
Court noted, however, that other considerations, such as the effect of bargaining on the
employer's freedom to conduct his business, could be important. And, the Court slighted
the Board's emphasis upon the industrial practice of bargaining over retiree benefits as a
valid ground for including those benefits within the mandatory subjects of collective bar-
gaining. Id. at 180 n.19, 182.
710. 441 U.S. 488 (1979). When the company refused to bargain with the union over
proposed price increases, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge. Consistent with its
earlier view that in-plant food prices and services are "other terms and conditions of em-
ployment," the Board upheld the charge and ordered the company to bargain. The Seventh
Circuit enforced the order, based on the facts and circumstances of the case. NLRB v. Ford
Motor Co., 571 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1978) (enforcing 230 N.L.R.B. 716 (1977)). The previous
stance by the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, however, had been to reverse the NLRB
when the Board found that in-plant cafeteria and vending machine prices were mandatory
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held that in-plant cafeteria and vending machine prices are "terms and
conditions of employment" subject to mandatory collective bargaining
under sections 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), and 8(d). The Court relied on Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.
NLRPB7 1 1 and found that the prices of in-plant food are "plainly ger-
mane to the 'working environment,' " they are "not among those 'man-
agerial decisions which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control.' "7112
Furthermore, the record established a trend of negotiations over in-
plant food prices.7"3
In AifredM Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB,1 4 the Ninth Circuit applied the
general principle that rules and standards of plant operation are
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.7"5 The court found that
the company had clearly violated sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) by failing
to bargain with a union before it unilaterally instituted quota systems
and terminated its policy of permitting employees to have union repre-
sentation at counseling and disciplinary procedures.716
In Maas v. Feduska, Inc. v. NLRB,71 7 the court held that an em-
ployer's contributions to a union's fringe benefit trust fund on behalf of
two supervisors fell outside the statutory phrase "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment."'71 8 Relying upon the
mandatory-permissive distinction established in Borg- Warner, the
bargaining subjects. Eg., Ladish Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 354 (1975), rev'd, 538 F.2d 1267 (7th
Cir. 1976); Package Mach. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 268 (1971), rev'd, 457 F.2d 936 (Ist Cir. 1972);
McCall Corp., 172 N.L.R.B. 540 (1968), rev'd, 432 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1970); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1966), rev'den banc, 387 F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1967).
711. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
712. 441 U.S. at 498 (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203,
222-23 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). Moreover, in-plant food prices and services were
"an aspect of the relationship" between the company and its employees. As a result, "[n]o
third-party interest was directly implicated" and "the standard of [Allied Chem. & Alkali
Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. had] no application" here. Id. at 1851. See note 709
supra for discussion of Allied Chemical, 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
713. 441 U.S. at 499-500 n.11.
714. 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978).
715. See NLRB v. Miller Brewing Co., 408 F.2d 12, 14 (9th Cir. 1969) (safety rules and
regulations are mandatory); Master Slack Corp., 230 N.L.R.B. 1054, 1055 (1977) (tardiness
and absenteeism rules are mandatory); Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 824 (1976)
(safety, work, and disciplinary rules are mandatory); San Isabel Elec. Serv., 225 N.L.R.B.
1073 (1976) (safety and work rules are mandatory); Donna Lee Sportswear, 174 N.L.R.B.
318 (1969) (warning and discharge policies are mandatory). Cf. Hilton Mobil Homes, 155
N.L.R.B. 873 (1965), modfed, 387 F.2d 7 (8th Cir. 1967) (rule prohibiting employees from
taking company tool boxes home not a mandatory subject; rule necessary for theft and fire
protection of company property).
716. 587 F.2d at 407-11.
717. No. 78-1832 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 1979).
718. Id., slip op. at 2746, 2748.
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court concluded that the union had violated section 8(b)(3) by threaten-
ing to strike over a permissive subject of collective bargaining.1
C. Enforcement of Agreements under Section 301
1. The power of the Board
Under section 10(a) of the NLRA, "[t]he Board is empowered...
to prevent any person fron engaging in any unfair labor practice...
affecting conmerce.' ' 720 Except when it declines or cedes jurisdiction,
the Board has exclusive and primary jurisdiction over the adjudication
of unfair labor practices. 721 During the survey period, the Ninth Cir-
cuit addressed the Board's section 10(a) power in Merchants Home De-
livery Service, Inc. v. NLRB.722 The court found that the Board was
without jurisdiction under section 10(a) to enforce a bargaining order
against a contract carrier that had refused to bargain with truck drivers.
The drivers, as independent contractors, were not "employees" within
the meaning of section 2(3) and were therefore expressly excluded from
NLRA coverage.723
2. The scope of section 301
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act regulates
suits based on contract violations between an employer and a labor
organization, or between labor organizations in any industry affecting
72commerce. Suits may be brought "in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
in controversy, or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 725
In Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc.,726 motion picture pro-
jection technicians covered by a collective bargaining agreement
brought a class action suit against their employer under section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act seeking overtime pay allegedly
due them under the express terms of the agreement. Upholding the
propriety of the employees' suit, the court held that "uniquely personal
rights" including "wages, hours, overtime pay, and wrongful dis-
charge" may be directly enforced by individual employees under sec-
719. Id., slip op. at 2748.
720. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
721. A proviso to § 10(a) allows the Board to cede jurisdiction to a state or territorial
agency. The Board may also decline to assert jurisdiction under § 14(c)(1). Id. § 164(c)(1).
722. 580 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1978).
723. Id. at 976. See note 605 supra.
724. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
725. Id.
726. 582 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1978).
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tion 30 1.727
In Bergman v. NLRB,7 2 8 the Ninth Circuit rejected an employer's
complaint that a union had committed an unfair labor practice by filing
a section 301 suit in federal district court for purposes of harrassment.
The court held that the Board had correctly dismissed the employer's
complaint.729 The union had filed suit in order to establish the em-
ployer's breach of contract after its efforts to resolve contractual dis-
putes had failed. There was no indication that the union had been
guilty of malicious prosecution or abuse of process.730 Based upon the
particular facts of the case, the court concluded that the union had not
committed an unfair labor practice by filing a civil suit in federal dis-
trict court to enforce "a facially valid and binding labor agreement,"
regardless of its allegedly coercive effect upon the employees' statutory
rights.
7 3 1
In Keppard v. International Harvester Co.,7 3 2 an employee who had
failed to exhaust intra-union remedies was foreclosed from bringing a
breach of fair representation claim against the union under section
301.733 The court found that the aggrieved employee failed to show
either that he had appealed the local union's unsatisfactory settlement
of his medically-related grievance to higher tribunals within the inter-
national union or that such an appeal would have been futile. 3 The
court concluded that there was no error in granting the union's motion
for summary judgment under these facts.
In Sheeran v. GeneralElectric Co.,73 5 over 1,500 former employees
of a company brought suit in state court seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that they were entitled to the same pension plan increases that
current employees were to receive under the existing agreement.736
The company removed the case to federal court where the cause of
action was barred by the statute of limitations.737 On appeal, the Ninth
727. Id. at 511 (quoting Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976)).
728. 577 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1978).
729. Id. at 103-04. The court noted that in Clyde Taylor, 127 N.L.R.B. 103, 108-09
(1960), the NLRB had held that "while the making of a threat... to resort to the civil
courts as a tactic calculated to restrain employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the
Act was a violation of § 8(a)(1) of the Act, an actual suit was not similarly unlawfu." 577
F.2d at 103 (emphasis added).
730. Id. at 104.
731. Id.
732. 581 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1978).
733. Id. at 766-67.
734. Id. at 766.
735. 593 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1979).
736. Id. at 95.
737. Id. at 98-100.
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Circuit rejected the employees' contention that the federal court lacked
jurisdiction under section 301. The court reasoned that the individual
union members had a right to sue the company under section 301(a) for
enforcement of the labor contract, since the pension plan was incorpo-
rated by reference into the labor contract. The employees' suit for vio-
lation of the pension plan was therefore removable and federal law
applicable.738
Finally, in Certfed Corp. v. Hawaii Teamsters & Allied Workers,
Local 996,719 an employer brought a section 301 suit in district court
alleging that the union had breached the no-strike provision of a writ-
ten collective bargaining agreement by failing to give notice of the
agreement's termination as provided for in a subsequent oral agree-
ment.7 4 0 The district court granted summary judgment for the union,
finding the oral contract to be unenforceable. 74' Reversing and re-
manding, the Ninth Circuit applied principles of contract law and held
that the written collective bargaining agreement could be modified
orally as to duration.742 Moreover, the oral collective bargaining agree-
ment was enforceable under section 8(d) of the NLRA, which does not
require that collective bargaining agreement be in writing.743
a. preemption
State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over
suits brought under section 301 .7 Federal labor law, however,
prevails over inconsistent local rules in the substantive interpretation of
the labor agreement.745 During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit
found that federal labor law preempted an employer's claims of defa-
mation and busi iess disparagement brought under Oregon state law
against a local un on and a labor council. In Hasbrouck v. Sheet Metal
Workers Local 23.2, 4 the employer's claims were based upon a labor
council's publication of its name in a "Do Not Patronize" list. The
court found that the union's activity was protected from federal liabil-
738. Id. at 95-97.
739. 597 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979).
740. Id. at 1270. The oral agreement with the union extended the written collective bar-
gaining agreement on a day-to-day basis, subject to termination on 48 hours notice. Id.
741. Id. at 1272.
742. Id. at 1271. The court adopted the rule that a written agreement may be modified
orally, even "in the face of a provision requiring that any modification must be in writing,"
because this rule furthers the federal policy of maintaining "industrial peace."
743. Id. at 1272.
744. Charles Dowd Box v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962).
745. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962).
746. 586 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1978).
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ity by the publicity proviso to section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA.747 Federal
preemption of state remedies also precluded the employer from assert-
ing state claims of defamation and business disparagement as pendent
to the section 8(b)(4) charge.748
b. the Norris-LaGuardia Act
Prior to 1970, a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agree-
ment was not specifically enforceable in federal courts. 7 4 9 In 1970, the
Supreme Court, in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local
770,750 held that a federal district court can issue an injunction to stop
a strike that breaches a no-strike clause.75 The federal courts are not
precluded from this action by the anti-injunction policies of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.1 52 One of the prerequisities for the issuance of a Boys
Markets injunction to endorse contractual no-strike agreements is that
the strike must concern a grievance that both parties are contractually
bound to arbitrate. 3 In 1976, the Supreme Court, in Buffalo Forge Co.
v. Steelworkers,754 held that a Boys Markets injunction cannot be is-
sued against a sympathy strike because sympathy strikes do not con-
cern grievances over which the parties have agreed to arbitrate. 755 It
therefore does not come within the narrow Boys Markets exception to
section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.756
In JA. Jones Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Pipe Fitters, Local
598717 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the Buffalo Forge rule and held
that a restraining order against a sympathy strike had been wrongfully
issued because there could have been no agreement to submit such a
747. Id. at 694. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976) permits "truthful publicity" to inform the
public "that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organ-
ization has a primary dispute."
748. 586 F.2d at 694.
749. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
750. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
751. In Boys Market, the collective bargaining agreement contained an arbitration provi-
sion that was binding on the dispute over which the strike had been called. Id. at 238.
752. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). In 1932, Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act
to restrict the power of the federal courts to issue an injunction against unions engaged in
peaceful strikes. It also provided that the workers had a right to organize and engage in
collective bargaining. Courts were allowed to issue an injunction only in extreme cases of
union picket-line violence. GORMAN, supra note 288, at 624-25.
753. 398 U.S. at 243-53.
754. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
755. Id. at 403-04.
756. Id. Section 4(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act expressly forbids injunctions that pro-
hibit any person from "[c]easing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any rela-
tion of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976).
757. 568 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1978).
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dispute to binding arbitration.75 In Jones, the employer sought to en-
join fourteen unions from a sympathy work stoppage allegedly in viola-
tion of agreements between the parties pursuant to section 301 of the
LMRA. The district court granted the employer's motion for a tempo-
rary restraining order and the unions appealed.759 Reversing and re-
manding, the Ninth Circuit held that the temporary restraining order
had been wrongfully issued against one of the striking unions because
the parties were not bound by a collective bargaining agreement.760
This "fatal defect" could not be cured by the employer's subcontrac-
tor's agreement with the union. With respect to the other unions, the
court declined to determine whether the Buffalo Forge requirements
had been met, due to an incomplete and fragmentary record.76
In San Francisco Electrical Contractors Association v. International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 6,762 the Ninth Circuit fol-
lowed the Boys Market-Buffalo Forge rationale. San Francisco demon-
strates that the broad anti-labor injunction language of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act is to be tempered under section 301 when a union's
concerted activities are found to violate no-strike and arbitration
clauses in a collective bargaining agreement.763 In San Francisco, the
court held that the district court had jurisdiction under section 301 to
enter a preliminary injunction against the union because it had en-
gaged in a work stoppage over a grievance that had been resolved in a
prior arbitration proceeding. Such an injunction was necessary to en-
force the arbitration clause of the collective bargaining agreement by
binding the union to the prior arbitrator's award.7"4 The court noted
758. Id. at 1295-96.
759. Id. at 1293. The principal issue on appeal was whether the district court had erred in
refusing to apply the Buffalo Forge rule. That case was decided after the issuance of the
temporary restraining order but before the court had decided the union's motion for an
award of costs and attorneys' fees.
760. Id. at 1295.
761. Id.
762. 577 F.2d 529 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978). The union had filed a
grievance against the employer alleging that the employer's unilateral implementation of a
modified lighting system would eliminate a substantial amount of unit work in violation of a
work preservation clause in the collective bargaining agreement. The Board summarily re-
jected the union's unfair labor practice charge on the ground that the instant grievance had
been resolved against the union by a prior arbitration award involving the same dispute.
The union began a work stoppage, and the district court granted the employer's request for a
temporary restraining order. On appeal, the union claimed that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
specifically precluded the federal court's jurisdiction to issue an injunction. The employer
contended that the injunction served to implement a binding arbitration award and there-
fore fell within an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
763. Id. at 532-34.
764. Id. at 533.
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that the Boys Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunc-
tion policy, as defined in Buffalo Forge, was inapplicable. The court
reached this conclusion because the union's concerted activity occurred
after the issuance of an arbitration award, not prior to its issuance as it
had in Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge.765
3. Contract interpretation by the NLRB
a. jurisdiction of the Board
According to Supreme Court guidelines, the Board may exercise
jurisdiction over a contract dispute only when this determination is
necessary to decide an unfair labor practice case.766 Furthermore, this
section 10(a) jurisdiction may be exercised even when a party seeks
additional relief under section 30 1.767 The Ninth Circuit applied these
guidelines in NLRB v. H. Koch & Sons.768 The court found that an
employer had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) by refusing to exe-
cute a written collective bargaining agreement embodying the terms of
an oral agreement concerning employee severance benefits.769 The
Board had correctly determined that the parties were bound by the oral
agreement under common law principles of offer and acceptance.77°
The company, therefore, had violated its statutory duty to bargain col-
lectively pursuant to section 8(d), which includes the obligation to exe-
cute "a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party.
771
b. Board interpretation of lawful clauses
The NLRB frequently interprets contractual provisions when a
union allegedly commits an unfair labor practice and the employer as-
serts a contractual defense. In deciding the contractual issue, the Board
studies the clause in light of its own experience with the administration
of the collective bargaining agreement.772 During the survey period,
the Ninth Circuit sustained the Board's interpretation of contractual
765. Id. at 532-34.
766. J.I. Case v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 340 (1944); NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385
U.S. 421, 425-30 (1967).
767. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. at 429-30.
768. 578 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1978).
769. Id. at 1287-88.
770. Id. at 1290-91.
771. Id. at 1290.
772. See ABA LABOR LAW, supra note 608, at 455-58; NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp.,
385 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1967).
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clauses in two out of three decisions.773
D. Grievance Arbitration
1. The arbitration process and the courts
In 1957, the Supreme Court in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills7 7 enforced the obligation of the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement to arbitrate their grievances. Since that time, the grievance-
arbitration procedure has been recognized as a central part of the col-
lective bargaining process.775 The courts have tended to defer to arbi-
tration awards, resolving any doubts concerning an arbitration clause's
coverage in favor of the arbitration process.77 6 When an arbitrator
does exceed the scope of his authority, however, courts have the power
to vacate the arbitration award.77 7
During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit deferred three times to
the arbitral process, while in two "rare" decisions the court vacated
awards that had exceeded the arbitrator's authority. In Auto, Marine &
Speciality Painters Local 1176 v. Bay Area Sealers, Inc.,778 the district
court had dismissed a union's petition to compel the arbitration of cer-
tain grievances because it found that the union had abandoned the
agreement. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the arbitration
773. NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 588, 587 F.2d 984, 986-87 (9th Cir. 1978) (NLRB inter-
pretation sustained; "new stores clause" asserted by minority union denied new employees
freedom of choice and therefore not binding on them); Boeing Co. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 793,
794 (9th Cir. 1978) (NLRB's interpretation of welders' recognition clause reversed; non-
union tack-welders outside union's jurisdiction); NLRB v. Hospital & Inst. Workers Union,
Local 250, 577 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1978) (NLRB's interpretation of new agency provision
sustained; union not the exclusive bargaining agent for non-member therapists; showing of
majority support required).
774. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
775. The relationship of the courts to the arbitral process was set forth by the Supreme
Court in the "Steelworkers Trilogy;" see United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960) ("The function of the court is very limited when the parties have
agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator."); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 575, 578 (1960) ("A major factor in
achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the
collective bargaining agreement."); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960) (The arbitrator interprets the collective bargaining agreement; it is
his "construction which was bargained for, and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns
construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their inter-
pretation of the contract is different from his.").
776. The leading NLRB decision on post-arbitral deferral is Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
777. City Elec., Inc. v. Local 77, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 517 F.2d 616, 618-19 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975).
778. 577 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
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clause was "sufficiently broad" to include "all disputes and griev-
ances," including the defense of abandonment.779 Such a defense,
therefore, was a question for the arbitrator, not the courts.
780
In Leyva v. Cert'fed Grocers of Calfornia, Ltd ,78 wholesale deliv-
ery truck drivers sued to recover overtime compensation under both the
master collective bargaining agreement and the Fair Labor Standards
Act [FLSA]. The court held that the contractual claims for relief were
subject to arbitration, despite the fact that the employees wanted
broader relief under the contract than the arbitrator was empowered to
provide.78 2 Similarly, an exception to the arbitration clause, which pro-
vided that the arbitrator lacked authority to modify the agreement, did
not preclude the arbitrator from determining the controlling contrac-
tual language.78 3 Absent express provisions for the arbitration of statu-
tory claims, such claims were not subject to the arbitration process.7
84
The Ninth Circuit again deferred to the arbitration process in
Riverboat Casino, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive Board.7 5 The court
held that, absent a contrary provision in the collective bargaining
agreement, an arbitrator does not exceed his authority by failing to de-
fer to a previous "binding" arbitration award that interprets an identi-
cal "good cause" provision regarding excessive absenteeism and
tardiness.786 Contrary to a prior arbitrator's ruling, the arbitrator in
this case concluded that an employee's discharge was not for "good
cause" and, accordingly, reduced the penalty to a suspension.78 7 The
arbitrator considered the prior award but concluded that "strict adher-
ence to stare decisis would impair the flexibility of the arbitral process
contemplated by the parties.' 78 The court declined to vacate the
award absent "infidelity" to the collective bargaining agreement.78 9
779. Id. at 610.
780. Id.
781. 593 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1979).
782. Id. at 860. The arbitration clause of the contract provided for a maximum of six
months retroactive compensation. The employees sought back pay for four years, a signifi-
cantly greater amount than that provided for by the clause.
783. Id.
784. Id. at 861-63. The FLSA claims were outside the scope of the arbitration provisions
of both the master contract and the addendum.
785. 578 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1978).
786. Id. at 250-51. The prior arbitration proceeding involved different parties and a dif-
ferent arbitrator, but it did concern the interpretation of the same "good cause" provision in
the collective bargaining agreement.
787. Id. at 250.
788. Id. at 251.
789. Id.
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In Federated Employers of Nevada, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 631,790
the Ninth Circuit made clear that it will reverse a district court's en-
forcement of an arbitrator's award when "the arbitrator [has] ignored
the essence of the agreement in making the award."79' In Federated
Employers, the arbitrator had granted a modified arbitration award re-
garding annual wage increases that violated express restrictions in the
arbitration clause concerning such modifications. The arbitrator's "im-
plausible" interpretation of the contract precluded its enforcement.792
Similarly, in World Airways, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 93 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order, va-
cating part of an arbitrator's award that compelled an airline to retrain
a demoted pilot and provide him with an opportunity to requalify as a
Pilot-in-Command.794 The court reasoned that the arbitrator's award
would have led to the pilot's requalification without the airline's in-
dependent assessment of his renewed fitness.795 Federal law preempted
the area of aviation and placed the responsibility of determining judg-
mental qualifications of pilots on the airlines, not arbitrators. The
court concluded that the "strong federal policy in insuring the safety of
air travel" outweighed "the [strong] federal policy of resolving labor
differences by arbitration. 796
2. Discretionary jurisdiction of the NLRB
Although the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor
practice charges under section 10(a), such jurisdiction is discretion-
ary.797 This discretionary jurisdiction of the NLRB was in issue in
NLRB v. California Inspection Rating Bureau.798 The Ninth Circuit
held that the Board had not abused its discretion in exercising jurisdic-
tion over the California Inspection Rating Bureau (now called the
Workers' Compensation Insurance Rating Bureau) by requiring it to
bargain with a labor organization. 7 9 9 The court relied upon the Board's
determination that the Bureau was an "employer," not a "political sub-
division," of the State of California within the meaning of section
790. 600 F.2d 1263.
791. Id. at 1265.
792. Id.
793. 578 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
794. Id. at 801.
795. Id. at 802-03.
796. Id. at 803.
797. Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418,421 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 815 (1951).
798. 591 F.2d 56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 943 (1979).
799. Id. at 57.
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2(2),1° and, therefore, subject to the Board's jurisdiction.80 The court
also declined to find that the Board should have exercised its discre-
tionary authority to refuse to assert jurisdiction because of the "unique
relationship" and "intimate connection" enjoyed by the Bureau with
the State of California, which is exempt from Board coverage.8 2 Ac-
cording to the NLRB, this employer was "not the type of nonprofit
business or operation over which the Board has declined jurisdiction
; it will effectuate the policies of the Act for the Board to assert
jurisdiction in this case."' 03
3. Post-arbitral deferral
Section 10(a) of the NLRA empowers the Board to prevent the
commission of unfair labor practices."° The Board, however, may de-
cline to exercise its jurisdiction, deferring to an arbitration award that
deals with unfair labor practices."' 5 In 1955, the NLRB, in Spielberg
Manufacturing Co.,806 established several conditions that must be met
before the Board will defer to an arbitrator's award: (1) the proceed-
ings must be fair and regular; (2) all the parties must have agreed to be
bound; and (3) the decision must not be repugnant to the purposes and
policies of the NLRA. °7 The District of Columbia Circuit and Ninth
Circuit have qualified the Spielberg standards in Banyard v. NLRB 808
and Stephenson v. NLRB. 09 In Banyard, the court set out additional
prerequisites: "the Spielberg doctrine only applies if the arbitral tribu-
nal (A) clearly decided the issue on which it is later urged that the
Board should give deference, and (B) the arbitral tribunal decided an
issue within its competence."' 10 In Stefphenson, the Ninth Circuit
adopted the Banyard qualifications."1 '
During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the
800. See note 603 supra.
801. 591 F.2d at 57. The court relied upon the Board's decision reported at 215 N.L.R.B.
780 (1974).
802. 591 F.2d at 57.
803. 215 N.L.R.B. 780, 782 (1974).
804. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
805. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 270-72 (1964).
806. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
807. Id. at 1082.
808. 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
809. 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977).
810. 505 F.2d at 347.
811. 550 F.2d at 538. See also Hawaiian Hauling Serv. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.
1976), cer. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977) (enforcing 219 N.L.R.B. 765 (1975)); Machinists &
Aerospace Workers Lodge 87 v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1976) (enforcing 211
N.L.R.13. 834 (1974)).
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Board may rightfully refuse to defer to arbitral awards that are repug-
nant to the purposes of the NLRA. In Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v.
NLRB,81 2 for example, the Board had refused to defer to an arbitration
award, because the arbitrator had incorrectly concluded that the com-
pany had the right to introduce a production quota system without
prior bargaining with the union. In upholding the Board's decision, the
court noted that the Board had "squarely relied on the Spielberg crite-
rion that deference to arbitration will not be given where the arbitral
award is repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act."'81 3 By fail-
ing to bargain with the union, the company had clearly violated section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA. The Board, therefore, had not abused its discre-
tion in refusing to defer to such an award.
14
V. CONCERTED ACTIONS
A. Strikes
A strike is a form of concerted activity in which workers withdraw
labor services from an employer in order to force that employer to ac-
cept their demands." 5 Although the legality of the strike had been rec-
ognized at common law,816 it was not until 1935 that Congress first
declared that the right of workers to engage in strikes was federally
protected.81 7 Although the strike continues to be preeminent among
labor's "economic weapons, '818 the cost to the employer and to society
can be devastating.81 9
1. Classification of strikes
Strikes fall into two categories: economic strikes820 and unfair la-
812. 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978).
813. Id. at 407.
814. Id. at 408.
815. The Point Reyes, 110 F.2d 608, 609-10 (5th Cir. 1940) ("mTlhe word strike contains
two essential ingredients: There must be the relation of employer and employee, and there
must be a quitting of work.").
816. See Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
817. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976) states that "[nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically
provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in
any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." See
also 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), infra note 860.
818. ABA LABOR LAW, supra note 608, at 517.
819. See Imberman, Strikes Cost More Than You Think, 57 HARV. Bus. REv. 133 (1979).
820. ABA LABOR LAW, supra note 608, at 524. Economic strikes are generally used to
force economic demands on an employer, although this is not an absolute requirement. 1d
at 524-25. A strike that begins as an economic strike may be converted, however, into an
unfair labor practice strike if an employer's unfair labor practice prolongs or aggravates the
strike. See notes 829-37 supra and accompanying text.
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bor practice strikes.821 Whether a strike is economic or motivated by
an unfair labor practice is critical to the determination of whether strik-
ers have a right to reinstatement and back pay when the labor dispute
has ended. Economic strikers are entitled to reinstatement without
back pay only if they have not been permanently replaced,"22 while
unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to immediate reinstatement
with back pay even if that necessitates discharging permanently hired
replacements.
23
It is generally accepted among the circuits, as a matter of law, that
a strike is classified as an unfair labor practice strike if an unfair labor
practice is a "contributing cause" of the strike. 24 The Ninth Circuit
recently registered its accord in NLRB v. Broadmoor Lumber Co. 825
The Broadmoor court held that an employer's unfair labor practices
were not a contributing cause of the strike because the employees
viewed the strike as an economic one. 26 The holding in Broadmoor
should be narrowly applied, however, to those situations in which em-
ployees themselves expressly deny that unfair labor practices have con-
tributed to the strike. 27 In the absence of such facts, a strike should be
classified as an unfair labor practice strike if unfair labor practices have
821. ABA LABOR LAW, supra note 608, at 523-24; NLRB v Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.,
304 U.S. 333 (1938).
822. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
823. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956).
824. See, e.g., Larand Leisurelies, Inc. v. NLRB, 523 F.2d 814, 820 (6th Cir. 1975) (em-
ployer's conduct-union handbill destruction, employee interrogation, picket photos--con-
tributed to strike; unfair labor practice strike from inception); NLRB v. Columbia Tribune
Pub. Co., 495 F.2d 1384, 1392 (8th Cir. 1974) (employer's refusal to bargain in good faith
contributed to strike; therefore, unfair labor practice strike); NLRB v. Cast Optics Corp., 458
F.2d 398, 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972) (mem.) (unfair labor practice strike
since employer's refusal to bargain in good faith and to recognize union were contributing
causes); Southwestern Pipe, Inc. v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 340,352 (5th Cir. 1971) (no unfair labor
practice involved in strike; discharge of strikers proper). See also NLRB v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 216 F.2d 898, 907 (6th Cir.), rev'don other grounds, 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (NLRB to
determine whether strike caused by employer's refusal to bargain (Ze., unfair labor practice
strike) or by employer's failure to reach agreement on economic issues (ie., economic
strike)); NLRB v. Stockpile Carbon Co., 105 F.2d 167, 176 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
605 (1939).
825. 578 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1978). Accord, Queen Mary Restaurants Corp. v. NLRB, 560
F.2d 403, 410 (9th Cir. 1977) (employer's refusal to bargain in good faith found to be con-
tributing cause of strike).
826. 578 F.2d at 242. A majority of bargaining unit employees explicitly denied that
unfair labor practices contributed in any way to the strike. Id
827. In most cases, it is highly unlikely that strikers will make this type of denial because
of the tremendous economic advantages which attach to the unfair labor practice striker.
See notes- 822-23 supra and accompanying text. It is therefore in the striking employee's
best interest to assert that an unfair labor practice contributed in some way to the strike. See,
e.g., cases cited in note 824 supra.
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contributed to the strike in any way.8 2
8
Under certain circumstances, a strike that is originally an eco-
nomic strike may become an unfair labor practice strike. Such a con-
version may be effected if the employer commits an unfair labor
practice during the course of an economic strike.8 29 The general rule,
as expressed by the various circuits, is that if a strike is prolonged or
aggravated by the employer's unfair labor practice, the strike changes
into an unfair labor practice strike.130 If there is some question as to
whether the unfair practice prolonged the strike, the burden is on the
employer to show that the strike would have continued anyway. 31
Courts consider certain unfair labor practices as having more po-
tential than others to prolong economic strikes and they will automati-
cally convert an economic strike into an unfair labor practice strike.
832
In such cases, an analysis of whether the unfair labor practice actually
prolonged that particular strike is considered unnecessary.8 33 Among
the unfair practices in this category are an employer's refusal to bar-
828. Queen Mary Restaurants Corp. v. NLRB, 560 F.2d 403, 410 (9th Cir. 1977).
829. NLRB v. International Van Lines, 448 F.2d 905, 911 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 409 U.S. 48 (1972). Although not necessary to the holding in this case, the Court
recognized that a strike becomes an unfair labor practice strike when the employer commits
an unfair labor practice during the strike. The issue in International Van Lines concerned
the reinstatement rights of illegally discharged workers who had not been permanently re-
placed. It was not necessary to determine whether the strikers became unfair labor practice
strikers at the time of permanent replacement because they were entitled to reinstatement
solely by virtue of the unlawful discharge. 409 U.S. at 53.
830. See, e.g., General Teamsters Local 992 v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(economic strike converted into unfair labor practice strike when company made unlawful
unilateral wage increase during the strike). The unfair labor practice had the effect of pro-
longing the strike. Id at 586-87. See also Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720,
729 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964) (strike converted into unfair labor practice
strike when, during strike negotiations, employer insisted upon implementing seniority sys-
tem that discriminated against striking workers); NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc.. 130 F.2d
919, 928 n.8 (2d Cir. 1942) (strike may convert from economic to unfair labor practice if
prolonged or aggravated by employer).
83 1. See, e.g., Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720, 729 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 888 (1964) (burden on employer to show that strike would have continued even if
proposal of superseniority had been withdrawn); NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 236 F.2d
898, 907 (6th Cir. 1956), rev'don other grounds, 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (burden on employer to
show that strike would have continued even if employer had not unlawfully insisted on a
recognition proposal); NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 105 F.2d 167, 176 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 605 (1939) (burden on employer to show that strike would have continued
even if employer had not unlawfully interfered with employees' right to organize).
832. See, e.g., Crosby Chem., Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 791, 797 (1949), modo/ed, 188 F.2d 91
(5th Cir. 1951) (employer domination of union "inevitably" prolongs strike). See generally
GORMAN, supra note 288, at 339-40; Stewart, Conversion of Strikes: Economic to Unfair
Labor Practice I1, 49 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1301-23 (1963); Stewart, Conversion of Strikes." Eco-
nomic to Unfair Labor Practice, 45 VA. L. Rv. 1322, 1344-49 (1959).
833. GORMAN, supra note 288, at 339-40.
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gain with a union"' and an employer's domination of a union.83 5 In
NLRB v. Top Manufacturing Co.,836 the Ninth Circuit held that an eco-
nomic strike had been automatically converted into an unfair labor
practice strike when an employer withdrew recognition from the in-
cumbent union during the strike. The court concluded that this with-
drawal of recognition established a prima facie case of unlawful refusal
to bargain,837 and thus Justice Hufstedler found it unnecessary to dis-
cuss whether the unfair labor practice actually prolonged the strike.
The sympathy strike, which results when workers refuse to cross
another union's picket line at their employer's place of business, 38 is
difficult to categorize as either an economic or unfair labor practice
strike. Many circuits,8 39 including the Ninth,84 have recognized the
sympathy strike's legality and have concluded that sympathy strikers
"stand in the shoes of primary strikers for purposes of lawful discipline
834. See, e.g., NLRB v. Waukesha Lime & Stone Co., 343 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1965)
(employer refused to bargain with union without reason to believe striking union did not
represent a majority); NLRB v. Reliance Clay Prod. Co., 245 F.2d 599, 599 (5th Cir. 1957)
(per curiam) (employer refused to resume bargaining with striking union, thereby con-
verting economic strike into unfair labor practice strike); NLRB v. Pecheur Lozenge Co.,
209 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954) (economic strike converted into
unfair labor practice strike when employer insisted that a condition precedent to resuming
negotiations was employee abandonment of strike); Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. NLRB, 94
F.2d 875, 879 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 579 (1938) (employer refused to bargain with
economic strikers, converting them into unfair labor practice strikers). See generaly Stew-
art, Conversion of Strikes: Economic to Unfair Labor Practice, 45 VA. L. Rav. 1322, 1344-49
(1959).
835. See, e.g., Crosby Chem. Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 791, 797 (1949), modfed, 188 F.2d 91 (5th
Cir. 1951) (economic strike automatically converted when employer dominated union and
directed activities of that union against another union); NLRB v. Crowley's Milk Co., 208
F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1953) (economic strike converted when employer provided preferential
assistance to one union over another).
836. 594 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
837. Id at 224.
838. "[N]onstriking employees who refuse as a matter of principle to cross a picket line
maintained by their fellow employees have 'plighted [their] troth with the strikers, joined in
their common cause, and [have] thus become. . . striker[s] [themselves]."' NLRB v. Union
Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 55 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971) (quoting NLRB
v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299, 1301 (5th Cir. 1970)) (brackets in original)
(employee refusal to cross picket lines in sympathy with strikers is activity protected by § 7).
839. E.g., NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 55 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 826 (1971); NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299, 1301 (5th Cir. 1970);
NLRB v. Louisville Chair Co., 385 F.2d 922, 928 n.3 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1013 (1968); Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 916 (1964); NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505-06
(2d Cir. 1942).
840. E.g., NLRB v. Coast Delivery Serv., Inc., 437 F.2d 264, 270 (9th Cir. 1971); NLRB
v. West Coast Casket Co., 205 F.2d 902, 905 (9th Cir. 1953).
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and replacement." 4 ' In other words, if the underlying strike is classi-
fied as an unfair labor practice strike, then a sympathy strike will be
similarly classified for reinstatement purposes. The classification of
sympathy strikers was considered by the Ninth Circuit during the sur-
vey period in General Teamsters Local 162 v. NLRB.842 In that case,
three employees refused to cross picket lines set up by a sister union at
their employer's shop.843 Permanent replacements had been hired for
the three sympathy strikers; the court held that the strikers were enti-
tled to the same reinstatement rights as the primary economic strik-
ers.844 The court found it unnecessary to inquire into the nature of the
primary strike because the sympathy strikers conceded that it was for
845economic reasons.
2. Rights of strikers
Employees who join a strike have a certain number of protected
rights. Among these are the right to retain employee status while on
strike,846 the right not to be fired for engaging in concerted activities,8
47
and the right to engage in concerted activities free from interference or
inducements. 848  The NLRA clearly designates the proper status of
strikers in section 2(3), which includes in the definition of "employee"
"any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in con-
nection with any current labor dispute."
'8 49
The Supreme Court outlined the status of strikers in the 1938 case
of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,85 when it noted that "if
841. NLRB v. C.K. Smith & Co., 569 F.2d 162, 166 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
956 (1978) (affirmed NLRB policy that, when sympathy striker supports an unfair labor
practice strike against a common employer, sympathy striker enjoys same reinstatement
rights as primary striker). See Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 341, 342 (1976);
Hoffman Beverage Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 981, 982 (1967) (sympathy strikers given same rein-
statement rights as primary strikers).
842. 568 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978).
843. Id at 667.
844. Id at 668-70.
845. Id at 669.
846. See notes 849-54 infra and accompanying text.
847. See note 855-64 infra and accompanying text.
848. See notes 865-87 infra and accompanying text.
849. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
The term "employee" shall include any employee and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states other-
wise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of,
or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent
employment ....
850. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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men strike in connection with a current labor dispute their action is not
to be construed as a renunciation of the employment relation and they
remain employes [sic] for. . . remedial purposes."85' The Ninth Cir-
cuit followed Mackay's interpretation of section 2(3) in the recent case
of NLRB v. Murray Products, Inc. 52 In Murray, the court held that
"[e]mployees who are not working because of a labor dispute continue
to be 'employees' of their employer unless they have obtained regular
and substantially equivalent work elsewhere. '85 3 The significance of
strikers retaining their employee status is that they continue to enjoy
NLRA protections while on strike.8 54
Closely allied to the right of workers to retain their employee sta-
tus while on strike is their right not to be discharged prior to permanent
replacement.155  Applying this principle, the Supreme Court, in the
1972 case of NLRB v. International Van Lines,856 held that it was an
unfair labor practice to fire striking employees before their positions
have been filled. 57 The Court noted that it is a violation of sections
8(a)(1) 85 " and 8(a)(3)8 59 of the NLRA to discharge these employees
when they engage in activity protected by section 7.860
The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that the discharge of eco-
851. Id at 347. See also NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967) (strik-
ing workers retain employee status).
852. 584 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1978).
853. Id at 938. The language in the opinion echoes the statutory language of NLRA
§ 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976), set forth in note 849 supra.
854. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). See also Note, Labor
Law--Reinstatement: Expanded Righisfor Economic Strikers, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 511, 511-12
(1970).
855. A fundamental distinction between economic and unfair labor practice strikers is
that the latter are protected against both discharge and permanent replacement, while eco-
nomic strikers may be permanently replaced and are protected against discharge only until
such replacement occurs. NLRB v. Comfort., Inc., 365 F.2d 867, 874 (9th Cir. 1966).
856. 409 U.S. 48, 50 (1972) (employer discharged four striking employees before replac-
ing them).
857. Id at 52-53.
858. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer. . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title."
859. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976) provides in part that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer.. . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor or-
ganization."
860. 409 U.S. at 53. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities ....
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nomic strikers prior to their permanent replacement is an unfair labor
practice.86" ' This principle was applied in NLRB v. Long Beach Youth
Center, Inc.862 The court in Long Beach held that the employer had
violated section 8(a)(1) by terminating seventeen employees who were
engaged in a strike.86 s The court reasoned that the mass firings inter-
fered with the employees' right to strike, an activity protected by sec-
tion 7.864
In addition to the right to be free from unlawful termination, strik-
ers have the right to strike without interference or inducements by their
employer. This right is protected by section 8(a)(1), which forbids the
coercion of employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.8 6 The
decisions in this area distinguish between an employer's proper expres-
sion of views or opinions, which are sanctioned by section 8(c), and
coercive statements made by an employer which contain threats of re-
prisal or promises of benefits.866
The Supreme Court made this distinction in NLRB v. Virginia
Electric & Power Co.,867 noting that the NLRA does not enjoin "the
employer from expressing its view on labor policies or problems. 8 68
The Court determined whether coercion had occurred by examining
861. See, e.g., NLRB v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F.2d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1951) (19 eco-
nomic strikers unlawfully discharged prior to being permanently replaced). The Globe court
held that strikers were "clearly engaged in a concerted activity for 'mutual aid or protection'
within the intendment of § 7" and that "[t]heir discharge for engaging in the strike was
accordingly a violation of § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act." Id at 750. See also NLRB v.
Comfort, Inc., 365 F.2d 867, 874 (9th Cir. 1966) (employer unlawfully discharged economic
strikers prior to replacement); NLRB v. McCatron, 216 F.2d 212, 215 (9th Cir. 1954) (eco-
nomic strikers unlawfully discharged prior to replacement); NLRB v. Cowles Pub. Co., 214
F.2d 708, 710-11 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 876 (1954) (employees illegally discharged
one hour after strike began).
862. 591 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1979).
863. Id at 1278. The court, however, did not analyze the. unfair labor practice as a viola-
tion of § 8(a)(3). Such an analysis was unnecessary because the strikers were unorganized
workers and none were members of any labor union. Id at 1277-78. Section 8(a)(3) only
proscribes conduct that serves to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organiza-
tion; this type of conduct was never an issue in the case. See note 859 supra for the text of
NLRA § 8(a)(3).
864. 591 F.2d at 1278.
865. See notes 858 & 860 supra for the text of sections 8(a)(l) and 7.
866. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976) provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evi-
dence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if
such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
867. 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
868. Id at 477.
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the totality of circumstances surrounding the employer's activities. 869
In examining these activities, courts may consider the employer's state-
ments. The Supreme Court, in May Department Stores v. NLRB,
870
held these statements to be "part of the totality of Company activities
...properly received. . as evidence of the unilateral action of the
employer."
871
The circuit courts of appeals have uniformly interpreted what
types of statements made to strikers constitute coercion prohibited by
section 8(a)(1). For example, an employer's solicitation that urges
strikers to return to work has been held to be an unfair labor practice
when accompanied by promises of benefits or threats of reprisal.8 72 On
the other hand, letters sent to striking employees informing them of the
employer's intentions and asking them to indicate whether they intend
to return to work have not been held to be sufficiently coercive to con-
stitute an unfair labor practice.8 73 Mere predictions or expressions of
opinion "not coupled with a threat to use the employer's economic
power to make the prediction a reality" have also been considered per-
missible.874 In the 1978 case of NLRB v. Triumph Curing Center,875 the
869. Id "If the total activities of an employer restrain or coerce his employees in their
free choice, then those employees are entitled to the protection of the Act."
870. 326 U.S. 376 (1945).
871. Id at 386.
872. See, e.g., Swarco Inc. v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 668, 670 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 931 (1963) (supervisors solicited economic strikers to return to work, promising senior-
ity over employees who did not return); NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 236 F.2d 898, 905
(6th Cir. 1956) (company solicited striking employees through newspaper and radio adver-
tising, calling them to return to work; the ads stressed the advantages of returning and the
unreasonableness of the union's demand); American Rubber Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 214
F.2d 47, 54 (7th Cir. 1954) (foreman solicited economic strikers to abandon their union and
return to work; solicitation accompanied by threats of reprisal and promises of benefit);
NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 213 F.2d 70, 73-74 (3d Cir. 1954) (foreman solicited strikers
individually to return to work, promising benefits if they did and termination if they did not
return by certain date); NLRB v. James Thompson & Co., 208 F.2d 743, 748 (2d Cir. 1953)
(employer's promise that, if union leader called off strike, employees would "all be satisfied"
held to be vague promise of benefit sufficient to find an unfair labor practice).
873. See, e.g., Rubin Bros. Footwear Inc. v. NLRB, 203 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1953)
(letters sent to economic strikers requesting them to indicate whether they would return to
work when plant opened not an unfair labor practice); NLRB v. Penokee Veneer Co., 168
F.2d 868, 871 (7th Cir. 1948) (letters sent to striking employees to ascertain how many de-
sired to return to work on the terms previously offered not an unfair labor practice).
874. Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720, 733 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
888 (1964) (statements by minor supervisory employee that if enough strikers returned to
work company would put in effect contract offered to union and that if not, the company
would move the plant to cheaper labor area, not an unfair labor practice). See also NLRB
v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 271 F.2d 109, 117 (3d Cir. 1959) (vague non-coercive warnings, not
coupled with threats to use economic power to enforce them, not unfair labor practice).
875. 571 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Ninth Circuit followed the generally accepted rule, which prohibits an
employer from promising economic benefit to strikers.876 In Triumph,
supervisors had talked to economic strikers, offering them jobs at an-
other plant if they withdrew from the union and abandoned their
strike.8 77  The court held that these offers "represent the type of
promises of economic benefit. . . prohibited by the Act. 878
During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit also found improper
coercion in NLRB v. Broadmoor Lumber Co.87 9 In Broadmoor, the em-
ployer had talked to strikers and promised to meet any union demand
if they returned to work without forcing him to sign a collective bar-
gaining agreement. 880 The court found the employer's promise to be an
unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(l).88' In NLRB v. Yama Wood-
craft, Inc.,882 however, the court held that an employer may inform
economic strikers of its intention to continue operations by hiring
replacements, without violating section 8(a)(1). 883 In Yama, the em-
ployer notified economic strikers, after an impasse in negotiations, that
it intended to maintain operations by replacing striking employees.
884
Following notification, the company did not exhibit any conduct calcu-
lated to undermine the union, a frequently cited reason for prohibiting
an employer from directly soliciting striking employees.885 Since no
additional promises were made886 and no advantage offered to those
employees who sidestepped the union, the employer did not violate sec-
tion 8(a)(1).
887
876. Id. at 470-7 1.
877. Id at 470.
878. Id at 471.
879. 578 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1978).
880. Id. at 240. The employees had been recently organized and struck to force employer
to sign a collective bargaining agreement with the union.
881. Id at 241.
882. 580 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1978).
883. Id at 945.
884. Id at 944.
885. See, e.g., Swarco Inc. v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 668, 673 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
931 (1963) (supervisors promised strikers superseniority if they returned to work); NLRB v.
Clearfield Cheese Co., 213 F.2d 70, 73-74 (3d Cir. 1954) (foreman solicited strikers individu-
ally).
886. 580 F.2d at 944.
887. The court stated, however, that the direct contact would not have been permissible in
the absence of an impasse. "Once negotiations have reached an impasse, however, the em-
ployer is under no obligation to continue bargaining with the union ... and may communi-
cate directly with its employees." Id at 945 (citations omitted).
In Yama, the court found that an impasse had been reached when the parties dead-
locked on critical economic issues. Neither party attempted to negotiate other non-eco-
nomic issues after that point, yet the court held that a total impasse had been reached,
permitting the employer to deal directly with its striking employees. Id at 945. The court
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3. Unorganized employees' right to strike
The right of unorganized employees to engage in concerted activi-
ties without employer interference was sustained by the Supreme Court
in NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co. 88 Since the Washington Alumi-
num decision, the Ninth Circuit has consistently upheld the right of
unorganized workers to strike in protest of working conditions.88 9 Dur-
ing the survey period, the court continued to follow that principle. For
example, in NLRB v. Long Beach Youth Center, Inc.,8g° a work stop-
page in protest of working conditions by seventeen unorganized em-
ployees was held to be protected by section 7.891
Labor organizations representing health care workers are required
to give ten days notice before engaging in a work stoppage, pursuant to
section 8(g).892 The first federal case to interpret that section's notice
provision, NLRB v. IBEW,893 concluded that it applied solely to un-
ions representing health care institution employees, not to other unions
performing unrelated work on the premises.894 The Ninth Circuit, in-
terpreting section 8(g) in Kapiolani Hospital v. NLRB,895 held that the
notice requirement applied only to labor organizations at health care
institutions, not to unorganized employees.896 The court determinec
indicated that a multiplicity of issues was not required to find an impasse; a single "critical"
issue can create an impassable situation. Id Accord, American Fed'n of Television & Radio
Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 627 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (deadlock on one critical issue
created impasse).
888. 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (seven unorganized employees walked out to protest intolerably
cold working conditions).
889. See NLRB v. Robertson Indus., 560 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1976) (20 unorganized work-
ers walked offjob to protest intolerable working conditions); Electromec Design & Dev. Co.
v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1969) (four unorganized workers walked out to protest
working conditions).
890. 591 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1979).
891. Id at 1278. The 17 employees called in sick to protest working conditions. Al-
though they had planned to apply for union membership, they were not then union mem-
bers, nor was a union responsible for the work stoppage. Id
892. 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1976) provides in part that "[a] labor organization before engag-
ing in any strike, picketing, or other concerted refusal to work at any health care institution
shall, not less than ten days prior to such action, notify the institution in writing and the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of that intention."
893. 548 F.2d 704 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1978) (picketing by electrical
workers' union against electrical contractor performing work at hospital not subject to ten
day notice requirement).
894. Id at 709.
895. 581 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1978).
896. Id at 234. The court held that the notice requirement applied only to "labor organi-
zations" as defined by § 2(5) of the NLRA. Section 2(5) defines a labor organization as "any
organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
1980]
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that a single unrepresented clerk who refused to cross a picket line was
not required to give a ten-day notice under the section because she was
not a member of a labor organization 97 The Kapiolani court noted
that the legislative intent of section 8(g) was to insure continuity of
health care to the community and to protect the well-being of patients
who might be jeopardized by large scale unanticipated strikes. 898 The
court concluded that there was little danger of massive disruption of
health care services due to brief work stoppages by individuals or small
groups of unorganized employees; therefore, the statute was not in-
tended to apply to them.899
4. Waiver of the right to strike
Although the right to strike is protected by the NLRA,9°° the
Supreme Court in Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770901 deter-
mined that "a no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the quidpro
quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance disputes
to the process of arbitration."9 2 In other words, the right to strike may
be waived by the inclusion of a promise in a collective bargaining
agreement to submit disagreements to binding arbitration. 90 3 The
with employees concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employ-
ment, or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976).
897. 581 F.2d at 234.
898. Id (citing Walker Methodist Residence, 227 N.L.R.B. 1630 (1977)).
899. Id Similarly, in NLRB v. Long Beach Youth Center, Inc., 591 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir.
1979), the Ninth Circuit held that a work stoppage by a small group of unorganized hospital
employees was not subject to the § 8(g) notice requirement. Id at 1278. The Long Beach
court agreed with the Kapiolani court in holding that § 8(g) applies only to labor organiza-
tions as defined by § 2(5) of the NLRA. Id The court noted that "[w]hether a particular
group is a labor organization is a question of fact, and the Board's finding should be upheld
if supported by substantial evidence." Id In Long Beach, the NLRB had determined that
the employees were not a labor organization under § 2(5) principally because their first orga-
nizational meeting did not occur until after the work stoppage had begun. Id.
900. See note 817 supra.
901. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
902. Id at 248.
903. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 381 (1974). See also Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 387, 407 (1976) ("The quidpro quo for the employer's prom-
ise to arbitrate was the union's obligation not to strike over issues that were subject to the
arbitration machinery.") But see Drake Bakeries v. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 261
(1962) (there is no "inflexible rule rigidly linking no-strike and arbitration clauses of every
collective bargaining contract in every situation").
The rationale for finding an implied no-strike promise is that "[s]triking over an arbitra-
ble dispute would interfere with and frustrate the arbitral processes by which the parties had
chosen to settle a dispute." Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
Such strikes may be enjoined by the district court once it is determined that the underlying
dispute is over an arbitral grievance. Id at 406-07.
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existence of the express or implied no-strike agreement creates an ex-
ception to the section 4 prohibition9" against issuing injunctions for-
bidding strikes.9°5
According to the Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers, a sympathy strike, however, is not subject to an injunc-
tion, notwithstanding the presence of a mandatory arbitration clause.906
The Court held that the sympathy strike had not been conducted over
any dispute that was "even remotely subject to the arbitration provi-
sions of the contract." 9 7 Therefore, the rationale that led the Court in
Boys Market to allow injunctions against strikes was not applicable to
a sympathy strike situation.
90 8
The Ninth Circuit has consistently followed the Supreme Court
rule regarding the waiver of the right to strike when the contract con-
tains mandatory arbitration provisions.90 9 During the survey period, in
JA. Jones Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 598,910 the court recog-
nized that a promise not to strike is the quidpro quo for an agreement
by management to submit to binding arbitration.91' In Jones, however,
the court held that the necessary consideration for the waiver of the
right to strike was not present because there had been no collective
bargaining agreement between the parties.912 Absent such an agree-
ment, there was no promise by the employer to submit to binding arbi-
tration, and thus the necessary quidpro quo for the union's obligation
not to strike was missing.913
Although it is well settled that an agreement to submit to arbitra-
904. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976) provides in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in con-
cert, any of the following acts:
(a) ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment.
905. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 402-03 (1976).
906. 428 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1976).
907. Id at 407.
908. Id See note 903 supra.
909. See, e.g., Martin Hageland, Inc. v. United States District Court, 460 F.2d 789 (9th
Cir. 1972) (no mandatory arbitration clause agreed to; therefore, no injunction against strike
could be issued); Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Union, 454 F.2d
262 (9th Cir. 1971) (injunction proper against strike if valid arbitration agreement exists);
Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Local 295, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 449 F.2d 586 (9th
Cir. 1971) (strike was not over grievance subject to arbitration; injunction was improper).
910. 568 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1978).
911. Id at 1292.
912. Id at 1294-95.
913. Id
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tion is the quidpro quo for a no-strike agreement, the Supreme Court in
Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Bakery Workers914 rejected the premise that the
two clauses "are exact counterweights in every industrial setting."9 15
The Ninth Circuit followed that rule in NLRB v. Tomco Communica-
tions, Inc. ;916 the court rejected the argument that a no-strike clause is
evidence of bad faith simply because the range of subjects covered by
the no-strike clause is broader than that for the arbitration clause.917
The court therefore held that the no-strike clause was still valid.
The lomco court logically interpreted the Drake Bakeries deci-
sion, which had rejected the claim that the arbitration clause and the
no-strike clause are exact counterweights, to preclude a finding that a
no-strike clause invariably gives rise to an implied promise to submit to
arbitration.918 The court determined that the Drake Bakeries rule
mandates that "[a]n agreement to arbitrate may be sufficient, but it is
not necessary, consideration for an agreement not to strike." 919 The
court justified this bias toward arbitration by recognizing that it was
part of "the broader federal policy favoring the substitution of collec-
tive bargaining for industrial strife." 920 The significance of this inter-
pretation by the court is that if an. arbitration clause is present in a
collective bargaining agreement, the court will infer a no-strike clause
covering those areas subject to arbitration.921 On the other hand, if
there is a no-strike clause in the agreement, but no arbitration clause,
the court will uphold the no-strike clause without implying an arbitra-
tion obligation.922
B. Lockouts
The lockout is to the employer what the strike is to the em-
ployee.923 Whereas a strike is the "cessation of work by employees in
an effort to get for the employees more desirable terms," 92 4 a lockout is
the "cessation of the furnishing of work to employees in an effort to get
914. 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
915. Id at 261 n.7.
916. 567 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1978).
917. Id at 879.
918. Id.
919. Id
920. Id
921. See note 903 supra.
922. 567 F.2d at 879.
923. See generally Denbo, Is the Lockout the Corollary of the Strike?, 14 LAB. L.J. 400
(1963).
924. Iron Molders' Union v. Allis Chalmers Co., 166 F. 45, 52 (7th Cir. 1908) (Grosscup,
C.J., concurring).
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for the employer more desirable terms. 925
The scope of the lockout was outlined by the Supreme Court in
American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB. 926 In that case, the employer
had locked out its employees solely as a means of bringing economic
pressure in support of its bargaining position.927 The Court held that
"where the intention proven is merely to bring about a settlement of a
labor dispute on favorable terms, no violation of section 8(a)(3)9 28 is
shown. ' 9 2 9 Under the holding in American Ship Building, after reach-
ing an impasse in negotiations, an employer is free to lock out its em-
ployees to improve its bargaining position.930 That the lockout may
dissuade employees from adhering to the position that they had ini-
tially adopted is not sufficient justification for barring its use by an em-
ployer. 931 The Court observed that "there is nothing in the Act which
gives employees the right to insist on their contract demands free from
the sort of economic disadvantage which frequently attends bargaining
disputes.
' 932
The use of the lockout does not necessarily carry the implication
that the employer acted to discourage union membership or otherwise
discriminate against union members.933 In addition, a lockout does not
violate sections 7934 or 13931 simply because it permits an employer to
preempt the possibility of a strike.936 As the Court noted in American
Ship Building, a work stoppage, the object of any strike, has in fact
occurred at that point, and the union is not precluded from accomplish-
ing other objectives by ancillary measures such as picketing.
937
The Ninth Circuit closely followed the rules set out by American
925. Id
926. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
927. Id at 313.
928. See note 859 supra for text of § 8(a)(3).
929. 380 U.S. at 313.
930. Id at 318. The Court described the situation that existed to create the impasse:
"[A]fter extended negotiations, the parties separated without having resolved substantial dif-
ferences on the central issues dividing them and without having specific plans for further
attempts to resolve them." Id at 303. See note 887 supra for a discussion of what consti-
tutes an impasse. See also NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 284 (1965).
931. 380 U.S. at 309.
932. Id at 313.
933. Id at 312.
934. See note 860 supra for text of § 7.
935. See note 817 supra for text of§ 13.
936. 380 U.S. at 310. There is nothing that "would imply that the right to strike carries
with it the right exclusively to determine the timing and duration of all work stoppages. The
right to strike as commonly understood is the right to cease work-nothing more." Id
937. I.d at 310 n.10.
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Ship Building in NLRB v. Golden State Bottling Co"938 The Golden
State court stated that an employer's lockout, "used as a means of
bringing pressure on his employees in support of his bargaining posi-
tion," is not a violation of section 8(a)(1) or section 8(a)(3) absent a
showing that the employer intended "to injure a labor organization or
to evade his duty to bargain collectively, or to discourage union mem-
bership. '9 39 During the survey period, the court was consistent in ap-
plying the same rule in NLRB v. Tomco Communications, Inc. 940 The
Tomco court held that a lockout instituted after an impasse and used to
support an employer's "lawful bargaining position" was entirely
proper.
941
A type of lockout that does not require an analysis of the em-
ployer's motivation is one that occurs when an employer liquidates his
business. The Supreme Court held in Textile Workers Union v. Dar-
lington Manufacturing Co. ,942 that "when an employer closes his entire
business, even if the liquidation is motivated by vindictiveness toward
the union, such action is not an unfair labor practice. 943 A partial
closing on the other hand, motivated by discriminatory objectives, was
held to be improper.9 " The Ninth Circuit recently echoed the Textile
Workers holding in Great Chinese American Sewing Co. v. NLRB.945
In that case, an employer closed down one of his two plants merely to
"chill unionism."'" 6 The Great Chinese American court found that the
938. 401 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1965).
939. Id at 456-57. In Golden State, the employer had locked out his employees to sup-
port his bargaining position. Immediately following the lockout, the union split into two
groups. Id at 455. The court determined that the disruption in union activities had not
been a "necessary" consequence of the lockout. Id at 457. The lockout, therefore, was not
an unfair labor practice per se simply because of the disruption it caused. Id
940. 567 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1978).
941. Id at 884. The court emphasized that the lockout was only as good as the bargain-
ing position of the employer. "As the company's bargaining position was lawful, so was the
lockout in support of its position." Id In Tomco, after reaching an impasse in negotiations,
the employer made its final offer and locked out its employees when the union refused to
accept it. Id at 876. The court held that the employer's bargaining position was lawful in
this instance; therefore, the lockout in support of its position was also lawful. Id at 884.
942. 384 U.S. 263 (1965).
943. Id at 273-74. See also NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 283 (1965) (employer may
completely liquidate his business without violating either § 8(a)(1) or § 8(a)(3)).
944. 384 U.S. at 275. "[A] discriminatory partial closing may have repercussions on what
remains of the business, affording employer leverage for discouraging the free exercise of § 7
rights among remaining employees of much the same kind as that found to exist in...
'temporary closing' cases." Id at 274-75.
945. 578 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1978).
946. Id at 255 (citing Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275
(1965)). The company president spoke to an assembly of employees, promising them a wage
increase if they rejected the election of a union, and threatened to close the plant if they did
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lockout was unlawful because it had been motivated by an anti-union
animus.9 4 7 The court noted, consistent with the holding in Textile
Workers, that if the employer had completely terminated his business
rather than partially closing it down, his action would have been lawful
even if motivated by anti-union reasons.
948
C. Work Assignment Disputes
A "work assignment" or "jurisdictional" dispute arises when there
is "a controversy as to whether certain work should be performed by
workers in one bargaining unit or those in another." 949 A strike or
threat of a strike over a work assignment dispute, aimed at forcing an
employer to assign particular work to one group of employees over an-
other, is an unfair labor practice9 50 under section 8(b)(4)(D).951 The
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79,952 stated that section
8(b)(4)(D) is interlocked with section 10(k),953 which directs the NLRB,
once a strike is threatened, "to 'hear and determine' the dispute out of
which the alleged unfair labor practice arose." 95 4 The Board is then
required by section 10(k) "to decide which union or group of employ-
ees is entitled to the disputed work." 955 The outcome of a section 10(k)
hearing will determine "[w]hether the 8(b)(4)(D) charge [against the
not. Id at 253. After the union filed unfair labor practice charges, the employer shut down
its plant and discharged all of the workers. The few who had renounced the union were
given jobs at the employer's other plant. Id at 254.
947. Id at 255.
948. Id See also note 944 supra and accompanying text.
949. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 263 (1964). See also NLRB v.
Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs Local 1212, 364 U.S. 573, 579 (1964) (jurisdictional
dispute is "a dispute between two or more groups of employees over which is entitled to do
certain work for an employer").
950. See NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116, 123 (1971); Carey v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 263 (1964).
951. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1976) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents--
i4) . . (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or
in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is-
(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employ-
ees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class
rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft,
or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of
the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing
such work ....
952. 404 U.S. 116, 124 (1971).
953. 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1976).
954. 404 U.S. at 124 (quoting § 10(k)).
955. Id
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union] will be sustained or dismissed." '956 If the striking union "persists
in its conduct despite a section 10(k) decision against it, a section
8(b)(4)(D) complaint issues and the union will likely be found guilty of
an unfair labor practice and be ordered to cease and desist.
'957
The Ninth Circuit has consistently followed this rule.95 8 In Cham-
ber of Commerce v. NLRB, 959 a union ordered its members to stop
work on a contractor's project until the contractor complied with a
work preservation clause 960 in the union's collective bargaining con-
tract.961 The contractor was not a party to that contract and already
had an agreement with another union covering the same work.9 62 In
order to comply with the union's demands, the contractor would have
had to reassign the work to the demandant union.9 63 The Chamber of
Commerce court properly held that this demand by the union, which
was intended to force the employer to reassign work, violated section
8(b)(4)(D).964
In Stromberg-Carlson Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 965 the court
narrowly interpreted section 8(b)(4)(D). The union in the case had
picketed a jobsite of the employer in an effort to secure future work,
disclaiming any desire for work currently in progress.966 The court
held that section 8(b)(4)(D) did not apply since the target of union ac-
tivity was not the assignment of any "particular work." 967 This holding
is in accord with Plasterers' Local 79,968 in which the Supreme Court
determined that the "applicability of § 8(b)(4)(D) is premised on con-
fficting claims of unions or groups of employees for the same job; ab-
956. Id
957. Id at 127.
958. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Local 50, 504 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975) (no question that a union has violated section
8(b)(4)(D) by engaging in coercive activity to force the assignment of work "assuming that
the Board's § 10(k) decision is valid").
959. 574 F.2d 457 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978).
960. A work preservation clause requires an employer to give a union all work "tradition-
ally done by them." See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 635
(1967).
961. 574 F.2d at 460.
962. Id
963. Id at 463.
964. Id The Board, pursuant to § 10(k) had awarded the work to the other union. The
demandant union continued to picket and to threaten strikes against the general contractor
after the Board decision against it. That activity was held to be an unfair labor practice
under § 8(b)(4)(D).
965. 580 F.2d 939 (9th Cir. 1978).
966. Id at 941.
967. Id
968. 404 U.S. 116 (1971). See text accompanying notes 952-57 supra.
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sent such an actual conflict, it would be futile to proceed under that
section.
969
The Supreme Court in Carey v. Westinghouse970 recognized a po-
tential problem regarding work assignment disputes. The NLRA does
not provide a mechanism for resolving a "jurisdictional" controversy
unless one of the unions involved strikes or threatens to strike.97 1 The
threat of a strike gives the Board the authority to resolve the dispute
under section 10(k).972 The Carey Court concluded that arbitration
procedures should be used to fill the gap in the event of a work assign-
ment dispute that lacks the threat of concerted activity.
973
The Ninth Circuit also recognized, in Burke v. Ernest W Hahn,
Inc, 9" that section 8(b)(4)(D) does not operate prior to .a strike
threat.97 5 The Burke court found, however, that the conflict in question
was not a jurisdictional dispute.976 Therefore, the court did not decide
how a claim should be resolved when it arises out of a work assignment
controversy that has not resulted in a strike or strike threat.
. Boycotts
A boycott is an attempted withdrawal of services or patronage
from an employer, the object of which is to disrupt the employer's
ongoing business relationships with its suppliers or purchasers, thereby
weakening the employer's resistance to union demands.97 7 A "pri-
mary" boycott occurs when a union requests other businesses to refrain
from dealing with the union's employer (the primary employer).978 A
"secondary" boycott, on the other hand, occurs when union pressure is
directed towards a neutral employer.9 79 In order to protect employers
from such pressure, Congress enacted section 8(b)(4)(B). 9 0 If a union's
969. Id at 135.
970. 375 U.S. 261 (1963).
971. Id at 263-64.
972. Id at 264.
973. Id at 266, 272.
974. 592 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1979).
975. Id at 545.
976. Id The actual controversy involved the payment by Hahn to employee trust funds.
The question involved a determination of which of two different funds he was required to
contribute money. The court determined that such a controversy was not within the mean-
ing of section 8(b)(4)(D). Id at 544-45.
977. See GoRMAN, supra note 288, at 240.
978. Id
979. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 623 (1967) (central
aspect of a "secondary boycott" is "pressure tactically dire. d toward a neutral employer in
a labor dispute not his own").
980. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976).
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objective is to influence a neutral employer, then its conduct will fall
within the prohibition of that section.981
A common form of the secondary boycott occurs in connection
with the "hot cargo" clause, a provision in a collective bargaining
agreement which specifies that the employer may not compel employ-
ees to handle non-union made materials.982 The hot cargo clause is
thereby designed to put pressure on neutral employers who are not a
party to the agreement, an essential goal of the secondary boycott. Sec-
tion 8(e),983 enacted in 1959, outlawed the use of the hot cargo
clause.984 The statute, however, contains a proviso exempting the con-
struction industry when contracting or subcontracting of work is to be
performed at a construction site.985 The rationale behind the proviso,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in National Woodwork Manufac-
turer'sAssociation v. NLRB,986 was to allow these agreements for "cer-
tain secondary activities on the construction site because of the close
community of interests there."987 According to National Woodwork,
however, the ban on "secondary objective agreements" still applies to
981. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 689 (1952). It is
not necessary to find that the sole object of the pressure was secondary before the section is
violated. Id As long as one of the union's objectives was to influence a neutral employer,
the conduct is prohibited by § 8(b)(4)(B). See NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429
U.S. 507, 530 n.17, 531 (1977).
982. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 112 (1958) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
983. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, trans-
porting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to
cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered
into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent
unenforcible [sic] and void.
984. Prior to the enactment of § 8(e), the mere execution of a "hot cargo" clause and the
voluntary observance of the clause by the employer was not considered an unfair labor
practice. See Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958) (hot
cargo clause itself not considered unlawful). The enactment of§ 8(e), however, rendered the
clause itself unlawful. See National Woodwork Mfr's Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 634
(1967).
985. The construction industry proviso to NLRA § 8(e) provides that:
nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor organiza-
tion and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or
subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, paint-
ing, or repair of a building, structure, or other work.
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
986. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
987. Id. at 638-39. See also Acco Constr. Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848, 851 (9th
Cir. 1975) (purpose of § 8(e) proviso was to alleviate friction on the construction site).
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the construction industry when contracting for non-jobsite work.988
The Ninth Circuit followed the holding of National Woodwork in
the recent case of International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 701
v. NLRB. 98 9 In International, a clause in the collective bargaining
agreement between the union and a general contractor required that all
persons repairing the contractor's equipment "at or near" a jobsite
comply with that agreement.990 The court held the provision unlawful
because it affected secondary employers, such as equipment dealers or
manufacturers, by trying to force them to comply with the agreement
with the contractor.991 The court rejected the argument that the clause
came under the construction industry proviso to section 8(e) and held
that the proviso applied strictly to work performed at the jobsite.
992
The court emphasized that "at the jobsite" means on the site, not "at or
near" as the union had argued.993
The Supreme Court in National Woodwork also determined that
the prohibition against secondary pressure in section 8(b)(4)(B) does
not encompass employees' activity "to pressure their employer to pre-
serve work traditionally done by them," since that is primary activ-
ity.994 Due to the primary nature of the conduct, the Court decided
that section 8(e) "does not prohibit agreements made and maintained
for that purpose."995 In NLRB v. Enterprie Assoiation ofP#7efitters,996
however, the Court held that, although the work preservation clause
itself may be valid, an attempt to enforce it by secondary activity pro-
scribed by section 8(b)(4)(B) remains an unfair labor practice.997
The Pipefitters Court established the standard to be applied in
cases involving the enforcement of work preservation clauses.998 That
standard requires the application of the "right to control" test under
which a union commits an unfair labor practice by coercing "an em-
988. 386 U.S. at 639.
989. 578 F.2d 841 (1978).
990. Id at 842 n.1. In order to comply with the agreement, the employers repairing the
equipment were required to use only members of the International Union of Operating En-
gineers for all repair and servicing work. Id.
991. Id at 842.
992. Id.
993. Id
994. 386 U.S. at 635.
995. Id
996. 429 U.S. 507 (1976).
997. Id at 520-21. "[R]egardless of whether an agreement is valid under § 8(e), it may
not be enforced by means that would violate § 8(b)(4)." Id at 521.
998. Id at 521. See also Leslie, Right to Control- A Study In Secondary Boycotts and
Labor Antitrust, 89 HARv. L. REv. 904, 908-10 (1976) (description of the "right to control"
test).
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ployer in order to obtain work that the employer has no power to as-
sign."999 The Ninth Circuit, in Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB,1 °
followed the standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Pipfitters.
The Chamber of Commerce decision conformed with the "right to con-
tror' test, noting that its earlier decision, which had rejected the test,
was no longer valid. 001 The court found improper secondary activity
because the union had pressured three subcontractors to either shut
down or allow the union to perform work, the assignment of which the
subcontractors could not control. 002 The court determined that the
union had engaged in improper conduct since its actual object was to
pressure the general contractor .who did have control over the assign-
ment of work.100 3
An exception to the rule prohibiting union attempts to influence
anyone other than a primary employer is the "publicity" proviso to
section 8(b)(4)(B). ' ° The proviso permits a labor organization to ad-
vise the public that a product has been made by an employer with
whom the union has a primary dispute. The three qualifications to the
proviso are that: (1) the labor organization must have a primary labor
dispute with the employer; (2) the publicity may not influence employ-
ees of employers other than the primary employer; and (3) the publicity
may not take the form of picketing.
100 5
The Supreme Court has indicated that a broad range of publicity
is acceptable under the publicity proviso. In Branch 496, NationalAsso-
ciation of Letter Carriers v. Austin, °° the Court noted that the federal
policy favored "uninhibited, robust and wide open debate in labor dis-
putes." 00' 7 In addition, the Court, in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Lo-
999. 429 U.S. at 521.
1000. 574 F.2d 457 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978).
1001. Id at 462 n.9. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Pipetiters, the Ninth Circuit
had been on both sides of the fence on the right to control test. In Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1975), the court favored the test, while in Western
Monolithics Concrete Prod., Inc. v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1971), mod#Fed, 429 U.S.
507 (1976), the court joined with the majority of circuits rejecting the test. See NLRB v.
Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 527 n.15 (1976). The Supreme Court resolved
the split among the circuits in its decision in ipoefitters, specifically approving of the ap-
proach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Associated. Id.
1002. 574 F.2d at 462.
1003. Id
1004. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976).
1005. Id But see NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1964) (prohibition
against picketing does not extend to consumer picketing to publicize labor dispute against
producer).
1006. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
1007. Id at 273.
[Vol. 13
1980] LABOR LAW SURVEY
cal 114 ,1008 acknowledged the "congressional intent to encourage free
debate on issues dividing labor and management."'" Similarly, the
Ninth Circuit has given the publicity proviso a broad application. 010
In the 1978 case of Hasbrouck v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 232,1011
the court held that the publication of a "Do Not Patronize List"' 012 was
not an unfair labor practice.10 1 3 The court reiterated the language of
section 8(b)(4)(B) requiring the existence of a primary labor dispute
before publication.10 14 The Hasbrouck court held that, since there was
a primary labor dispute, 0 15 the publication of the list was accepta-
ble.10
16
E. Pickets
Picketing, as the term is commonly understood, consists of a "pa-
trol" of persons bearing signs, in the "immediate vicinity of the em-
ployer's premises, to discourage employees and others from entering
upon those premises."'01 " The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Interna-
tional Rice Milling Co.,101 determined that picketing is not secondary
activity per se, even though it may induce individual employees of neu-
tral employers to avoid dealing with the primary employer. 019 If the
object of the picketing, however, is to influence a neutral employer,
then the activity is prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(B). 20
A problem in determining the propriety of picketing activity arises
1008. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
1009. Id at 62.
1010. See, e.g., Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434, 436 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1002 (1966) (publicity proviso to be given as broad an application as
the statutory prohibition against union activities in section 8(b)(4)(B)).
1011. 586 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1978).
1012. The union had published a list in a local newspaper asking consumers not to patron-
ize certain businesses. The employer's name was included in that list. Id at 692.
1013. Id at 694.
1014. Id
1015. A "labor dispute" is defined by 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1976) as including "any contro-
versy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association
or representation of persons. . . regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee."
1016. 586 F.2d at 694.
1017. Note, Picketing by an Uncert'ed Union: The New Section 8(b)(7), 69 YALE L.J.
1393, 1396 (1960). See also NLRB v. United Furniture Workers, 337 F.2d 916, 940 (2d Cir.
1964) (union representatives need not physically hQld picket signs as long as pickets are
associated with signs); NLRB v. Local 182 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 314 F.2d 53, 57-58 (2d
Cir. 1963) (placing signs in snowbank and retiring to nearby cars is picketing).
1018. 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
1019. 341 U.S. at 671 (picketers induced men in charge of a truck belonging to a neutral
employer to refuse to cross picket line to pick up goods).
1020. Id.
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in "common situs" cases in which two employers are performing sepa-
rate tasks on common premises. The Supreme Court, in Local 761, In-
ternational Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB (General Electric),'0 2 1
approved of the application of an NLRB standard, known as the
"Moore Dry Dock" rule,10 22 to picketing of a primary employer work-
ing on the premises of a secondary employer. 0 2 3 The Court warned
against a mechanical application of the test, but held that picketing
would be presumed to be "primary," and therefore lawful, if the
"Moore Dry Dock" standard has been complied with.' 4 In General
Electric, the Court outlined a method by which the secondary em-
ployer at a common situs may insulate his employees from the union's
dispute with the primary employer. The court authorized the employer
to set up separate gates through which primary and secondary employ-
ees may enter the premises. 0 25 Pickets may operate only at the gate
used by primary employees. A qualification on the use of the separate
gate system to protect neutral employers from interference is that work
done by the neutral employers must be unrelated to the normal opera-
tions of the struck employer.
0 26
The Ninth Circuit, while recognizing the use of the "Moore Dry
Dock" standards as outlined by General Electric, has refused to apply
the "unrelated work" doctrine to cases involving a general contractor
and neutral subcontractors working together at a construction jobsite.
The court, in Carpenter's Local 470 v. NLRB, 0 27 held that the related-
ness qualification in General Electric applied only to an industrial plant
1021. 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
1022. The "Moore Dry Dock" rule is derived from Sailor's Union of the Pacific (Moore
Dry Dock), 92 N.LR.B. 547 (1950), in which the NLRB held that picketing a secondary
employer's premises is primary activity if it meets the following conditions:
(a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of dispute is located on
the secondary employer's premises; (b) at the time of the picketing the primary
employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs, and (c) the picketing is
limited to places reasonably close to the location of the situs, and (d) the picketing
discloses clearly that the dispute is with the primary employer.
92 N.L.R.B. at 549 (emphasis in original).
1023. 366 U.S. at 677.
1024. Id The Court noted that, although compliance with the rule is presumptive of pri-
mary activity, non-compliance with one or more of the conditions in the rule is not presump-
tive of illegal secondary activity. Id The court concluded that the application of the "Moore
Dry Dock" rule, limiting the effects of picketing to the employer against whom the dispute is
directed, carries out the dual objective "'of preserving the right of labor organizations to
bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding
unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own."' Id at
679 (quoting NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951)).
1025. 366 U.S. at 680-81.
1026. Id at 680.
1027. 564 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 13
1980] LA4BOR L4 W SURVEY
or commercial enterprise.' 28 In 1979, the Ninth Circuit in Interna-
tional Association of Bridge Workers v. NLRB 1°29 continued to follow
this decision, one which aligns the Ninth Circuit with several other cir-
cuit courts of appeals.1
0 30
VI. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),10 3' enacted "to
assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation
safe and healthful working conditions,"' 32 was a response to the sub-
stantial burden placed on interstate commerce by work-related deaths
and injuries. 0 33 It was passed in an effort to consolidate existing fed-
eral regulations governing occupational health and safety10 34 and to
create a comprehensive scheme of safety guidelines for the benefit of
employees. 0 35 Pursuant to these objectives, Congress authorized the
1028. Id at 1362.
1029. 598 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1979). Bridge Workers involved union picketing at a con-
struction site; the main issue was whether the "neutral" employer had properly set up the
reserve gate system. Id at 1156. The affirmative recognition of the gate by the picketing
union was held to override minor technical imperfections (e.g., gate signs) on the part of the
employer. Id at 1158.
1030. It is not clear from a reading of General Electric whether the distinction between
industrial plants and construction sites is warranted. See 366 U.S. at 680. That is the basis,
however, upon which the circuit courts are distinguishing the cases. See Linbeck Constr.
Corp. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1977) (relatedness qualification not applicable to
construction sites); NLRB v. Nashville Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 425 F.2d 385, 390-
91 (6th Cir. 1970) (contractors and subcontractors on construction site neutral with respect to
each other's labor disputes; relatedness is not an issue); Markwell & Hartz, Inc. v. NLRB,
387 F.2d 79, 83 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 914 (1968) (relatedness qualification not an
issue where subcontractor and contractor on same construction site).
1031. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
1032. Id. § 651(b); Dale M. Madden Constr., Inc. v. Hodgson, 502 F.2d 278, 279 (9th Cir.
1974) ("The controlling purpose of the Act is to reduce safety hazards and improve working
conditions.").
1033. Congress had found that hazardous working environments hinder interstate com-
merce causing a loss of productive hours, decreased health and efficiency, and untold death
and misery to its victims. S. REP. No. 1282, 91 Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5177-78.
1034. Section 653 of OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 653 (1976), expressly provides that OSHA safety
and health standards preempt corresponding but less effective safety and health standards of
the following statutes: Act of June 30, 1936 (Walsh-Healey), 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1976);
Service Contract Act of 1965, 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-358 (1976); Act of Aug. 23, 1958, 33 U.S.C.
§ 941 (1976); Act of Aug. 9, 1969, 40 U.S.C. § 333 (1976); National Foundation of Arts &
Humanities Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-968 (1976).
1035. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. OSHRC, 573 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1978) (OSHA stan-
dards tell "employers just what they are required to do in order to prevent or minimize
danger to employees"); Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. v. OSHRC, 529 F.2d 649, 653 (8th
Cir. 1976) ("Act is intended to prevent the first injury"); Brennan v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 1032,
1039 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Secretary of Labor to create mandatory safety and health standards 0 36
enforceable against employers engaged in businesses affecting inter-
state commerce 0 37 and established the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission (OSHRC) to carry out adjudicatory functions
under the Act.
10 38
A. General Duty Clause
In order to eliminate hazardous conditions in the workplace,
OSHA establishes two basic requirements for employers: 0 39 (1) under
section 654(a)(2) 104 employers must comply with those safety and
health standards promulgated, pursuant to the Act, and (2) in the ab-
sence of applicable standards, employers have a general obligation
under section 654(a)(1) to furnish their employees with a place of em-
ployment free from recognized hazards that may cause death or serious
physical harm.' An action alleging a violation of this general duty
1036. The Secretary of Labor has the authority to establish safety regulations that will
serve the objectives of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1976). By definition, a standard is "a rule
or regulation established in accordance with law or other competent authority, which
designates safe and healthful conditions or practices by which work must be performed to
prevent injury or illness." Heath, The Implementation and Philosophy of the William Steiger
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 25 U. FLA. L. REV., 249, 250 (1973).
The Secretary is additionally authorized, when necessary, to promulgate "emergency
temporary standards" to take immediate effect upon their publication in the Federal Regis-
ter. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1976). These emergency standards are enacted only when employ-
ees are exposed to hazards that gravely endanger their lives or are physically harmful and
when the standard is necessary to protect the employees from such danger. Florida Peach
Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 130 (5th Cir. 1974).
1037. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (1976). Section 652 defines an employer as "a person engaged
in a business affecting commerce who has employees" except "the United States or any state
or political subdivision of a State." Id. § 652(5).
1038. Id. § 651(b)(3). The basic function of the Commission is to hear, at its discretion,
appeals from persons aggrieved by a hearing examiner's determination. The Commission is
composed of three members appointed by the President of the United States. Each member
serves a six-year term; vacancies are filled only for the remaining number of years left in an
unexpired term. Removal of a member may be effected by the President for malfeasance,
inefficiency, or neglect of duty in office. Id. § 661.
1039. Congress placed on employers the primary responsibility for assuring a safe working
environment, because of their control over it. Aiming-Johnson Co. v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d
1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1975).
1040. An employer's basic duty under the Act is defined as follows: "Each employer-(1)
shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are
free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to his employees; (2) shall comply with occupational safety and health standards
promulgated under this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1976).
1041. Id. § 654(a)(1). This section of the Act is commonly referred to as "the general duty
clause." See generally Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 86 HARv. L. REv. 988, 992 (1973).
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clause can only be maintained if three essential factors are established.
The Secretary of Labor must prove that an alleged hazard is (1) recog-
nized, (2) preventable through reasonable measures, and (3) the type of
hazard likely to cause death or serious physical injury. 1
4
2
1. Recognized hazards
A recognized hazard is "a condition that is known to be danger-
ous, . . . [although] not necessarily by each and every individual em-
ployer, . . . taking into account the standard of knowledge in the
industry."' 3 It is a condition with a potential for harm that experts in
the industry would consider when prescribing a safety program."
The determination that a hazard is recognized is made on a case-by-
case basis, with the burden of proving its existence and recognition by
the particular industry on the Secretary of Labor."' 4
In Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Usery, °46 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a recognized hazard existed in the titanium industry. Us-
ing an objective test to determine industry recognition, the court found
that extreme flammability was associated with the accumulation of tita-
nium particles and that the industry was aware of the safety hazard
presented. 11 7 In addition, the court determined that "[a]n activity or
practice may be a 'recognized hazard' even if the employer is ignorant
of the activity or practice or its potential for harm.""' 8 The record
indicated, however, that the employer had experienced numerous mi-
nor fires caused by the ignition of titanium dust and had implemented
a safety program to combat the danger. 1049 Given this abundant evi-
dence, the court found that the danger clearly was a "recognized haz-
ard., 0 50
The Titanium Metals court also held that the lack of precise OSHA
standards on titanium dust levels did not make the danger of accumu-
1042. National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
1043. .d. at 1265 n.32 (citing 116 CONG. REc. 38377 (1970)).
1044. Id.
1045. Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Usery, 579 F.2d 536, 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1978)
(per curiam).
1046. Id.
1047. Id. at 541.
1048. Id. (citing National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n.32 (D.C.
Cir. 1973)).
1049. Id. at 539. The employer's safety program to lower the level of titanium dust ac-
cumulation consisted of periodic washdowns of the reactor and sweepdowns of working
areas after each shift. The court found, however, that this program was unsupervised and at
times not done at all. Id. at 542.
1050. Id. at 541.
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lation less "recognized," nor did it relieve the employer of its general
duty to minimize hazardous accumulations.'1 5' Rather, the court rea-
soned that, given the volatile nature of titanium, the lack of precise
standards "arguably imposes an even greater duty on [the employer]
.. .[to adopt] feasible measures to assure the safety of its employees,
[and] to err, if at all, on the side of greater, not lesser, caution."'1
0 52
2. Preventable hazards
OSHA was not intended to hold employers strictly liable for un-
safe working conditions. 0 53 Rather, it was only intended to require
that work environments be free from unsafe conditions whenever possi-
ble. 0 54 In order to prove that a recognized hazard is preventable, the
Secretary must articulate the particular precautionary measures to be
taken by an employer as well as the feasibility and likely utility of such
actions. 1055
In Titanium Metals, the Ninth Circuit sustained a general duty
clause violation when it found that accumulations of titanium dust
could be prevented. The Secretary had met his burden of proof; the
Secretary's metallurgy expert testified that the best way to minimize
titanium dust fires was by isolating the titanium particles. 0 56 The rec-
ord showed that this could be accomplished by more frequent
washdowns of the plant's reactor, better supervision of employee
sweepdowns, and the removal of sparking tools from the work site.
10 57
1051. Id. at 543.
1052. Id. Although the court did not expressly support its holding on the absence of pre-
cise standards, its ruling accords with other circuits. Eg., Usery v. Marquette Cement Mfg.
Co., 568 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1977); Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011 (7th
Cir. 1975); National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See
29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(f) (1979).
1053. See Home Plumbing & Heating Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 1976)
(employer not responsible for "the unforeseeable, implausible, and therefore unpreventable
acts of his employees"); Brennan v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1974) (employer not
liable for violation of general duty clause when inexperienced employee was killed while
unloading a truck, after the employer had explicitly told him to stay away from the trucks).
1054. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
wherein the court stated:
Hazardous conduct is not preventable if it is so idiosyncratic and implausible
in motive or means that conscientious experts, familiar with the industry, would
not take it into account in prescribing a safety program. Nor is misconduct pre-
ventable if its elimination would require methods of hiring, training, monitoring,
or sanctioning workers which are either so untested or so expensive that safety
experts would substantially concur in thinking the methods infeasible.
1055. Id. at 1268. Accord, Champlin Petroleum Co. v. OSHRC, 593 F.2d 637, 640 (5th
Cir. 1979).
1056. 579 F.2d at 544.
1057. Id. See note 1049 supra.
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3. Causation
The Secretary must also demonstrate that the hazard is one which
is "causing or [is] likely to cause death or serious physical harm."'"" 8
Minor injuries will not establish a general duty clause violation. 10 59 In
evaluating this causal element, the analysis focuses not on the
probability of an accident, but rather on the potential for serious physi-
cal harm should an accident occur.1° 0 Applying this analysis to the
facts of the case, the Titanium Metals court did not focus on the
probability of a fire, but rather on its potential to spread, once ignited,
and its likelihood of causing serious physical injury.1°61 The Ninth
Circuit agreed with the lower courts determination that "[w]hatever the
cause of [a fire], the several weeks' accumulations of dust and fines
presented a dangerous situation that could well have resulted in death
or serious injury to [Titanium Corp.] employees." '' 1 62
B. Serious Violations
The declared purpose of OSHA is to protect employees from haz-
ardous working conditions.' 3 Serious violations of OSHA are those
conditions which have a "substantial probability of causing death or
serious physical harm."'' 1 6 Employers who maintain these conditions
in violation of OSHA may be assessed up to $1,000 as a penalty for
each violation."65 To determine whether a violation is serious, courts
do not evaluate the probability that an accident will occur, but rather
the probability of serious harm should an accident occur. 
106
6
In California Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. OSHRC,'°67 the employer
1058. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976).
1059. This statement is implicit in § 654(a)(1), which requires only that the employer keep
his workplace free from hazards causing serious harm.
1060. Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Usery, 579 F.2d at 543 (citing California Ste-
vedore & Ballast Co. v. OSHRC, 517 F.2d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 1975)).
1061. Id.
1062. Id. at 542.
1063. Kent Nowlin Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 593 F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir. 1979) (OSHA
regulations are designed to compel maintenance of safe working conditions, not merely to
assess penalties for injuries already suffered by workers).
1064. 29 U.S.C. § 6660) (1976).
1065. Id. § 666(b).
1066. Shaw Constr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 1183, 1185 (5th Cir. 1976) (substantial
probability of serious injury to workers in trench if debris fell into it; held a serious violation
to maintain debris); Accu-Namics, Inc. v. OSHRC, 515 F.2d 828, 831 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976) (substantial probability of serious harm if cave-in occurred; held
a serious violation).
1067. 517 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1975).
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was cited for a serious violation of an OSHA regulation. 10 68 His work-
ers had left an unsecured beam in place while unloading through the
hatch of a ship. The record showed that there was very little chance
that the beam would become dislodged and fall into the hold but, if it
did fall, there was a high probability that serious injury would result.
The Stevedore court held that the Secretary need not prove that there
was a "substantial probability" that the beam would fall,0 69 only that
if it did fall, there would be a "substantial probability" of death or
serious physical harm. It reasoned that "Congress could not have in-
tended to encourage employers to guess at the probability of an acci-
dent in deciding whether to obey [a] regulation."'0170 It concluded that
"[i]f the harm that the regulation was intended to prevent is death or
serious physical injury, then its violation is serious per se."'
107 1
C. Repeat Violations
Heavier sanctions are imposed on employers who violate the Act
"repeatedly."' 10 71 In the Ninth Circuit, a citation alleging a repeat vio-
lation of OSHA will be sustained only if (1) at least one prior violation
has occurred and (2) the violations are "substantially similar."' 1 73 The
Third Circuit also requires that the violations demonstrate a "flouting"
of the Act's provisions.
10 74
1. Prior violations
The circuits do not agree on the number of prior violations neces-
sary to warrant a repeat citation. This disagreement stems primarily
from the interpretation of the word "repeatedly." The Ninth Circuit in
Todd Shipyards v. Secretary of Labor (Shipyards 1)1075 and the Fourth
1068. Id. at 987. The employer was cited for a violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1918.43(e) (1979).
At first the citation was inadvertently labeled "non-serious." It was changed, however, to a
"serious" violation on review before the Commission. The Ninth Circuit upheld this
amendment by the Commission.
1069. 517 F.2d at 988. The court noted that when a specific standard is the basis of a
serious violation charge, the Secretary is not required to show that there is the slightest
possibility that an accident might occur. Id. at 988 n.l.
1070. Id. at 988. The court found it important that serious harm could occur even though
an accident may be unlikely. By designating violations of standards protective of human life
as serious, the court intended to discourage employers from violating them.
1071. Id. at 988 n.l.
1072. Repeated violations give rise to discretionary fines up to $10,000 for each new viola-
tion. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976)
1073. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor (Shipyards 1), 566 F.2d 1327, 1329-30
(9th Cir. 1977).
1074. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1976).
1075. 566 F.2d 1327, 1330-31, 1330 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Circuit in George Hyman Construction Co. v. OSHRC I07 6 interpreted
this term as meaning "more than once," thus allowing a repeat citation
to be issued based on one prior violation.10 77 The Third Circuit in
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. OSHRC,178 however, found that the term
"repeatedly" in its adverbial form literally means "often repeated,"
"constantly," or "frequently" and thus established the rule that a re-
quirement must be violated "more than twice" to constitute a repeat
violation.
2. Substantial similarity
In Todd Shoyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor (Shipyards II),1079
the employer was cited for three violations of section 1916.47(a) of the
Code of Federal Regulations, which requires that scaffolds and ladders
be provided for employees working at elevations more than five feet
above a solid surface. The violations, although of the same regulation,
were not factually identical and did not occur on the same vessel. As a
result, the ALJ held that they were not "repeated." The Ninth Circuit,
reviewing this decision, held that violations do not have to be identical
to constitute a repeat violation. 080 It reasoned that in most industries,
especially shipbuilding, it would be nearly impossible to find two viola-
tive conditions which were factually identical.'08' It thus concluded
that a showing of "substantial similarity" between violations would be
sufficient to meet the criteria of a repeat violation. 1082
3. "Flouting" the Act
Another area of controversy concerning repeat violations is
whether an employer's repeated violations must constitute a "flouting"
of the Act, demonstrated by an employer's willful disregard of the Act's
requirements. Section 666(a) of OSHA prohibits "[a]ny employer from
willfully or repeatedly" violating its provisions. 083 The Third Circuit
contends that since "willfully" and "repeatedly" are in the same sec-
tion, this strongly suggests that "the objective conduct which 'repeat-
1076. 582 F.2d 834, 839 (4th Cir. 1978).
1077. Additional support for the Ninth and Fourth Circuits' definition is provided by the
OSHA Field Operations Manual's definition of "repeatedly." A repeat citation may issue
when, "upon reinspection, another violation of the previously cited section... is found."
OSHA Field Operations Manual, Ch. VIII, § (B)(5)(a) (1975).
1078. 540 F.2d 157, 160-62 (3d Cir. 1976).
1079. 586 F.2d 683, 684 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978).
1080. Id. at 685.
1081. Id. at 685 n.6.
1082. Id. at 687.*
1083. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976).
1980]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW.REVIEW [
edly' encompasses must be similar to that which would raise an
inference of willfulness."'10 Rejecting this view, the Ninth Circuit in
Shipyards 11 held that an employer can "repeatedly" violate the re-
quir.ements of the Act without displaying a "flouting" of its stan-
dards.1085 It concluded that flouting the Act is not an element of a
repeat violation for Congress did not intend to equate repeated viola-
tions with willful ones.
10 16
The Fourth Circuit likewise found that Congress did not mean to
require a showing of employer intent for a repeat violation. 0 87 It ar-
gued that willful violation citations and repeat violation citations were
designed to reach different problems. "The crux of the repeated viola-
tion penalty is failure to correct safety hazards."1088 Subsequent viola-
tions of OSHA standards indicate that an added incentive is necessary
to gain compliance from the employer. "Willful violations, on the
otherhand, contemplate an intentional disregard for the Act's safety
standards" and are designed to prevent an employer from consciously
disregarding safety standards of which he has actual knowledge. 08 9
Given the distinctions drawn by the Ninth and Fourth Circuits be-
tween willful and repeated, it is clear that an employer can be charged
with "repeatedly" violating the Act without "flouting" its require-
ments. 10
90
1 OSHA Inspections
In order to assure compliance with standards promulgated pursu-
ant to the Act, section 657(a) of OSHA authorizes the'Secretary of La-
bor to conduct inspections of employers' premises.' 091 In the past,
1084. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1976). The court sug-
gested several factors to be considered in determining whether an employer has flouted the
Act: "the number, proximity in time, nature and extent bf violations, their factual and legal
relatedness, the degree of care of the employer in his efforts to prevent violations of the type
involved, and the nature of the duties, standards or regulations violated." Id.
1085. 586 F.2d at 686. The Ninth Circuit noted, however, that a penalty can only be as-
sessed for a repeat violation if the employer "knew or should have known" that a violation
existed. Id.
1086. Id.
1087. George Hyman Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 582 F.2d 834, 840 (4th Cir. 1978).
1088. Id.
1089. Id.
1090. The Ninth and Fourth Circuits have implicitly adopted the approach of the OSHA
Field Operations Manual, which does not require that an employer "flout" the Act to estab-
lish a repeat violation. Rather, it provides: "Repeat violations differ from willful violations
in that they may result from an inadvertent, accidental, or ordinary negligent act." OSHA
Field Operations Manual, Ch. VIII, § (B)(5)(b) (1975).
1091. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976).
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these inspections had been conducted without a search warrant. The
Act authorized Compliance Safety and Health Officers, upon presenta-
tion of their credentials, "to enter without delay, at reasonable times,
any. . . workplace. . . where work is performed by an employee of
an employer; to inspect and investigate. . . all pertinent conditions;
. . . to question privately any employer, owner, operator, agent or em-
ployee; and to review records required by the Act."' 092 This authoriza-
tion, allowing warrantless inspections of business establishments, was
held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc. 10 93 in 1978.
1. Warrant requirement
In Barlow's, an OSHA inspector, after presenting his credentials,
requested permission to inspect the working areas of Barlow's plant.
The owner refused the request.10 94 The Court held that section 657(a)
violated an employer's fourth amendment right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.10 95 Considering prior decisions, which
had limited administrative searches made without a warrant,10 96 the
Court determined that a warrant requirement would not impose a seri-
ous burden on the Act's inspection system. 1097 The element of surprise,
claimed by the Secretary to be essential to effective enforcement of the
Act, could be maintained, when necessary, through the issuance of an
ex parte warrant. 1°98 The Barlow's Court further noted that "the great
majority of businessmen can be expected ... to consent to inspection
1092. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.3 (1979).
1093. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
1094. Following Barlow's refusal to permit the inspection, the Secretary sought compul-
sory process in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1979) to compel Barlow's to permit the
inspection. The District Court of Idaho ordered Barlow's to admit the inspector. Again
refusing, Barlow's got its own injunction against the warrantless search. A three-judge court
was convened, finding in Barlow's favor that the fourth amendment required a search war-
rant for this type of inspection. Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437, 442 (D. Idaho
1977).
1095. 436 U.S. at 325. In a subsequent decision, the Seventh Circuit found § 657(a) consti-
tutional as long as a search warrant is obtained before inspection. It stated that the "Court
made it clear . . . that despite Congress' failure to include a warrant requirement in
§ 657(a), if process was obtained that satisfied the Fourth Amendment requirements, inspec-
tions under § 657(a) would be perfectly permissible." Blocksom & Co. v. Marshall, 582 F.2d
1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1978) (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 n.23 (1978)).
1096. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
1097. 436 U.S. at 316.
1098. Id See See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 n.6 (1967) ("the reasonableness of warrants
issued in advance of inspection will necessarily vary with the nature of the regulation in-
volved").
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without a warrant."10 99 When an employer refuses consent, the Act's
procedure for inspection requires the Secretary to seek compulsory
process. 1100
2. Probable cause
Realizing that inspections are crucial to the enforcement of the
Act, the Barlow's Court adopted a modified standard of probable
cause. 1101 Under that standard, probable cause may be based "not only
on specific evidence of an existing violation, but also on a showing that
'reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an
• . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establish-
ment].' "1102 The Seventh Circuit, interpreting Barlow's, requires more
than a mere statement that "a desired search is part of an inspection
and investigation program pursuant to the Act" as a basis for probable
cause.1103 Rather, the magistrate must be provided with sufficient evi-
dence from which it can be determined that an inspection program ex-
ists, that it is reasonable, and that the inspection of the particular
employer's establishment fits within the program.lo4
E. Procedure
1. Exhaustion of remedies
During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit decided two cases in
which employers challenged OHSA's jurisdiction in federal district
1099. 436 U.S. at 316.
1100. Id. at 317, 318. In December of 1978, 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 was modified to clarify the
meaning of "compulsory process" and to ensure that its provisions met the Barlows' require-
ments. This section now defines "compulsory process" as "the institution of any appropriate
action, including ex parte application for an inspection warrant or its equivalent." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1903.4 (1979). This change was a response to a district court's determination that, in its
original form, the section did not provide the Secretary with the authority to proceed ex
parte to obtain a warrant. Cerro Metal Products v. Marshal, 467 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Penn.
1979). Contra, Blocksom & Co. v. Marshall, 582 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1978) (warrant
obtained pursuant to § 657(a) and § 1903.4 in its original form is perfectly permisible under
Barlow's).
1101. 436 U.S. at 320. In defining probable cause the Barlow's Court stated that the Secre-
tary's "entitlement to inspect will not depend on his demonstrating probable cause to believe
that conditions in violation of OSHA exist on the premises." Id.
1102. Id. (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 357 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)).
1103. In re Northwest Airlines, 587 F.2d 12, 15 (7th Cir. 1978).
1104. Id. Marshall v. Chromalloy American Corp., 589 F.2d 1335, 1343 (7th Cir. 1979)
(probable cause found in warrant application: desired inspection was part of a "[n]ational-
local plan designed to achieve sufficient reduction in the high incidence of occupational
injuries found in the metal working and foundry industry").
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court without previously exhausting their administrative remedies."105
In Marshall v. Able Contractors, Inc.," 6 OSHA officers cited the em-
ployer for violations of the Act. The employer contested OSHA juris-
diction on the ground that he was not an employer affecting interstate
commerce, arguing that the Secretary must first conduct a pre-inspec-
tion evidentiary hearing to determine jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit
rejected this argument and held that the proper time to raise issues of
statutory coverage is on administrative appeal while contesting the va-
lidity of a citation." 7 To require a jurisdictional hearing before in-
spection "would totally frustrate OSHA's express objective of
establishing a system of enforcement without undue delay."'" 8
In Marshal v. Burlington Northern,109 the employer obtained an
injunction against a proposed OSHA inspection of its railroad yard on
the ground that OSHA jurisdiction had been preempted by the Federal
Railroad Administration. 1 10 The Ninth Circuit quashed the injunc-
tion because the employer failed to exhaust his administrative reme-
1105. The OSHRC, composed of three members appointed by the President, takes notice
of employer objections to the Act-based primarily on citations issued by the Secretary of
Labor-and designates one of its hearing examiners to preside over the case. 29 U.S.C.
§ 661 (1976). Following a hearing, the recommended decision and order of the hearing
examiner becomes a final order within 30 days unless the Commission orders a review. Id.
§ 661(i). Following such a review, the Commission can issue orders based on findings of fact
or conclusions of law, affirming, modifying, or reversing the examiner's determination, or
may direct other appropriate relief. Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by an order
of the Commission may obtain a review of such order in a United States Court of Appeals.
Id. § 660(a).
1106. 573 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
1107. 573 F.2d at 1057. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 214
(1946) (Congress authorized the government, not the judiciary, to make determinations of
agency jurisdiction in the first instance). Accord, Christensen v. FTC, 549 F.2d 1321, 1323
(9th Cir. 1977) ("agencies are created to apply their statutory authority in the first instance
and... considerations of agency expertise and efficiency counsel the courts not to interfere
before the agency has acted").
1108. 573 F.2d at 535. Only a clear showing of irreparable injury from anticipated agency
action will excuse a litigant from exhausting his administrative remedies and permit judicial
intervention in the agency process. Litigation expenses, however, even if substantial and
nonrecoverable, do not constitute irreparable injury. Christensen v. FTC, 549 F.2d 1321,
1324 (9th Cir. 1977).
1109. 595 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1979).
1110. Section 653(b)(1) precludes OSHA jurisdiction where "other Federal agencies, and
State agencies" have exercised "statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or reg-
ulations affecting occupational safety and health." 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1) (1976). Also, the
Act expressly provides that its jurisdiction does not extend to federal employees. Id.
§ 652(4). Currently there is legislation pending in Congress which will extend the Act's
protection to include United States postal workers. This legislation, introduced by Senator
Wilson of California, has been passed in the House of Representatives and has been as-
signed to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affaris. H.R. REP. No. 487, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979). As of January 1980, the Senate had not acted on the bill.
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dies. Accordingly, it held that the proper procedure for challenging the
Act's coverage is to raise the jurisdictional issue together with other
defenses on administrative appeal before the OSHRC."I
2. Final orders
Under section 660 of OSHA, any person adversely affected or ag-
grieved by a "final order" of the Commission may obtain a review of
such "order" in any United States Court of Appeals.' 11 2 Two types of
orders are reviewable: (1) a hearing examiner's determination, which
becomes a final order within thirty days provided no Commission
member directs a review, and (2) a decision by the Review Commis-
sion, once it elects to review a case. The three-member Commission's
determination, however, is not a "final order," unless it is based on the
"affirmative vote of at least two members."' '1 When less than two
members join in a decision, the issue becomes whether a "final order"
of the Commission has been rendered.' 4
This precise question was dealt with by the Ninth Circuit in the
1978 case of Cox Brothers, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor."'5 In Cox, the
employer contested the issuance of three OSHA citations at its con-
struction site. The ALJ sustained all three violations and levied a
$1,100 fine. The Commission, sitting with only two members, elected
to review the determination but was equally divided on all three viola-
tions. It then "affirmed [the ALJ's decision] by an equally divided
Commission." The Ninth Circuit held that this was not a final order
and therefore not reviewable."' 6 Relying on section 666(i) of the
Act, 1 7 the court concluded that a one-to-one affirmance of an ALJ's
1111. 595 F.2d at 513 (citing In re Restland Memorial Park, 540 F.2d 626, 628 (3d Cir.
1976)).
1112. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976). The findings of the Commission if based on substantial
evidence are conclusive on review. Courts generally accord the Commission considerable
deference in reviewing an administrative record. See Brennan v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 1196
(7th Cir. 1974) (OSHRC is presumed to have technical expertise and experience in the field
of job safety; a court must therefore defer to findings and analysis of the Commision).
1113. 29 U.S.C. § 661(e) (1976) provides: "For the purpose of carrying out its functions
under this chapter, two members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum and official
action can be taken only on the affirmative vote of at least two members."
1114. It is possible for less than two members to join in a decision when, for example, (1)
there are only two members sitting on the Commission (a quorum) and they cannot agree on
a decision; or (2) when three members are sitting on the Commission, but no two members
vote the same way. See George Hyman Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 582 F.2d 834 (4th Cir. 1978)
(one commissioner voted for remand, another for affirmance, and the third for reversal).
1115. 574 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1978).
1116. Id. at 466.
1117. See note 1105 supra.
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decision is not the "affirmative vote of at least two members" and thus
provided no final order for the Court of Appeals to review." 18 Accord-
ingly, the court dismissed Cox's petition for review.1119
The Cox court's interpretation of "official action" was rejected by
the Fourth Circuit in George Hyman Construction Co. v. OSHRC.I12°
In Hyman, the employer was cited for repeatedly violating the Act.
The violations were sustained by an ALL Upon review, the Commis-
sion was divided on whether the violations were repeated. Conse-
quently, one Commissioner voted to remand, a second Commissioner
voted to affirm, and the third voted to reverse. As a result, the Chair-
man of the Commission directed that the AL's decision become the
final action of the Commission. On appeal, the court found there was a
reviewable order. It held that when there is no "official action" of the
Commission, because of the lack of an "affirmative vote of at least two
members," the AL's decision shall constitute a "final order."""' It
noted that allowing the AL's decision to stand is analogous "to the
case of split decision affirmances by a court of appeals or the Supreme
Court under which the lower court decision is allowed to stand.""
1 22
James Boyle -The Representation Process and
Union Recognition (III)
Nicholas Cipiti -Occupational Safety and Health Act
(VI)
Afred Clark III -Administration of the NLRA (I)
Mark D. Sachar -- Concerted Actions (V)
Carol Sherman -Collective Bargaining (IV)
Catherine Stevenson -Unfair Labor Practices (II)
1118. 574 F.2d at 466.
1119. Id. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the quorum requirement finds support in
the Fifth Circuit. In Shaw Constr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1976), the court
held that a one-to-one affirmance of an AIJ's decision did not comply with the statutory
requirement of § 661(e). Instead of dismissing the petition for review as the Cox court had
done, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case back to the Commission to determine the substan-
tive issue previously decided by a split vote.
1120. 582 F.2d 834 (4th Cir. 1978).
1121. Id. at 836; Bristol Steel & Iron Works v. OSHRC, 601 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1979) (one-
to-one vote by OSHRC constitutes affirmance of AU's decision).
1122. 582 F.2d at 837 n.5.
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